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status of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in light of the early
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To understand these events, Professor Moore examines three alternative
models of the domestic law of the sea debate, each one a reflection of
strongly and honestly held views about the national interest and political
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and on such issues as the new international economic order. A newly activist America, he says, must participate in the struggle over the making of
new international law, and must win that struggle.
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Israel. Dr. Levine refutes, inter alia, Dr. Kassim's reliance on the "decision" of the U.N. Security Council to grant the PLO rights "as if" it were a
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public order' is little more than care for 'Israel's public order.'" Finally,
Prof. Sanford Silverburg contributes a legal bibliography on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as an aid to further research.
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MYRES S. McDOUGAL
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE

Charting a New Course
in the Law of the Sea Negotiations
JOHN NORTON MOORE

This is the sixth annual Myres S. McDougal Distinguished Lecture in
International Law and Policy, presented at the University of Denver
College of Law on March 12, 1981. The series is sponsored by the International Legal Studies Program, the International Law Society, the
Student Bar Association, and the Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy.

When I got involved in the law of the sea negotiations, I was told
that the title of the job would be Chairman of the National Security
Council Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea and Deputy Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference.
There was only one problem: They did not fully disclose that in Washington, power is inversely related to the length of the title. So you should not
attach any particular importance to the titles in Professor Nanda's generous introduction.
It is a privilege and a pleasure to appear at this law school, and particularly to appear in this distinguished lecture series named after a personal friend of mine who, I believe, has made one of the greatest contributions, not only to international law, but also to jurisprudence, in the
history of law. And I make that statement, which is a monumental generalization, only after soul-searching produced by the kind of statement
that it is. But I think it has truly been an outstanding contribution, and it
is only fitting that one of the finest international law programs in the
John Norton Moore is Walter L. Brown Professor of Law and Director of the
Center for Oceans Law and Policy at the University of Virginia. Prior to serving from 1973
to 1976 as United States Ambassador to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law

of the Sea, he was Counselor on International Law at the Department of State. He was also,
during the years 1972 and 1975, a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations
General Assembly. He is the author of numerous books and articles, including Cases and
Materials on Oceans Law and Policy (edited with N. Seeburg-Elverfeldt, forthcoming). He

is a member of the State Department Advisory Committee on Law of the Sea, of the Board
of Directors of the American Oceanic Organization, and of the Boards of Editors of the
American Journal of InternationalLaw and the Marine Technology Society Journal.
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country should have a lecture series named after Myres McDougal. Indeed, I believe this is the first such series in the world, and my guess is
that over the next several centuries, there will be many more named after
Professor McDougal.
It is also a particular pleasure to be asked to share a few thoughts on
the law of the sea negotiations, because this is a subject that is very dear
to my heart after investing four years of my life in seeking to move these
negotiations forward.
One of the things that was quickly apparent as one went around the
United States to talk about law of the sea, is that all Americans were
familiar with SALT, and the SALT process, but few had heard about
UNCLOS III, which admittedly doesn't roll off the tongue quite as nicely
as SALT. But I think the events of the last few days* may have altered
that. For this negotiation-the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea-is the largest multilateral negotiation in history. It is the
most important negotiation other than SALT that the United States is
engaged in today. At stake is a basic constitution for an area that covers
about seventy-two percent of the surface of the earth. There is a full
range of issues: transit rights through straits and over straits for aircraft;
submerged rights through straits for SSBN submarines, as part of the
overall strategic balance; about forty percent of the potential oil and gas
reserves of the world, located under saltwater in the continental margins
of the world; and a very large source of protein for all mankind-the
fishery stocks, the coastal species, the highly migratory stocks, such as
tuna, and the anadromous stocks, the salmon. In addition to that are the
issues of marine scientific research, the basic freedom to use the oceans to
find out fundamental information about the nature of planet Earth and
the protection of its environment, issues of marine pollution and conservation of the oceans.
It's one thing to cleanse the Great Lakes by draining them into the
oceans when we pollute them, but it's going to be quite a challenge to try
to drain the oceans. So it's terribly important that we protect that very
vital part of the ecosystem that is truly necessary for the survival of all
mankind. These negotiations have been developing a framework for the
protection of those oceans and in addition to that, have focused on such
things as the conservation of the great whales. How do we preserve the
* Ed. note: On March 3, 1981, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig instructed the
United States representatives to the Law of the Sea Conference "to seek to insure that the
negotiations do not end at the present session of the conference, pending a policy review by
the United States." N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1981, at 1, col. 5. On March 8, on the eve of the
opening in New York of the tenth session of the conference, seven senior members of the
U.S. delegation, including the Acting Special Representative of the President, George H.
Aldrich, were dismissed. Id., Mar. 9, 1981, at 1, col. 1. State Department officials were
reported to have said that the dismissals were necessary because the Reagan Administration
"felt it had to put a new team in charge." Id. at 14, col. 1. The new head of the delegation, it
was announced, would be James L. Malone, already designated as Assistant Secretary of
State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. Id.
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cetaceans of the world, the porpoise and the dolphin, and particularly the
great whales, that have been under so much pressure during the last several decades.
And there is the question of access to the nodules-the manganese
nodules of the ocean floor. These nodules look like lumps of coal littering
the abyssal plain of the deep ocean floor. One can pass a television camera across them and just see what looks like a coal field on top of the
abyssal plain. And those nodules contain what we believe are commercially attractive quantities of copper, nickel, cobalt, and manganese. If
you take all of the resources together, it is a very large resource indeed. In
fact, one or two operations could for a twenty-year period reverse all of
the import dependence of the United States on cobalt, manganese, nickel,
and that portion of copper that we do still import. There may be twentyfive to one hundred first generation mine sites, and by a mine site we're
talking about an area of the sea floor about the size of Rhode Island.
In addition to that, the question of conflict management and dispute
settlement is at stake. It is extremely important to build international
institutions, to establish a useful mechanism within the United Nations
system that is capable of resolving global problems in a realistic and constructive fashion, and to establish compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms that will enable peaceful resolution of such disputes as may arise
under the treaty.
These negotiations, including the informal negotiations in the United
Nations have been underway since 1967, when Ambassador Pardo of
Malta electrified the United Nations General Assembly by declaring that
the manganese nodules of the deep ocean floor should become the common heritage of mankind. That was followed by a principles resolution
that sought, in general terms, to develop the kind of negotiations that
would clarify the concept. Six years of preparatory work within the
United Nations Seabeds Committee then followed, and since 1973, there
have been annual and semiannual meetings of UNCLOS III.
Following the last session of the conference last summer, the United
States representative at the negotiations, Ambassador Elliot Richardson,
indicated that we were very close to final agreement. Indeed, let me read
to you an excerpt from his statement made in Geneva on August 29, 1980.
Historians are likely to look back at the ninth session of the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, just concluding here in
Geneva today, as the most significant single event in the history of
peaceful cooperation and the development of the rule of law since the
founding of the United Nations itself. When this session of the Conference resumed some five weeks ago, it faced a number of basic outstanding issues. Almost all of these have been resolved in a manner
commanding the broad support of the Conference participants. It is
now all but certain that the text of a convention on the law of the sea
will be ready for signature in 1981.
That statement was followed by a rash of press reports that we were
very close to the end of this negotiation. In fact, the draft which had been
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called an "informal composite negotiating text" had become a "draft convention," at the ninth session, and now looks like something that is very
close to finalization. That has created a major domestic debate, and it has
shifted the focus from the difficulties of the negotiation on the international side to the question of the United States' interest. Is the United
States' interest adequately protected in the text? Is it the kind of agreement that can realistically achieved political support in the United States
Senate? And with respect to that last issue, we must keep in mind that
this is going to be a different process than most treaties going to the
United States Senate in which a process of amendment, though awkward,
is still possible. Normally, certain amendments, reservations, and understandings can be suggested. This, however, is a treaty that has 320 primary articles and seven annexes and has a rule, almost certain to be
adopted, that no amendments and no reservations to that text will be
permitted. Moreover, it covers the range of about ninety-two major ocean
issues. Now imagine the debate in the United States Senate on that range
of issues, with the rule that no amendment and no reservation is permitted. It places a great premium on a domestic consensus that is very
strong, if there is to be any realistic hope of adopting the law of the sea
treaty, and the domestic debate is just beginning on the parameters of
that question.
The events of the last week, which have been prominently in the
news, have really been a continuation of that debate. Most recently and
most dramatically there have been two events. One is the indication by
the new administration that the American delegation is under instructions for the current session of the conference not to permit finalization
of the treaty text until there has been an opportunity for a full and careful review by the administration. And then shortly thereafter, the principal United States negotiator, who had been identified with the negotiations under the Carter Administration, was replaced by a new chief
United States negotiator. Ambassador Richardson had resigned prior to
the presidential election to campaign for the Republican ticket, so it was
not his resignation or replacement that occurred, but rather that of his
principal deputy.
Models of the Debate: The Richardson View
In understanding these events-which I think have, to those that
have not followed them, fallen like dramatic bombshells on the law of the
sea negotiations-I think it would be useful to step back for a moment
and examine several models of this debate. These models reflect the views
of varying groups that are strongly and honestly held within American
society about where we should go with the draft treaty text and the important question of our own national interest and political realism in
moving forward. These models are somewhat exaggerated. I put them
forth merely as heuristic models. It would be very difficult for me to cage
and exhibit a pure representative of each model, and I will be taking
somewhat unfair liberties with those I characterize as holding these positions, but nevertheless it is a good faith effort to be as close to their views
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and as fair in describing them as I can be.
Let's look first at what until the last two weeks has been an official
executive branch view. Perhaps today we can call this the Ambassador
Richardson view. This model comprises a number of points.
It includes first a strong realization, as was evident from the statement I read, that a law of the sea treaty is important to the overall interest of the United States and of the community of nations, that at stake
here is a matter of institution-building, a matter of strengthening the
United Nations system and global law-making machinery. For the United
States in particular, the treaty is central to the question of navigational
freedom and of a variety of important national security objectives, including the movement of strategic submarines through important straits and
the protection of navigational freedom of oil tankers moving forty-five
percent of the oil used by the United States to our shores.
Also implicit in that view is a sense that the existing draft text, with
a few changes that would need to be made, is realistically about the best
accommodation that is obtainable in this difficult multilateral negotihtion. It is not the kind of text that Ambassador Richardson would have
drafted or preferred, but it is, the feeling goes, a reasonable accommodation, and in the real world, one cannot always obtain everything one believes is desirable. Moreover, there is a sense that an effort to move forward to toughen up the negotiation could result in a failure of the
negotiation and a loss of the important navigational provisions protecting
transit rights through straits, for example, that have been very successfully achieved in the negotiations.
Another aspect of the Richardson model, though it is not spoken of
explicitly, is the belief that the treaty could, at least at an appropriate
time, receive the requisite support of the United States Senate, because
surely no responsible negotiator would want to move forward unless he
believed that a treaty would receive the support of the United States
Senate.
As a result of these views, adherents of this model would urge that
we move forward basically with the text that was negotiated, but single
out a few remaining problems before submission to the Senate. These
problems include, for example, protection of the integrity of investments
to be made by the mining industry prior to the treaty coming into effect-the so-called preparatory investment protection or "PIP" issue-and the details of setting up a preparatory commission that would
have to draft rules and regulations before mining could take place. The
basic idea is to move forward roughly with the current draft text as satisfactory and probably to go to a signing of some kind at this session if
possible, followed by negotiations of these rules and regulations in a preparatory commission over a period of three to four years, and then, probably in 1985, to submit this package to the United States Senate.
The Skeptical View
Let me shift now and present what I would call a skeptical view. By
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the way, I present both of these views not as caricatures but with the
greatest respect for the individuals who hold them; I believe they are the
competing views of reasonable men and women, and that they should be
taken seriously and examined on their merits. The skeptical view is not
quite as cohesive, because it really represents a number of diverse viewpoints that come together in significant opposition to the Richardson
view of moving forward. It includes one camp that does not believe that a
law of the sea treaty is particularly useful to or needed by the United
States, and usually implicit in that assumption is a sense that any treaty
will result necessarily in a trade-off of our access rights to deep seabed
minerals. This group would stress the importance of access for the economic needs of the United States to the copper, nickel, cobalt, and manganese of the deep seabed, as opposed to the other view that would tend
to stress the navigational issues more and not to argue the case for the
importance of access to seabed minerals. There is also a corollary of this
view that would argue that if a good treaty is strongly in the United
States' interest, the current draft text does not provide assured access to
seabed minerals, and that it ought to be unacceptable for the United
States to agree not to have that kind of access.
I would like to step back for a moment and describe the current system. It is a complex accomodation on deep seabed mining, something
called a parallel or a dual system, in which half of all mine sites, theoretically, would be mined by assured access by private firms, including
United States firms, that currently have the technological lead in the
world in deep seabed mining. The enterprise side would operate primarily
through joint-venture or contract arrangements, probably with the same
firms. There would be on the assured access side of the system substantial revenue-sharing for the benefit of developing countries, and those
provisions are widely, basically, and fairly strongly agreed. I think even
the industry has only some reservations about some portions of those revenue-sharing texts. So the issue is not, as you'll read in some of the press,
that it is a matter of deciding not to give anything to the poor countries
of the world, the developing countries. That is basically not at issue. That
has not been a problem in any of the core, informed aspects of the debate. In any event, this model would say, in this dual system, you have
developed the enterprise side very carefully. The Group of 77 developing
countries have negotiated very well, and their side of the system is spelled
out in detail. But when we shift to our side of the system-that is, assured access, the thing that was the quid pro quo of this accomodation-we discover that it's very fuzzy. We're very worried that there will
not be full assured access or protection for investment.
Another component of the skeptical view is that in addition to some
of these problems in the text, it probably cannot in its current form get
by the United States Senate. This is a political realization that, if we
move forward as the old official view wanted to-in the Nixon terminology, "toughing it through"-the chances are, the political realists feel,
that that kind of fight with the industry, though it might be satisfying to
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some, would not be likely to produce a treaty that could receive the endorsement of the United States Senate. There are simply too many kinds
of problems, too many different diverse groups, and there has to be a
more broadly based consensus including the seabed mining industry to
move this treaty forward.
The Balanced View
The third view-which of course, in all options, is the true viewprovides some assessment of both of these camps. I'm somewhat sympathetic to the argument that both sides in this debate have been advancing, and I believe there is substantial truth in both, and I think there is
also some danger in both. I believe, on the Richardson side, that he is
correct that the law of the sea treaty is important in the United States
national interest and in the interest of the nations of the world; that the
institution-building side of this treaty is significant; and I would endorse
the kind of statement he made that I read to you earlier about that significance. I think he is also correct that the navigational issues and the
national security issues are indeed very important and that the United
States has done well in those negotiations. There is at least ninety percent of this text that has been completed and that is in the interest of our
nation.
On the other hand, I believe that the skeptical model is absolutely
correct on a number of very essential points. First, it seems to me that
the United States ought to stand firm in its national interest for assured
access to seabed minerals within this parallel system. That is, that our
side of the system should be spelled out clearly and unambiguously so
that the mining firms in the United States can, with appropriate protection of their investment, be assured that they can mine the seabed and
the United States can get permanent access to the mineral resources of
the deep seabed. I regard that as a significant economic issue at stake in
this negotiation, and in my judgment, the regime that has been negotiated on that point is below the line and is very fuzzy on assured access. It
is not the kind of system that skeptical lawyers operating in a difficult
international climate would be inclined to say provides genuine protection of access.
In addition to that, there are I believe substantial institutional defects that are of significant importance going beyond law of the sea issues,
and these take place in the deep seabed mining area. Let me just give you
three of these problems. The first is an ambiguity as to whether, under
the text, the Palestine Liberation Organization, or other terrorist groups,
would be permitted to share in the revenues from deep seabed mining.
That, I think, would be a treaty-stopper in the United States Senate. In
fairness to the outgoing delegation, they were not unaware of that. They
had sought to do something about it, and it was their view that the problem would have to be corrected, but I think there may nevertheless be
significant differences about the degree of ambiguity that might be acceptable on that issue.
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The second institutional concern is that the socialist camp-the Soviet Union and the Eastern European "Socialist Bloc" in United Nations
negotiating parlance-has been given three permanent seats on the Council of the deep seabed authority. The United States probably, indeed in
fairness almost certainly, would have most of the time one seat. That one
seat would also be subject to the principle ultimately of rotation off, if our
allies decided that we'd been on too long, and perhaps some other NATO
members, for example, within the Western European and Others Group,
should have a right to participate on the Council. In my judgment, it is
institutionally unsound for the United States to agree to a permanent
arrangement that goes out of its way to provide three permanent seats for
the Soviet Bloc on the Council, where we would have one seat. I would
regard that issue as one in which the United States Senate is likely to
have a substantial interest.
The third kind of institutional concern here is the question of the
review provision for deep seabed mining. The negotiations have for the
last four or five years assumed, after Secretary Kissinger suggested the
possibility, that at the end of some appropriate period, let's say fifteen
years, there would be a review conference to reexamine the issue of deep
seabed mining-the most difficult chapter to negotiate-and to decide
whether there should be changes in that text. When the Group of 77 initially suggested a review conference, they thought maybe this meant that,
let's have a parallel system for the first fifteen years, and at that point
let's shift to a single operating monopoly enterprise for the entire area,
which had been their proposal all along. That was not the proposal of
Secretary Kissinger, and that's not something that our delegation has
agreed to, but they have agreed to something that, it seems to me, may be
the functional equivalent. This is a clause that says you have a review
conference after fifteen years for the deep seabed mining chapter. If you
cannot then reach agreement within five years, then at the end of that
period of time, there can be a conference vote, and a single two-thirds
vote will be able to totally rewrite the entire seabed chapter and it will be
binding on every nation that is a signatory of the treaty whether or not
they vote for it.
That, it seems to me, is reasonably close to phasing out whatever
protections we have in access to deep seabed minerals at the end of
twenty years. The response of our delegation in the official view has been
twofold. First, it is argued, the review negotiations really are likely to be
more sensible than that. It is realized that the technological importance
of developed nations in participating in mining is a significant ingredient
in having it go forward to generate revenues; therefore, it's likely that
things will move forward more reasonably. I am not entirely sure of that,
and the last five years of negotiations on deep seabed mining have not
inspired me as to the reasonableness of the Group of 77 on this issue. I'm
not saying we've been perfect, but I am saying clearly that I think the
Group of 77 has sought to overreach, and I think, by the way, not in their
interest. We could have concluded this negotiation some five years ago,
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had there been a more reasonable position from the 77, but I see no reason to believe that there would not be significant advantage taken of that
opportunity to rewrite the text.
The other answer given to this is that in any event, the United States
could then withdraw from the entire treaty. The difficulty is that in the
interim it could have become customary international law. When you
have this kind of broadly based multilateral treaty, much of it is likely to
become customary international law, and if we were to withdraw from the
treaty, it would still be extremely difficult to move forward in that kind of
climate with deep seabed mining under national legislation as opposed to
trying to get the treaty right in the first place.
So, it seems to me that on those institutional grounds, there are serious concerns that need to be reviewed very carefully. There is yet another
I won't go into in detail, but it's a provision for mandatory transfer of
technology to the international enterprise which would amount to a
forced sale from the industry of their technological lead, with arbitration
if the price could not be agreed on. That was a provision that was suggested as reasonable and an overall accommodation, but I must admit, in
every single review that the Center for Oceans Law and Policy among
others has conducted, and when we have asked the view of congressional
participants trying to get some advance sense of how Congress feels, that
has been flagged as an absolute treaty-stopper. There is a certain climate
in the United States at the present time. We are competing with a number of other very technologically advanced nations around the world. We
are very sensitive, and rightly so, to our economic problems and it is not a
climate in which we take lightly the notion of mandatory transfer abroad
of a United States technological lead.
The last point in trying to evaluate these two models, and yet another point on which I would agree with the skeptical model, is the political consensus point, the realism point. Is it realistic to "tough this
through," and to fight the industry, and to get this treaty through the
United States Senate in its current form with such a battle? Virtually
every knowledgeable observer of the Hill that I have seen, including many
friends of this treaty-and I would count myself among them-do not
believe that there is any realistic prospect for this text, in the context of a
war between the deep seabed mining industry and a delegation trying to
get it through the Senate unchanged, no matter how able the latter may
be. These observers just do not believe that it's politically realistic to
have a war instead of a consensus when the treaty is brought to the
Senate.
That was the kind of background that the Reagan Administration
confronted when it came into office. Needless to say, as one would expect,
those views were hard fought by the players that had been debating them
for some months. The decision by the administration to have a thorough
review is, I believe, a correct decision. I think it is in the interest of a
successful law of the sea conference, and I welcome this change. Do not
believe that what is at stake here is nothing more than a fight between a
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deep seabed mining interest trying to protect itself, and a delegation that
is pursuing overall United States national interests. I think there is much
more at stake, and it's far more complicated. It's also not simply an issue
of a decision to somehow retrench and to not give to developing countries
their due share of the common heritage of mankind or to renege on that
principle.
Responding to Confrontation: An Activist America
Let me shift now as a last point to place this in a perhaps more controversial format of broader issues facing the United States within multilateral negotiations. We are faced and have been for some time with a
variety of serious confrontations within the United Nations system, and
it's a system whose aspirations we all strongly support. We are faced, realistically, with East-West confrontations, in which the Soviet Bloc, and
proxies for the Soviets, such as the Cubans, stand up in the United Nations and lambast us with speeches year after year on such things as denying "self-determination" to Puerto Rico. They don't examine the options, including free referenda that have been put to the Puerto Rican
people-and by the way, if that issue wasn't there, they would find another issue-but it's issue after issue in which we come under attack from
the East in the East-West debate. It may have been less, at the height of
d6tente, but it has always been present, and it's a significant series of
attacks, not only on the United States but on the West and on western
values in general.
In addition to that there is an unfortunate confrontation taking place
between the North and the South, between the developed countries and
the underdeveloped countries of the world. I say unfortunate because to
me, there are fruitful areas of cooperation in which we could advance the
goals of both, but unfortunately, the rhetoric of the new international
economic order, I believe, has not proceeded that way. I'm not saying that
we are wholly free from blame. I'm saying that there has been a basic
confrontational mode of rhetoric and approach in the new international
economic order on North-South issues within the United Nations system.
By the way, the trend is toward improvement in this dialogue, with respect to challenges within the United Nations system and on global and
multinational issues, but the problem is still serious.
Conventional wisdom has been that the United States should take a
low profile, that we should ignore statements that are extreme and are
made against our interest, and that if there are resolutions-such as
those, for example, on permanent sovereignty over natural resources,
which has a nice title that no one can differ with, but which may have
provisions that are profoundly harmful to the protection of investment
and the free flow of capital around the world-in that kind of setting,
conventional wisdom would have us abstain or change the language so
that it's mildly ambiguous on a key phrase, and then do nothing else
about it, because to really have a debate would simply become a difficult
process that allegedly could be harmful to our interests.
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There is obviously truth in the traditional diplomatic wisdom on this.
I don't believe it's fruitful for the United States to adopt a shoe-pounding
posture in the United Nations. I think we must be sensitive to context,
and we must be sensitive and realistic as to what we can win and what we
can't win. But I think there has to be a change in tone. There has to be a
more realistic meeting on the merits of the kinds of arguments that are
made against western values, because the truth of the matter is that not
to do so is a profound insult to the United Nations system and to international law. It is really saying that notions of authority and notions of law
and what takes place in United Nations debates and the opinion of the
world do not count. Ladies and gentlemen, I submit that they do count,
that this is one of the major underpinnings of what law is all about, and
there is a struggle for authority going on in the world that is every bit as
real as Hans Morgenthau's "struggle for power." I think it is essential
that the United States take the lead in the Western world in trying somewhat more vigorously to defend traditional values in which we strongly
believe. That means notions of self-determination, notions of preventing
coercion against other nations, against external intervention by other nations, and against terrorism that strikes at innocent women and children
around the world, notions of human rights, and of efficient economic organization in the world community.
What does that mean specifically? I think there are a number of possibilities we might suggest. One is that the next time a Soviet proxy nation gets up and attacks the United States for denial of self-determination in Puerto Rico, let's have a full and open discussion of the issues and
the position of the United States in that case and let's in turn examine
self-determination in Cuba, and the treatment of minorities in Cuba, and
Cuban proxy forces abroad, and Cuban intervention in El Salvador. In
short, we don't have anything to fear by an honest and open debate. We
needn't precipitate it, but if we are going to be attacked, I think it's time
for us to take more seriously the need to respond in international
institutions.
Let's take a second set of problems. These concern not the kind of
problem we have with the Soviet Union and East-West confrontation, but
something we don't want to see as a confrontation: North-South
problems. We must have a commitment to aid developing countries. We
have a major trade stake with developing countries today-something we
sometimes overlook-with almost a quarter of the trade of the United
States going to developing countries. I think that provides an interest not
only in trying to protect our own national interest, but also in trying to
encourage a more open and honest debate on such issues as the new international economic order.
What has been the core of the new international economic order so
far? One, notions of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, meaning in essence, in terms of its legal effect, the right basically to expropriate without paying compensation and to not have a careful set of guarantees for the protection of the integrity of capital flows to developing
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countries. I'm sorry to say that's been one of the issues. I think that is
profoundly not in the interest of developing countries. I can see no group
that more urgently needs to attract capital, particularly in the area of
energy development, than developing countries. It is absolutely demonstrable with the simplest economic model that as you increase the uncertainty of the protection of investment, you will decrease the capital flow.
And as you increase the cost of that flow, you decrease the kind of economic rent that could go to the developing countries. The problem is that
it was the wrong issue. The issue should have been full and open bargaining between multilateral firms or others that were seeking to invest in
developing countries, with representation by the finest law firms in the
world, so that there will be a fair, full, well-thought-out, balanced negotiation, and no overreaching in terms of the interest of the developing
countries. And those issues are important. We don't want imbalanced
agreements. We want agreements that are in the interest of both sides.
But a focus on trying to attack the integrity of investment-and by the
way, I think that is beginning to change in the thinking of the Group of
77-that is in my judgment not a useful focus, and we should not have
simply abstained and remained silent on the kind of negotiation in creating authority that took place on those issues.
My last example concerns the current global negotiations that are
underway within the General Assembly, following a decision of the nonaligned conference last year, in which there was a call for a full range of
global negotiations, not only on energy issues, but on trade, on commodity stabilization agreements, and in short on the full shopping list of
North-South issues. Now that has been tried before. It was tried in Paris
in December 1975 at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, and was a clear failure. It was a failure because there was no realistic
opportunity then as there is no realistic opportunity now to conclude an
enormous agreement that will spell out all of those issues at the present
time. Instead, in my judgment, there should be a realistic focus, and we
should take the lead in trying to promote that focus on the most important multilateral economic issues today. One stands out: the instability in
global oil markets and the enormous transfer of wealth from "NOPEC"
developing countries to OPEC. That is the issue that is probably responsible for a greater transfer of wealth from developing countries than at
any time in the history of colonialism. I don't seek by that statement to
denigrate the problems of colonialism. I think it's absolutely clear that
the world wants to turn its back on that kind of past. But I don't believe
that we should also not address squarely the kinds of wealth transfers
that are taking place from developing countries today. The problems are
staggering and they are getting worse. It's an absolute emergency to deal
within the United Nations system for the kinds of mechanisms that can
meet the debt service requirements of developing countries, and that can
stabilize world oil markets. As a starter, let's take a page from the new
international economic order and consider the possibility of a commodity
stabilization agreement in the most important commodity in world trade,
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and that is oil. I think here there just might be some potential for the
North and the South to come together constructively to deal with one of
the more important issues.
It would have been easy to have stopped at law of the sea and not to
move on to the more controversial issues, but I feel that it is important
that the United States actively get into the arena with the debate about
authority-that is, the making of new international law. Whether you
agree with my particular examples or not is not necessarily the point. The
point is that there is a struggle for authority going on in the world, that
that struggle is important, and that we must win it. The law of the sea
negotiations are one battleground where we might join that struggle.
Thank you.

DIALOGUE: THE LEGAL
STATUS OF THE PLO
Editor's note: The following articles by Messrs. Friedlander, Levine,
and Kassim relate back to an earlier article by Dr. Kassim, The Palestine Liberation Organization'sClaim to Status: A JuridicalAnalysis
Under InternationalLaw, 9 DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND POLICY 1 (1980).

The PLO and the Rule of Law: A Reply to
Dr. Anis Kassim
ROBERT

A.

FRIEDLANDER

When the rule of law is being compromised by expediency in many
places of the world, it is crucial ... to make certain that the United
States does not retaliatein kind.1
The destiny of the Palestinianpeople is determined by the gun of
the Palestinianrevolutionary.'
[Tierrorism threatens, endangers or destroys the lives and fundamental freedoms of the innocent. .....

On June 13, 1980, the nine heads of state of the European Economic
Community, meeting in Venice, issued a unanimous declaration favoring
"recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" and urging
the participation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the full
exercise of the Palestinian "right to self-determination." 4 This was the
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1. Narenji v. Civiletti, 619 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
2. Statement of Yassir Arafat, quoted in N.Y. Times, June 15, 1980, at 5, col. 3.
3. Report of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418, Corr.
1, 2 & Add. 1 (1972).
4. The complete text of the Venice Declaration is reprinted in N.Y Times, June 14,
1980, at 4, col. 3.
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first time the major European leaders had specifically and favorably mentioned the PLO in the context of both the Camp David Accords5 and the
Arab-Israeli confrontation, although one could argue that it has been forgotten that the twenty-one members of the Council of Europe voted a
similar resolution with no opposition and few abstentions three weeks
earlier.6 The Common Market leaders were not reticent in articulating
their meaning. According to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
the Venice agreement "accepts the PLO as one of the participants that
must be involved in the talks." This has remained the European position, only slightly softened at the Venice Economic Summit, notwithstanding the fact that the PLO leadership disdainfully rejected the European initiative. In the view of Yassir Arafat, the European heads of state
were merely trying to "find a piece of bone that they could throw to us
and keep us busy."'
Not all outside observers were ready to endorse the EEC Declaration.1 0 Although attempting to be conciliatory and even supportive, the
editorial writers of London's The Economist put it best when they admitted that "[tihe cynical thing to say about the statement is that it will not
affect peace one way or another but may put Europe in the Arab oil producers' good books."" To paraphrase the late Harold Ickes, the cat is
finally out of the bag, and it is a shabby animal indeed. Europe is once
again playing power politics, or to use a better term, powerless politics,
and the name of the game is oil. This has led to an increased pessimism
on the part of Israeli politicians such as the former Israeli Deputy Minister of Finance: "When you make the account between Arab oil and Jewish blood, it's very clear which is heavier.""' And the threat is not only

5. For the texts of the Camp David Agreements of Sept. 17, 1978, see 17 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 1463 (1978).

6. Miami Herald, Apr. 23, 1980, at 16, col. 1.
7. The Oregonian (Portland), June 14, 1980, at 4, col 1. See also N.Y. Times, June 14,
1980, at 1, col. 1.
8. THE ECONOMIST, June 28, 1980, at 13-14; NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1980, at 16-17; TIME,
June 30, 1980, at 10-11. A favorable summary is provided by Mosettig, Europe's Mideast
"Initiative": But What's Next?, EuRoPE: MAGAZINE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Sept.Oct. 1980, at 4.

9. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
10. The United States at first seemed to disassociate itself from the Common Market
d~marche. "Whatever the allies might do about this problem," President Carter observed,

"our position is clear." N.Y. Times, June 15, 1980, at 13, col. 1. Actually, the U.S. position
was, and is, far from clear.
11. THE ECONOMIST, June 21, 1980, at 13. The fact that the PLO jointly and severally is
in continuing violation of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,
opened for signatureJan. 27, 1977, has been carefully ignored. The text of the Convention
is reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1272 (1976).
12. Quoted in Wall St. J., July 15, 1980, at 14, col. 1. See also Lewis, France Plays Its
Own Game in Wooing the Arab Oil, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1980, at E2, col. 3; Europe and
the PLO, The New Republic, June 14, 1980, at 7; Kedourie, Western Defense in the Middle
East, id., June 7, 1980, at 18; THE ARAB On WAON 4-295 (J. Paust & A. Blaustein eds.
1977); Friedlander, Problems of the Mediterranean:A Geopolitical Perspective, 32 Y.B.
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one of turning off the spigot, but more importantly (even if only implicitly) that of blowing up the wellhead. The 1979 statement of Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal is instructive: "The holy places are protected
by God; as for the oil fields, they are protected by man."18
Incredibly, the European leaders chose to ignore the proclamation
Al-Fatah, allegedly the moderate faction of the PLO, issued on June 2,
1980. This proclamation declared that the goal of the PLO would continue to be "the complete liberation of Palestine [sic), the liquidation of
the Zionist entity [Israel], politically, militarily, culturally and ideologically, and the establishment of a Palestinian democratic state with Jerusalem as its capital. 1 4 The Economist treated this as an unfortunate
faux pas, alluding to the PLO's penchant for "linguistic violence," 16 but
the Misgav-Am incident and the Hebron assassination are symptomatic
of something more than mere flaming rhetoric. It is hard to avoid the
conclusion that "[ilf this document truly reflects a new strategic position
of Fatah and the PLO, it terribly endangers regional and even world
peace. '" The former American Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, did
not shrink from raising the quintessential issue: "How do you expect
Israel to deal with a group that is bent on its destruction? ' 17 Can Israel
afford to give diplomatic and legal recognition to an organization which
has vowed to destroy its very existence? In a world where terror is the
ultimate arbiter, then might indeed makes right.
The Palestine Liberation Organization has not changed the nature of
its ideological landscape since it was created at the time of the Arab
League summit conference at Cairo in January 1964. The real initiative
for the establishment of the PLO came not from Palestinian nationalism
but from the political ambitions of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who even picked the PLO's first leader, Ahmed Shukairy.1 s Originally
WORLD AFF. 175, 175-86 (1978). See generally OIL, THE ARAB-IsRAELi DISPUTE AND THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD (J. Hurewitz ed. 1976); Symposium, Oil Crisis in Perspective, 104 DAEDA-

LUS (R. Vernon ed. 1975).
13. Quoted in Cooley, Iran, the Palestinians,and the Gulf, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 1017, 1027
(1979). Henry Kissinger commented: "[Olnce it is accepted that oil is a political weapon, the
[Arab] moderates have no excuse for not using it as a political weapon." Kissinger,
Nato-The Next 30 Years, reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. E4291 (1979).
14. Quoted in The Oregonian (Portland), June 7, 1980, at 22, col. 1. The New York
Times failed to mention the Al-Fatah manifesto.
15. THE ECONOMIST, June 21, 1980, at 13.
16. PLO Dogma Renews Mideast Danger, The Oregonian (Portland), June 7, 1980, at
22, col. 1. The New Republic, June 14, 1980, at 9, notes that the only European reaction to
the unremitting perpetration of political terror is that "Palestinian murderers are called
Palestinian moderates." Two weeks later, upon further reflection, the editors of that same
journal angrily remarked that the European leaders "endorse the PLO even as the PLO
abandons all its petty pretenses to political maturity." Id., June 28, at 7.
17. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1980, at El, col. 2.
18. See J. BELL, THE MYTH oF THE GUERRILLA: REVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND MALPRACTicE 171 (1971); D. HIRST, THE GUN AND THE OLIVE BRANCH: THE RooTs OF VIOLENCE IN THE'
MIDDLE EAST 272-73 (1977); T. KIERNAN, ARAFAT: THE MAN AND THE MYTH 232-34 (1976); B.
VALABREGA, LA REVOLUC16N ARABE 195-99, 212-14 (1971).
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designed as an instrument of Nasserite revenge upon Israel for the 1956
Suez humiliation, the PLO received its formal baptism on May 22, 1964,
with the convening of the First Palestinian National Congress. Shukairy's
keynote address set the tone of the organizational meeting, containing
such memorable phrases as "the liquidation of Israel," and "death to
Zionism."19
Of even greater significance, the Palestinian National Charter, last

amended in 1968, is brutually specific about the necessity for the destruction of Israel.20 Article 1 declares that Palestine "is an indivisible part of
the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the
Arab nation." Article 9 proclaims that "[a]rmed struggle is the only way
to liberate Palestine." Article 10 asserts that "[c]ommando action constitutes the nucleus of the popular liberation war." Article 19 sums up the
current PLO position from which historically it has never wavered: "The
partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel
are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time .

. . ."

Article 20

negates history and the international legal order: "The Balfour Declaration, the mandate for Palestine and everything that has been based upon
them, are deemed null and void." Last, and certainly not least, Article 29
arrogates to the PLO the self-proclaimed "right" to determine what is
lawful and what is not, and which rules with respect to the operation of
the international state system shall be observed and which shall be disregarded: "The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine legal right to liberate and to retrieve their homeland. The Palestinian people determine their attitude towards all states and forces on the basis of
the stands they adopt vis-d-vis the Palestinian cause .... "IS

On January 14, 1969, the Al-Fatah wing of the PLO, headed by Yassir Arafat, issued a seven point political manifesto. Aside from the ritual
denunciation of the "colonialist ... racist . . . expansionist" state of

Israel, the major objective of this declaration was to hold out the vision of
an "independent democratic Palestinian state where all citizens, whatever
their creed, can enjoy equal rights. 22 The only problem, and one not
mentioned by Dr. Anis F. Kassim in his scholarly, civilized, and judicious2
minded study of the PLO's claim to juridical status in international law, 8

19. T. KIERNAN, supra note 18, at 234.
20. The complete text of the Charter is reprinted in THE

AA-IsRABLi

CONFLCT. RRAD-

DocuMENTs 1086-91 (J.N. Moore ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT]; see also Lewis, The Palestiniansand the PLO: A Historical Approach, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1975, at 46-48.
21. This last claim was expanded upon by Yassir Arafat in his dramatic appearance
before the United Nations General Assembly on November 13, 1974. For a critique of the
Arafat thesis, see Rostow, The Illegality of the Arab Attack on Israel of October 6, 1973, in
INGS AND

AIAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 20, at 458-59, 472, 474-75.
22. The text is reproduced in THE COMNG OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL: A REVOLUTIONARY ANTHOLOGY 233-34 (J. Gerassi ad. 1971) [hereinafter cited as REVOLuTiONARY
ANTHOLOGY].

23. Kassim, The Palestine Liberation Organization's Claim to Status: A Juridical
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is that a secular Palestinian state encompassing all parties in interest
must by its very nature require the elimination of the state of Israel. Obviously, however, a Palestinian state composed of the West Bank and the
Gaza territory presents quite a different issue. The key question. here is:
What exactly is to be liberated? This point is never reached by Dr.
4
Kassim.2
Throughout the 1970's the Palestine Liberation Organization has
consistently maintained a radical Arab rejectionist position, refusing to
accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and thereby impliedly recognize the existence of the state of Israel,as and has constantly gone on record in favor of dismantling the Jewish state. The PLO's Ten Point Program of June 8, 1974,'26 not only denounces Resolution 242 (Point 1), but
also threatens the destruction of King Hussein's Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, which would be merged into a Greater Palestine (Point 5). As
always, the fundamental objective is declared to be the complete "liberation of all Palestinian soil," which means, of course, the end of the state
of Israel (Point 8). In March 1977, the PLO National Council, in a new
Fifteen Point Program,' 7 once again rejected Resolution 242 (Point 1),
strongly denounced American interference (Point 4), pledged to carry the
liberation struggle into every Arab territory (Point 10), and pledged to
restore a Palestinian Palestine (Point 11). Most ominous is the assertion
that any law, treaty, convention, or agreement that is inimical to PLO
interests is unacceptable and non-binding (Point 15 B). Once again the
PLO has set itself up as the sole judge of its own actions by declaring that
any law which is not in its own interests is null and void. This is an egregious violation of the spirit of the United Nations Charter, which the
PLO mentions so piously when it fits its interest to do so, and a blatant
refusal to abide by the rules of civilized conduct established by international law. Apparently the only law that the PLO wishes to recognize on a
continuing basis is the law of the jungle.
A little more than a decade ago, an interview given by a high-ranking
Analysis Under InternationalLaw, 9 DzN. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 1 (1980). The moderation of
tone and dispassionate discourse in this thought-provoking article should be contrasted with

the acerbic and unreasoned emotion of E. SAm, THE QUESTION OF PAEMrM (1980).
24. See generally Kassim, note 23 supra.
25. See, e.g., TIME, Apr. 14, 1980, at 50; Interview with Zehdi Labib Terzi (PLO representative to the United Nations), Another Voice, WHYY-TV (P.B.S.), Philadephia (May 24,
1980) [hereinafter cited as Terzi Interview]. Kassim, supra note 23, at 29, argues not very

persuasively that United States insistence on acceptance of Resolution 242, as a condition
precedent to PLO participation in the negotiation process, must fail because "recognition in

international law must be complete and not conditional ...
" But his reference is only to
state recognition, and nowhere in his article does Dr. Kassim specifically demonstrate that
the PLO constitutes a state.
26. Ten Point Program of the Palestine National Council (June 8, 1974), reprintedin
NEW EAST REPORT, MYTHs AND FACTS 1978: A CONcisE RECORD OF THE ARAB-IsRAzu CONFLicr 70-72 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MYTHS AND FACTS]; Lewis, supra note 20, at 48.
. 27. Fifteen Point Program of the Palestine National Council
(Mar. 1977), reprintedin
MYrHS AND FACTS, supra note 26, at 73-76.
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member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
the radical terrorist wing of the PLO, made it perfectly clear that "the
legitimate right of the Hebrew nation to possess and establish its own
state" is totally unacceptable to the Palestinian people. 28 During an interview with Time magazine in mid-April 1980, Yassir Arafat, as he had
done so many times, plainly refused to discuss the subject." The following month, the PLO observer at the United Nations, Zehdi Labib Terzi,
left no doubt what the PLO program continues to be when he said that
the achievement of Palestinian independence ' 0"will be a long process
which entails violence, bloodshed, and misery. 9
The PLO has never ceased to embrace murder and barbarism as the
prime means of attaining its goal, even if the battlefield happens to be a
grade school (Ma'alot) or a kibbutz nursery (Misgav-Am). National liberation struggles are one thing. World-wide terrorism is something else. It is
well established that the PLO has been engaged in a global program of
terror-violence with close links to other terrorist groups in disparate foreign countries, 1 that it acts as a training master and supply center s (going so far as to instruct the Ayatollah Khomeini's secret police in terrorist
techniques),8 8 and that it serves, on occasion, as a surrogate ally and disbursement agent for the Soviet Union.8 The PLO campaign of terror-

28. Hillier, Democratic Popular Front: We Are Marxist-Leninists, in
22, at 244.
29. TIME, Apr. 14, 1980, at 49.
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SHORT, VIOLENT HISTORY 42-171 (1974); A. PERRY, TERRORISM: FROM ROBESPIERRE TO
ARAFAT 435-40, 447-68, 563-76 (1976); Sterling, The Terrorist Network, THE ATLANTIC, Nov.
1978, at 37-47.
32. Sterling, supra note 31, at 39-46; Tinnin, Terror, Inc., PLAYBOY, May 1977, at 15254, 158, 166-82; Tinnan & Halevy, Strike Teams, PLAYBOY, Feb. 1979, at 92. See also R.
CLUTTEREUCK, KIDNAP AND RANSOM: THE RESPONSE 41-42, 49-52, 141-42 (1978); C. DOBSON &
R. PAYM, THE TERRORISTS: THEIR WEAPONS, LEADERS AND TACTICS 65-100 (1979); B.
HXGcsuN, TERRORISM: VXR TIDS KRIGFJRINO [WARFARE OF OUR TIMES] 172-73 (1978); A
PERRY, supra note 31, at 540-41; Homer, The Facts About Terrorism, COMMENTARY, June
1980, at 42-43; private information provided the author by the British Metropolitan Police,
Februrary 1980. Currently, the PLO is providing training for the Basque terrorist ETA. See
THE ECONOMIST, July 19, 1980, at 46. The PLO may also have reentered the assassination
arena with respect to foreign diplomats. Id., July 26, 1980, at 39; NEWSWEEK, Aug. 4, 1980, at

32, 35.
33. Moss, What Russia Wants, THE NEW REPUBLIC Jan. 19, 1980, at 25. Mr. Moss was
foreign editor of The Economist. There is also good reason to believe that the Israelis
helped train the Shah of Iran's notorious SAVAK. Cooley, supra note 13, at 1017. This does
not, however, justify the PLO's Iranian activities.
34. Originally, the PLO and its various affiliates allowed themselves to be used as surro-
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violence, which violates every human rights declaration and convention in
existence,3 has been totally indiscriminate with respect to its victims."

As one Israeli commentator observed, "the PLO may be the only terrorist
organization anywhere that does not. even recognize the concept of innocence among the population it opposes, that in fact seems to prefer attacking civilian targets to military, killing schoolchildren rather than

soldiers

. .

,.

Throughout modern history, advocates of revolutionary change have

argued that the end justifies the means, and that violent means are permissible and indeed desirable in order to attain revolutionary ends."
Much of present-day terrorism is political in origin, inextricably inter-

twined with so-called national liberation movements. National liberation
struggles have often adopted techniques of terror-violence as the most expeditious method for achieving self-determination." In modern parlance,

gates for the Red Chinese in the 1960's and then switched over to the Soviet Union at the
beginning of the 1970's. See C. DOBSON & R. PAYNE, THE CARLOS Coms uix 36-38, 53-55

(1977); Z.

SCHIFF & R. ROTHSTEIN, FEDAYEEN: GUERRILLAS AGAINST ISRAEL 210-17 (1972); C.
SMIrH, CARLOS: PORTRAIT OF A TERRORIST 56-67 (1976); Krosney, The PLO's Moscow Connection, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Sept. 24, 1979, at 64-72; The Miami Herald, Sept. 18, 1979,

at 1A, col. 1; id. Sept. 20, 1979, at 1A, col. 1. Also, Homer cynically observes that "it is at
the point when the Western democracies can no longer deny the facts of the relationship
between the PLO and the Soviet Union, that they begin to afford the organization greater
respectablity." Homer, supra, note 32, at 43-44.
35. On the role of international law and the use of terror-violence, see Franck, International Legal Action Concerning Terrorism,in 1 TERRoRIsM: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 187
(1978); Friedlander, Terrorism and InternationalLaw: What Is Being Done?, 8 RuT.-CAM.
L.J. 383 (1977); Paust, A Survey of Possible Legal Responses to InternationalTerrorism:
Prevention, Punishment, and Cooperative Action, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 431, 462-69
(1975). The activities of the PLO violate not only the Universal Declaration, the two International Covenants of 1966, and the Genocide Convention, but also the guarantee of human
rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the U.N. Charter in art. 1, paras. 1, 2 and 3,
and art. 55, para c.
36. For example, bombs have been placed in pickle jars in market places and in tourist
shops in Arab bazaars. See Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 19, 1979, at 6, col. 3; Chicago Tribune,
Sept. 17, 1978, at 2, col. 5.
37. Halkin, Whose Palestine? An Open Letter to Edward Said, COMMErARY, May
1980, at 27. The notorious Palestinian hijacker, Leila Khaled, who in Copenhagen in July
1980 represented the PLO at the United Nations Conference on the Decade of Women, told
a Time magazine correspondent in October 1970: "If we throw bombs, it is not our responsibility. You may care for the death of a child, but the whole world ignored the death of
Palestinian children for 22 years. We are not responsible." Quoted in 1 PoLITIcAL TERRORisM, supra note 31, at 3. Nobel laureate Albert Camus anticipated this "defense" in his play
Just Assassins by having his terrorist protagonist exclaim: "I threw the bomb at your tyranny, not at a man." The rejoinder: "There was blood, you know, a lot of blood."
A.
C.Aus, CALIGULA AND THREE OTHER PLAYS 282 (S. Gilbert trans. 1958).
38. Apologists for the PLO argue that "terrorism was a weapon of the weak and of the
oppressed, of people who had no other means of fighting." D. HmST, supra note 18, at 316.
See also J. SCHREIBER, THE ULTIMATE WEAPON: TEREORISTS AND WORLD ORDER 137-38
(1978); G. McKNIGHT, THE TERRORIST MIND 24-27 (1974). For a legal critique of this selfjustificatory rationale, see Friedlander, Terrorismand Political Violence: Do the Ends Justify the Means?, 24 CHrrTY'S L.J. 240 (1976). Dr. Kassim is strangely silent on this issue.

39. See generally SELF-DETERMINATION:

NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS
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self-determination is almost always synonomous with national liberation
conflicts. At times the one is used as a code word for the other and also
used as a justification for terrorist acts, particularly on the part of socalled guerrilla bands. 0 Dean Rusk's 1962 observation that success in irregular warfare is self-legitimizing still holds true."' And the United Nations has continually condoned rather than condemned such measures.
The United Nations definition of aggression, approved by consensus
on December 14, 1974, effectively exculpates terror-violence from any liability when employed on behalf of self-determination movements or
against colonial and racist regimes.42 In blunt, non-hyperbolic terminology, the United Nations majority has opted for a philosophy of ends over
means when the ends happen to concide with the desires of the Third
World and the Soviet Bloc. Ironically, the Final Act of the often maligned
Helsinki declaration pledges the thirty-five signatory states to "refrain
from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities . . ."'I The obvious contradiction between these two documents has not been resolved.
The effect of the legitimation of terror by the world community, through
such resolutions and agreements as the definition of aggression and the
1977 Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict,44 not only encourages third party
intervention on behalf of national liberation movements, but literally
turns self-determination claims into a license to kill. Has international
law, to use the terminology of Lord Simon of Glaisdale, conferred on Yassir Arafat and his terrorist organization "immunity from the criminal
law"?"5
(Y. Alexander & R. Friedlander eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SELF-DETERMINATION]; Tyner, Wars of National Liberation in Africa and Palestine: Self-Determinationfor Peoples
or for Territories?, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORDER 234 (1979).
40. See J. BELL, THE MYTH OF THE GUERRILLA: REVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND MALPRACTICE (1971); G. CHALIAND, REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD: MYTHS AND PROSPECTS (1977).

41. P. WYDEN, BAY OF PIGS: THE UNTOLD STORY 147 (1979).
42. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). For
the long, tedious historical record of international negotiations leading to the definition, see
B. FERENCZ, DEFINING AGGRESSION-THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY SuRVEY AND ANALYSIS (2 vols. 1975). A decidedly negative analysis is provided in J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION

(1976).
43. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, reprinted in INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 1293, 1294-95 (1975); 73 Dm'T STATE BULL. 323, 325 (1975). For a useful legal
survey of the Helsinki Final Act, see Comment, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Implications for Soviet-American Dktente, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 122
(1976).
44. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted at Geneva
June 8, 1977, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1391
(1977). For contrasting interpretations of the new Protocol, see Dinstein, The New Geneva
Protocols: A Step Forward or Backward?, 33 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 265 (1979), and Bassiouni,

Repression of Breaches of the Geneva Convention Under the Draft Additional Protocol to
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 8 Rurr.-CAM. L.J. 185 (1977).
45. D.P.P. v. Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653, 687 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale, J., dissenting).
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The most extreme statement of support by the world community for
national liberation struggles is to be found in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3103 of December 12, 1973, entitled "Basic Principles
of the Legal Status of Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien
Domination and Racist Regimes.' 46 Granting to these rebellions a claim
of legitimacy under international law, Resolution 3103 declared that
"armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples against colonial and racist regimes are to be regarded as international armed conflicts. . .," but
that "[tihe use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the
national liberation movements struggling for freedom and independence
from the yoke of colonialism and alien domination is considered to be a
criminal act and the mercenaries should accordingly be punished as
criminals."
Under this formula the Mauritanians who aided the Moroccans
against the Polisario Front were mercenaries, but the Cubans who fought
for (and against) the Angolans were legitimate combatants engaged in
permissible military intervention. Several years ago, the former Biafran
Minister of State remarked: "Biafra made a mistake in not trying terrorism. If we had terrorized, we would be independent today. The PLO has
shown how effective the use of terror can be in the international arena."' 7
Terrorism is at the core of the current Middle East crisis, and has affected and afflicted the course" of history in that unhappy region for the
48
past two generations.
But what of the Palestinians? Do they also have a claim to national
legitimacy? The credo of contemporary Arab politics has become "selfdetermination for the Palestinians," although the nature of that principle
is still much debated and much abused.' 9 There is no denying that selfdetermination has been a major force during most of this century. Nonetheless, what has been lacking with reference to international law is a
precise, definite, definable standard which may be fairly applied under
certain specified conditions.5 0 What lies at the heart of the problem is the

46. G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 142, U.N. Doc. 9030 (1973), reprinted in 1 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 495-96 (1979).
47. Quoted in Friedlander, Sowing the Wind: Rebellion and Terror-Violence in Theory
and Practice, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 83, 86 (1976). Terrorism was successful in the
Palestinian Mandate, Algeria, Cyprus, Kenya, Vietnam, and most recently, in Zimbabwe.
48. Dr. Kassim rationalizes this central, all-embracing issue by refusing "to pass a value
judgment on the coercion situations in which the PLO has been involved." He then broadly
asserts what he has not sought to explain: "The PLO has been able to exercise what
amounts to sovereign power over Palestinians in war situations." Kassim, supra note 23, at
22.
49. See generally SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 39; Franck & Hoffman, The Right
of Self-Determinationin Very Small Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. Ir'L L. & POL. 331 (1976); Note,
The Logic of Secession, 89 YALE L.J. 802 (1980).
50. See Paust, Self-Determination: A Definitional Focus, in SELF-DETERMINATION,
supra note 39, at 3-18; Friedlander, Self-Determination:A Legal-PoliticalInquiry, in id., at
307-31.
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curious conundrum that although self-determination is a collective concept, no one has yet adequately defined what constitutes a people or
group. The most conspicuous failure to identify the potential parties for
whom a self-determination remedy is to be applied has been that of the
United Nations to give any precision to its wide-ranging statements of
principle.' The two major pronouncements on the subject can be found
in the well-known General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Territories (December 14, 1960),"s
and in the Annex of implementing General Assembly Resolution 1541
(December 15, 1960), dealing with non-self-governing territories." In the
former, no definition was given for the frequently utilized term "peoples,"
while the latter resolution generally defines free association but neglects
to specify precisely to whom the categories of association and self-government will apply."
Existing legal norms and the historical record offer some definitional
means of clarification. A "people" consists of a community of individuals
bound together by mutual loyalties, an idei-x:ifiable tradition, and a common cultural awareness, with historic ties to a given territory. Their collective behavior is based upon the pursuit and implementation of specific
goals which give to the community at large a group identity and a shared
sense of values. A "nation" is a community of peoples, adhering to a single sovereignty, accepting mutually binding authority structures, and occupying a given territory within ascertainable geographic boundaries.
This collective entity, upon exercising political power and establishing social controls, becomes a nation-state, and its peoples are citizens
thereof."s In law and in fact there must be a positive link or rational
nexus between people and territory."

51. In a careful study, Umozurike argues that self-determination has become "law"
through its recognition by international bodies. Actually, custom and arbitrary state practice have prevented self-determination from achieving either the status of a peremptory
norm or the claims repeatedly made in its name by pro-liberationists. U. UMOZURIKE, SELFDETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 182-203, 272 (1972).
52. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
53. G.A. Res. 1541, Annex, id., at 29. See also Murphy, Self-Determination: United
States Perspectives, in SEFy-DTERmiNATION, supra note 39, at 50. G.A. Res. 742, 8 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 21, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953), sets out in greater detail, but similar
scope, various factors to be considered regarding the transformation of a dependent terri-

tory into a self-governing entity.
54. For an incisive analysis of both documents, see Clark, Self-Determinationand Free
Association-Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust?, 21 HAlv.
INT'L L.J. 1, 41-46 (1980).
55. These definitions are taken from Friedlander, Proposed Criteriafor Testing the
Validity of Self-Determination as it Applies to Disaffected Minorities, 25 CHrrr's L.J.
335, 336 (1977). Anthony D'Amato raises the jurisprudential query: "Who is to be a 'repre-

sentative' of a 'nation'? ....

If we cannot decide this in an a priori fashion, then there

appears to be an inconsistency in the 'self' part of the phrase 'self-determination."'
D'Amato, InternationalLaw and Rawls' Theory of Justice, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 525,
533 (1975).

56. One must beware of oversimplifications like the comment of Judge Hardy Dillard in
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According to United Nations practice, a "people" is any group that
august organization wishes to liberate from "colonial and racist regimes."

Thus, the Puerto Ricans are a people but the Kurds are not; the Namibians are a people and possess their own state but the population of East
Timor (or what remains of it) is without identity and without hope. Palestinian liberation has become a United Nations obsession,5" but who re-

members the Tibetans and who dares to recall Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia? Military conquest is proscribed and annexation of territory by
force of arms is condemned by international law," unless the conqueror
happens to be a super-power who is not afraid to use brute force against

those who would challenge its methods and their consequences.
The roots of the current Arab-Israeli conflict grow out of two conflicting sets of rights: the right of Israel to exist as a state, first enunciated

by the League of Nations, then created by the United Nations; and the
right of the Palestinians to secure control of their own future by means of
self-determination. For a variety of reasons-some religious, some political, some historical-the rights of both peoples have proved to be mutually incompatible during more than half of this century. Must they con-

tinue to be so?
At this point in history no one can deny the validity of the Palestinian claims to self-determination in those territories which remain today
uniquely or preponderantly Palestinian. The Israeli government of

Menachem Begin and its successors must face up to the hard fact and
cold reality that the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza have
an international right to express themselves politically and a strong claim
of right to constitute themselves into a sovereign political entity. How-

ever, the assertion that the PLO is "a territorial public body" and possesses international juridical status" has no foundation in international

his separate advisory opinion on the Western Sahara Case: "It is for the people to determine
the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people." Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 122 (separate opinion of Dillard, J.). But without
"people" and without territory there can be no claim. As with many legal arguments, selfdeterminative claims of right are a matter of focus. Radley asserts that "the uniqueness of
the Palestinian claim is that it finds little support in international law ...." Radley, The
PalestinianRefugees: The Right to Return in International Law, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 586,
611 (1978).
57. See Mallison & Mallison, An InternationalLaw Analysis of the Major United Nations Resolutions Concerning the Palestine Question, in U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/4
(1979)(United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People). The United States has steadfastly opposed both the creation and the existence
of this Committee. See the statement of Ambassador Andrew Young, 79 DEP'T STATE BULL.
51 (1979).
58. Gerson makes the interesting argument that Israel is acting as a trustee-occupant of
the West Bank Territory. Gerson, Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Presence in the West Bank, 14 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1973). Silverburg, "Uti Possidetis" and "Paz
Palestiniana":A Proposal,16 DuQ. L. REv. 757 (1977-78), is neither practical nor indicative
of the weight of authority in the post-Charter era.
59. Kassim, supra note 23, at 26. In December 1975 the U.S. representative in the U.N.
Security Council denounced the proposal to allow the PLO to participate in the debate on
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law. To compare it with regional or international agencies such as the
European Coal and Steel Community, the Organization of American
States (a regional group of nation-states which is subject to the provisions of Article 52 of the United Nations Charter), the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the International Labor Organization, 0 makes as
much sense as comparing apples and artichokes. Private bodies, or public
bodies, even if granted international personality (such as corporations),
do not take on the attributes of nation-states. 1
The so-called "diplomatic recognition" granted the PLO by well over
100 different governmentsss is a political recognition. It cannot be a diplomatic recognition since, despite claims to the contrary, the PLO does
not constitute a state. To compare the PLO with the Polish Governmentin-Exile during either world war, or the Free French Government, or any
similar wartime national group, 6" is misleading at best and is an insult to
the historic memory of those organizations. They did not violate international law, did not wage war upon the innocent, and did not maintain
their claims to public authority by a program of murder and intimidation
directed against their national oppositionists. In point of fact, the Free
French and all resistance movements operated by a code of honor which
sought to protect innocent civilians."
The inexorable dilemma confronting those who seek a just, fair, and
equitable Middle East settlement has been the difficulty of separating
Palestinian needs, aspirations, and goals from those of the PLO. There
are no moderate Palestinian political leaders, either outside or within the
PLO, because the radical leadership of that organization has not permitted it. Dissident moderates have been eliminated by an assassination

Lebanon as an "egregious attempt to use this body to deal with an amorphous terrorist
organization as though it were a concrete entity with the attributes of a sovereign Government." Gross, Voting in the Security Council and the PLO, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 470, 477
(1976).

60. Kassim, supra note 23, at 7-8.
61. In particular, see the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec.
26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 U.N.T.S. 19, article 1 of which provides: "The
State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory;, (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with the other States." This formulation is generally accepted by most commentators and is "often adopted in substance by jurists." I. BROWNLIE, PINCWLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

74 (3d ed. 1979).

62. Kassim, supra note 23, at 19 n.101, gives 103 as the number of recognizing governments as of 1974. Yassir Arafat claimed 115 in a meeting with Reverend Jesse Jackson in
October 1979. Jackson, A New Formula for Mideast Peace, The Chattanooga Times, Oct.
16, 1979, at A8, col. 1. In the Terzi interview, note 25 supra, Terzi made the claim in May
1980 that the PLO had between 80 and 90 full diplomatic missions in approximately 120
countries.
63. Kassim, supra note 23, at 31-33.

64. See, e.g., 1 R.

ARON,

HisToma

DE L'tPURATION

(1967); H.

FRENAY,

THE NIGHT WELL

END: MEMOIRS OF A REVOLUTIONARY (1976); RESISTANCE IN EUROPE, 1939-1945 (S. HAWES &
R. WHITE DS. 1976).
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campaign waged throughout Europe and the Middle East" The Palestinian people are adherents to PLO leadership by way of coercion and intimidation. 68 It is therefore no wonder that President Anwar Sadat has denounced the PLO's "murder for murder's sake" attitude, adding that
"[tihe fate of nations is being played with just as children play with toys
on the streets. 6 7 This is exactly what the Israelis fear from a PLO-dominated state.
Before the PLO Charter of 1964 and the Israeli occupation of 1967,
the Palestinians neither expressed any nationalistic desires nor evidenced
a national consciousness to any meaningful degree."
Moreover, the
United Nations discerned no Palestinian "right" to self-determination
until December 10, 1 9 6 9 .1s Nevertheless, since those dates, with Israel as
the catalyst, a Palestinian national movement has gone on to receive, in
countless resolutions and declarations, overwhelming United Nations support for7 °application of the self-determination principle to the Palestinian
people.

On November 18, 1979, in a television interview on station WEPC in
West Palm Beach, Florida, United Nations Secretary-General Kurt
Waldheim referred to the PLO as "the elected representative of the Palestinian people." With this kind of objective detachment it is not surprising that United Nations impartiality and its power of moral suasion have
become, to the Israelis if not to world popular opinion, inherently suspect.
A similar attitude was clearly implicit on November 22, 1974, when the
General Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed the creation of a Palestinian
state and granted the PLO permanent observer status at the United Na-

65. For an introduction to this phenomenon, see War Among the Terrorists, NzwsAug. 14, 1978, at 25-27. After the assassination of the former Syrian Prime Minister,
Salah Eddin al Bitar, in Paris during late July 1980, the Gaullist publication La Nation
complained: "If the PLO rents its services to Iranian fanatics... should we not reconsider
our attitude to the PLO?" The Hit Men Strike Again, NEwsWEEK Aug. 4, 1980, at 35.
66. Rashad al Shawa, Mayor of Gaza, at one time the target of several PLO assassination attempts, now makes frequent trips to Beirut to confer with Yassir Arafat. NzwswK,
June 9, 1980, at 57. See also Milson, supra note 30, at 33-34.
67. Detroit Free Press, Oct. 11, 1978, at 20D, col. 2. The Palestinian internecine strife
confused and confounded American policy under the Carter Administration. See the
thoughtful observations of Miller, Morality in Foreign Policy: A Failed Consensus?, 109
DAEDALUs 143, 151-53 (1980).
68. See Lewis, supra note 20, at 32-38. The Palestinian Arabs were, historically, hostile
to Palestinian Jews, not nationalistic in their own right. See Origines et evolution du
probl~me Palestinian, premiere partie: 1917-1947, in U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/1 (1978)
(United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People); J. BELL, TERROR OUT OF ZION: THE VIOLENT AND DEADLY SHOCK TROOPS OF ISRAEL
INDEPENDENCE, 1929-1949, at 1-59 (1977). A distinguished Hebrew University historian over
more than two generations writes: "We [Israeli Jews] educated the Arabs about nationalism.
It was our very existence that created Arab national consciousness." Scholem, The Threat of
Messianism, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 14, 1980, at 22.
69. G.A. Res. 2535 B, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 25, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
70. See Mallison & Mallison, supra note 57, at 40-48.
WEEK,
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tions.7 1 Even more significant than the wording of the resolutions was the
failure of the Assembly to take cognizance of Security Council Resolution
242, which calls for acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integ-'
rity, and political independence of all states involved in the 1967 War,
or to indicate in any way whatsoever the legitimacy and the right of Israel
to exist as an independent entity.78 Yet, despite a hostile international
climate-over two-thirds of the United Nations membership has recognized the PLO in one way or another-Israel has refused to negotiate the
maxim ex
modalities of its own demise, relying upon the ancient 7 legal
4
injuriajus non oritur (rights do not arise from wrongs).
The language of United Nations resolutions and declarations on the
Palestinian issue since these events has, if anything, grown more inflammatory. Neither in the General Assembly, nor in its major committees
and their subcommittees, nor in the Security Council, the Economic and
Social Council, or the Trusteeship Council, nor in any of the specialized
and related agencies, has there been any indication of the right of Israel
to exist as an independent member of the world community. In fact, at
the special emergency session of the General Assembly summoned by
Secretary-General Waldheim on July 21, 1980, under provisions of the
rarely invoked Uniting for Peace Resolution," the prime purpose was to
be the granting of the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza to
the PLO.7 Petroleum politics, petrodollar diplomacy, and Third World
hostility have combined to undermine and to challenge Israel's rightful
place in the community of nations, and by so doing, to strip away her

71. G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A.
Res. 3237, id. See also G.A. Res. 3375, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 3, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975), by which the Assembly called for the invitation of the PLO "to participate in all
efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices
of the United Nations ......
72. S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2
(1967). A summary of the Security Council debate is provided in the Report of the Security
Council, 16 July 1967-15 July 1968, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 2) 9-23, U.N. Doc. A/7202
(1968).
73. Commenting upon past and present U.N. developments, Rubin observes: "The entire peace and security machinery of the United Nations has been degraded." Rubin, UN
Resolutions Too Heavy for Delicate Tasks, Mar. 28, 1980, at 22, col. 2.
74. Hans Kelsen rejects application of the maxim as a general rule. His is, however, a
minority view. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 215-16 (2nd ed. 1966).
75. G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
76. The Blade (Toledo), July 22, 1980, at 1, col. 2; Chicago Tribune, July 23, 1980, at
16, col. 1. This followed an earlier attempt in the Security Council to pass a resolution,
vetoed by the United States, calling for Palestinian statehood. The four West European
members of the Council abstained. The Blade, May 1, 1980, at 1, col. 1. On July 29, 1980,
the General Assembly voted 112-7, with 24 abstentions (including all the Common Market
countries), for a resolution sponsored by the Communist and so-called non-aligned blocs
which would require Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories by November 15,
1980. The United States voted against this resolution on the grounds that it did not recognize Israel's right to exist. Id., July 30, 1980, at 1, col. 4; Chicago Tribune, July 30, 1980, at 1
col. 1. See also U.N. CHRON., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 5-18.
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historic and legal foundations.
There are those who somehow remain optimistic that reason will yet
prevail, even in the land of the scorpion and the frog. However, there
seems to be a growing belief among Western intellectuals and some political leaders that the current phenomenon of hostage-taking is not simply
criminal, that its perpetrators are forced to such measures in order "to
equalize power in a conflict, and in doing so to publicize a perceived injustice."' 7 But what of the greater injustice resulting from the attack
upon the innocent?78 Must the rhetoric of outrage, the ideology of resentment, and the propaganda of the deed become the dominant dialogue of
the 1980's?7 ' Should every patently aggrieved, ideologically motivated,

politically alienated group be able to bomb its way to the negotiating table? In the words of Wieseltier, "the terrorist chooses to kill, not because
he is a reasonable man at his rope's end, but because he is an unreasonable man who belongs at the end of a rope." 80
A guerrilla victory will become as meaningless as last week's oil
prices if terror-violence is legitimated merely because it is committed in
the name of national liberation. Where does it end? Who benefits by a
Darwinian global order?
In the conclusion of his thoughtful and provocative personal odyssey,
To Jerusalem and Back, Nobel laureate Saul Bellow sadly observed that
"the eagerness to kill for political ends-or to justify killing by such
ends-is as keen now as it ever was."81 With the legalization of terrorviolence in the name of self-determination, with the use of national liberation struggles as a means of surrogate warfare, the great powers and the
Arab rulers are lighting confrontation fires on a very short fuse. To fail to
recognize this, and to reject the rule of law for the rule of force, is to fan
the flames of mindless passion. The inevitable explosion may well engulf
us all.

77. Stone, Plebes and Patricians, N.Y. Rev. Books, May 29, 1980, at 46.
78. See A. CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AN DEATH 111-49 (J. O'Brien trans. 1961).
79. According to Yassir Arafat's famous speech before the U.N. General Assembly on
November 13, 1974, "[w]hoever stands by a just cause and fights for liberation from invaders and colonialists cannot be called terrorist." U.N. CHRON. Dec. 1974, at 80-81.
80. Wieseltier, The Sabbath Ambush, THE NEw REPUBLIC, May 24, 1980, at 23. Khalidi
offers the simplistic justification that "Israel and the PLO are at war with one another and
war is terror." This is not only feckless argumentation, it is also legal nonsense. Khalidi,
Regiopolitics: Toward a U.S. Policy on the Palestine Problem, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 1050, 1060
(1981).
81. S.BELLOW, To JERUSALEM AND BACK: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT 182 (1977). Silverburg
correctly notes that "nothing in the U.N. Charter suggests that violence is the answer."
Silverburg, The PalestineLiberation Organization in the United Nations: Implicationsfor
InternationalLaw and Relations, 12 ISRAEL L. REv. 365, 375 (1977).

A Response to

Professor Robert A. Friedlander
ANIS F. KASSIM
In The PLO and the Rule of Law,1 Professor Robert A. Friedlander
purports to reply to my study on the PLO's claim to status under international law.2 Unfortunately, almost all of the "reply" falls short of being a
response and what is left has missed, confused, and demoralized the issue.
I. THE "REPLY"
A. Missed the Issue
Professor Friedlander seems preoccupied with the "terrorist" aspects
of PLO activities. In my PLO study, however, it was plainly stated that
the study did not intend to characterize the coercion exercised by the
PLO, as this would be the subject matter of a second study. The separation was deliberate. If the premise is granted that the PLO has juridical
status under international law, it then necessarily follows that the PLO
must accept, with the rights granted or accorded, the obligations imposed
by international law. These obligations include the limitations on its
rights, if any, to use force. Professor Friedlander, in effect, argues to keep
the PLO outside the realm of law but, at the same time, expects the PLO
to comply with the rules of law. This is a self-defeating dissertation.
B. Confused the Issue
The PLO study attempted to establish with some detail the juridical
differences, and not the similarities, between territorial public bodies
(such as the PLO or the Free French Government) and nonterritorial
public bodies (such as the European Coal and Steel Community). The
study labored to draw distinctions in their "formation, purposes, admittance under public law, and scope of authority." The only similarity between territorial and nonterritorial public bodies is that both are "public
bodies" which, even though they do not have the full attributes of nationstates, have status under international law. It then becomes readily obvious, with all deference due, who is "comparing apples with artichokes." S
Anis F. Kassim is Resident Partner, Al-Saleh and Graham & James (Legal Consultants), Kuwait. LL.B., 1965, Damascus University Law School; M.C.L., 1968, University of
Miami (Florida) School of Law; LL.M., 1970, and S.J.D., 1973, National Law Center, George
Washington University.
1. Friedlander, The PLO and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Anis Kassim, 10 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 221 (1981).

2. Kassim, The Palestine Liberation Organization's Claim to Status: A Juridical
Analysis Under InternationalLaw, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. POL'Y 1 (1980).
3. Id. at 6 n.22, and at 22.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Friedlander, supra note 1, at 232.
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Demoralized the Issue
Professor Friedlander refutes the comparison between the PLO and
other territorial public bodies on two grounds. One is that the comparison
is "misleading," although Professor Friedlander provides no juridical argument to show how the comparison is misleading. 6 The second ground is
that the comparison is an "insult" to the historic memory of those organizations which "did not violate international law or wage a war against the
'innocent' or 'maintain their claims to public authority by a program of
murder . . . . 7 The "insult" issue is neither relevant nor accurate. The
PLO study did not try to degrade the heroic struggle of the resistance
movements in Europe or elsewhere, nor did it venture to legally characterize the use of force by these movements and compare it with the force
exercised by the PLO. The use of propogandist terminology like "insult"
unequivocally demonstrates a complete failure to advance sound legal argument. If Professor Friedlander's responses are motivated by "moral
outrage," this writer would concur with the moral ingredients of law but
would not subscribe to Professor Friedlander's moral selectivity. This will
be elaborated in the following section.
C.

II.

THE NON-REPLY

The major part of the "reply" focused on two main issues: the PLO's
stated goal of Israel's destruction and its terrorist activities. In both instances, Professor Friedlander has been selective on both morals and
facts.
A. Claims to the Destruction of Israel
Professor Friedlander identified the first "quintessential issue" in the
following question: "How do you expect Israel to deal with a group that is
bent on its destruction?" 8 He supports this question by citing the Palestine National Charter which, in his words, "is brutally specific about the
necessity for the destruction of Israel."'
It is unfortunate that some scholars did not discover the Palestinians
and their plight until seven decades after the publication of the World
Zionist Organization's Charter of 1897. The key provision of that charter
states that "[t]he aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a
home in Palestine .

. . ."0

A year before the publication of the charter,

Dr. Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, published his book
The Jewish State.1 " This book became the Zionist manual for establish6.

Id.

7. Id.
8. Id. at 223, quoting former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie.
9. Id. at 224.
10. 1 N. SOLOLOW, HISTORY OF ZIONISM 268 (1919).
11. T. HERZL, THE JEWISH STATE: AN ATTEMPT AT A MODERN SOLUTION OF THE JEWISH
QUESTION (S. D'Avigdor & I. Cohen trans. 1943). Leon Simon has argued that the term
"Jewish State" has no qualitative implications and that it would be more accurately called
the "Jew's State" or "State of Jews." Simon, Introduction, in SELECTED ESSAYS OF AHAD
HA'AM 30 (L. Simon trans. 1970).
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ing the proposed Jewish state through the conquest of the territory and
the people of Palestine. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, later the first President of
Israel, communicated to the Paris Peace Conference that the Zionists
wanted Palestine to be "as Jewish as England is English."'" It does not
take much imagination for one to ascertain that such official pronouncements call for nothing less than the complete destruction of a "Palestinian" Palestine and the creation of a "Jewish" Palestine.
The following excerpt appears in the official Israeli Government
Yearbook of 1955:
The state of Israel is the fulfillment of Herzl's vision in his book, "The
Jewish State." It is called the "State of Israel" because it is part of
the Land of Israel and not merely a Jewish State. The creation of the
new State by no means derogates from the scope of historical Eretz
Israel."
This official policy is neither history nor rhetoric. It is a deliberate, systematic, and on-going policy of the State of Israel to conquer all of Palestine and other areas constituting Eretz Israel, however defined. Since the
June war of 1967, Israel has colonized more than one third of the land
surface of the West Bank, in addition to the Gaza Strip. 4 Prime Minister
Menachem Begin has declared several times that. this colonization policy
is based on "right" and "security" considerations. 5 In July 1980, the
Knesset passed a law which "legally" annexed East Jerusalem." In light
of these events, the relevant question would ask which group is bent on
the brutal destruction of the other.
Professor Friedlander raises a very important question when asking
what territories should be liberated to create a Palestinian state.' 7 Every
nation, including the United States, has declared that the territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war are "occupied territories" in both a factual and legal sense. Furthermore, these nation-states have emphasized
that the occupied territories are subject to the humanitarian laws of war
as codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Against this universal attitude of sovereign states, Israel stands alone in declaring that these territories are "liberated,"' 6 and thus not subject to the Geneva
Conventions.19
Without subtracting from the substance of the above, Professor
Friedlander appears to reach the conclusion that the solution advanced

12.
13.
14.
15.

C. WEIZMANN, TRIAL AND ERROR 244 (1966).

[1955] ISRAEL Y.B. 320.
A. ROKACH, ISRAEL's SACRED TERRORISM (1980).
See, e.g., Int'l Herald Trib., Mar. 22, 1980, at 2, col. 5; N.Y. Times, July 28, 1977, at

3, col. 3.
16. Int'l Herald Trib., July 31, 1980, at 1, col. 7.
17. Friedlander, supra note 1, at 225.
18. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria,
3 ISRAEL L. REv. 279 (1968).
19. See The Beit El case, as reported in the Jerusalem Post, Mar. 19, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
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by the PLO, which calls for a secular democratic state, is equivalent to
the destruction of the State of Israel. It seems embarrassing for a scholar
to preach moralism on the one hand, and ridicule democratic values on
the other. A secular democratic state may be an idealist dream, but it is
certainly more consistent with humanitarian law than a racist state. The
Law of Return of 195010 gives every Jew the right to immigrate to Israel.
Upon arrival, the immigrant is immediately bestowed with Israeli nationality.21 However, non-Jewish Palestinians who remained in Israel after
the establishment of the state were considered by the Israeli courts as
"stateless."" When the Nationality Law was enacted, it "legally" denationalized these Palestinians." The children of these stateless Palestinians would also be stateless." The juridical reason for this discriminatory
attitude is that these Palestinians are not "Jewish."
It seems highly reasonable and legally justifiable to call for an inclusive democratic secular state rather than an exclusive ghetto state.2 It is
not the destruction of a state, but merely the de-zionization of a state. As
if to be more royalist that the king, a Jewish-Zionist member of the Knesset finally called for "Israel without Zionists"' as the solution to the Palestine-Israeli conflict.
B.

Terrorism versus Terrorism

The second major issue that preoccupies the "reply" is the terrorist
aspect of PLO activities. Once again, Professor Friedlander was selective
on facts and morals. Zionist historians and authoritative writers have recorded at length and in depth pre-state and post-state Zionist terrorism.
The present Prime Minister of Israel has written of the organized massacres, including that of Dair Yassin, that were inflicted upon Palestinian

20. 4 L.S.I. 114 (1950) (amended 1954 and 1970).

21. 6 L.S.I. 50 (1952) (amended 1958, 1968, and 1971). The discriminatory character of
the Nationality Law is explained by Professor Rubinstein in Israel Nationality,2 TEL Aviv
UNIV. STUD. IN LAW 159 (1976). See also I. GOULDMAN, ISRAEL NATIONALITY LAW (1970).
Gouldman conceded the point when asked if the law could be considered discriminatory.
See MIDDLE EAST RaV., Apr. 23, 1971, at 18.
22. See Re Goods of Shiphris, 3 Pesakim Mehoziim 222 (Aug. 13, 1950), where a Tel
Aviv District Court held that Palestinians, after the establishment of the State of Israel and
prior to the enactment of Israel's Nationality Law, were "stateless." This was upheld by the
same court in Oseri v. Oseri, 8 Pesakim Mehoziim 76 (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv, Aug. 7, 1952), and
by the Supreme Court in Hussein v. Governor of Acre Prison, 6 Piskei-Din 897 (Nov. 6,
1952). See generally [1950] Irr'L L. REP. 110-12.
23. Art. 18(a), 6 L.S.I. 50 (1952) (as amended).
24. Id. Compare art. 3(a) with art. 3(b). It is obvious that children born to parents who
could not meet the requirements of article 3(a) will inevitably be stateless as well. In an
attempt to remedy this awkward position, a new article 4(a) was introduced by the Amendments of 1968. 22 L.S.I. 241 (1968).
25. Professor Morris R. Cohen contemplated in 1946 that: "The supposition that the
Jews of Palestine will necessarily be on a higher spiritual plane and serve as an inspiration
to Jews throughout the Diaspora is like the argument that an independent Liberia will elevate the position of Negroes elsewhere." M. COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 330-31 (1946).
26. U. AvNs=, ISRAEL WITHOUT ZIONISTS (1968).
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villages. 27 The deliberate and well-planned massacre of Kufr Wasim in
195628 was not the last incident nor the last mockery of justice in the
annals of the State of Israel's history of terrorism. Moshe Sharett's Papers are the very latest available sources which document official Israeli
terrorism.2 9 The Report of the American National Lawyers Guild"s has
thoroughly substantiated and carefully documented the terrorism employed by Israel against the civilian population of the occupied territories.
These authoritative reports were undoubtedly prepared and recorded
without oil or petrodollar pressure, the short-cut excuse Professor Friedlander seems to give for anti-Israeli United Nations resolutions and other
official pronouncements8 1
Another important facet of the violence that engulfs the area has
been ignored by Professor Friedlander. It is imperative for a balanced
juridical analysis to define who has "initiated" the terrorism. Was it a
"necessary" use of force? And once exercised, was it used "proportionately"? These are the legal ingredients needed to differentiate aggressive
from defensive coercion."'
III. CONCLUSION
It is not my intention to become involved in an orgy of incrimination.
The major thrust must be consistenty and comprehensiveness when handling a highly complex issue like the Palestinian question. Power politics
and cold war strategies have proven to be a complete failure in promoting
peace and security to the entire arena of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Let us try law as a problem-solving tool.

27. M. BEGIN, THE REVOLT-STORY OF THE IRGUN (1951). See generally Y. BAUER, FROM
DIPLOMACY TO RESISTANCE (1970); L. COLLINS & D. LAPIERaE, 0 JERUSAI.E 272-81 (1972); P.
GABBAY, A POLITICAL STUDY OF THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT (1959); A. PERLMutrrr, MILITARY
AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL (1969); Khalidi, Plan Dalet: The Zionist Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine, 37 MIDDLE EAST FORUM 22 (1961). The references cited above document
the pre-state terror.
28. S. JIRYIs, THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 240-61 (1973). This massacre took place on October
29, 1956, when 49 Palestinians were killed in cold blood. The Israeli army officer in charge,
identified as Chedmi, was fined one piaster; this is today known in Israel as the "Chedmi
Piaster." Jiryis' account of the massacre was drawn from file no. 3/57 of the Central Court
of Israel's Defense Army.
29. See A. ROKACH, note 14 supra.

30.

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS IN IsRAm-OccUPIED WEST
1977 MIDDLE EAST DELEGATION

BANK AND GAZA: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

(1978). The Guild has taken a very supportive position toward Israel ever since its creation.
31. Friedlander, supra note 1, at 234.
32. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC OsDm 217-44
(1961).

A Landmark on the Road to Legal Chaos:
Recognition of the PLO as a Menace to
World Public Order
EVYATAR LEviNE
I.

STRANGE "DECISIONS,"

STRANGER CONCLUSIONS

On December 4, 1975, the United Nations Security Council accorded
to the Palestine Liberation Organization an "invitation" to participate in
its debate concerning Israeli attacks directed at Palestinian refugee
camps on Lebanese territory.' Nine members voted in favor of the resolution, three opposed (Costa Rica, the United Kingdom, and the United
States), and three abstained. By a vote of eleven to one (the United
States opposing), a similar "decision" was adopted on January 12, 1976.
Both decisions purported to confer on the PLO "the same rights of participation as are conferred when a Member State is invited to participate
under rule 37 ''1 (of the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure).8 But as
is clear from the wording and spirit of the resolutions, the Council did not
regard the 4PLO as a state. Nor, of course, does the PLO consider itself to
be a state.
Nevertheless, Dr. Anis Kassim stated in his recent article on the juridical status of the PLO that "the Council's invitation represents a
Dr. Evyatar Levine is affiliated with Tel-Aviv University. He is a Presiding Judge of the
Military Court of the West Bank, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Reserve, and a member of the
Israel Bar and of its Commission on Legislation. LL.M., 1954, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Ph.D., 1975, Brunel University (London). Co-editor, PoliticalDictionary of the Middle East in the 20th Century (2d ed. 1974). The research assistance of Mitchell Knisbacher
of Bar Ilan University is warmly acknowledged.
1. 30 U.N. SCOR (1859th mtg.) 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1859 (1975).
2. Id.; 31 U.N. SCOR (1870th mtg.) 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1870 (1976). "Invitation" and
"decision" are in quotation marks because the presidents of both meetings were wrong in
declaring the resolutions adopted, in view of the fact that two permanent members (the
United States and the United Kingdom) voted against the former resolution and one permanent member (the United States) voted against the latter. For this and other reasons, it will
be argued, the two resolutions are null and void. See also Gross, Voting in the Security
Council and the PLO, 70 Am. J. INT'L L. 470 (1976).
3. Rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council refers to the
invitation of
any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security
Council . . . to participate without vote in the discussion of any question
brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that
the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a
matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article
35(1) of the Charter.
4. See Kassim, The Palestine Liberation Organization'sClaim to Status: A Juridical
Analysis Under InternationalLaw, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 1, 3 (1980).
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landmark in establishing a controlling and authoritative precedent" and
that "[ilt is an innovative decision that better served the world public

order by allowing the PLO to exercise its rights by peaceful means and to
reestablish faith in the world organization."'
Is that so? According to rule 37 only a state may be invited to par-

ticipate. Hence, as pointed out by the representative of the United Kingdom, "the granting to the PLO of this exceptional status

. . .

constitutes

an undesirable and unnecessary departure from the established practice
of the Security Council. The provisional rules of procedure of the Council
provide only for Member States of the Organization to enjoy such treatment."6 The representatives of France7 Italy,' and the United States'
made similar reservations.
The 1975 "decision" was considered by two permanent members (the
United Kingdom and the United States) to be one of substance. They
had voted against it, but the president, contrary to Article 27(3) of the
United Nations Charter, nevertheless declared that it was adopted, 10 ignoring the fact that at least its second part was of a substantive nature.
The second part of the nearly identically 1976 "decision" also was substantive. In that instance, however, the representative of the United
States, while voting and protesting against it, failed to invoke Article
27(3) of the Charter."
In a similar case, in 1959, when the question of Laos was on the
agenda, it was the Soviet Union that protested such a ruling by the Council's president. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France had
submitted a draft resolution calling for the appointment by the Council
of a subcommittee to examine certain statements concerning Laos that
had been made before the Council and to conduct inquiries as the subcommittee deemed necessary."2 The Soviet delegate contended that the
second part of the draft was substantive, but insisted that the Council
first determine a preliminary question, viz., whether the vote on the proposed resolution should be considered a procedural one.11 By a vote of ten
to one the Council decided that it was of a procedural nature, and it was
so declared by the president. The Soviet delegate responded by rightly
claiming that the president's interpretation was illegal; that it was at variance with the Charter, with the four-Powers declaration,1 ' and with the
practice of the Security Council; and that, for these reasons, it was null
5. Id. at 31.
6. U.N. Doc. S/PV.1859, supra note 1, at 38-40.
7. Id. at 6.
8. Id. at 11-12.
9. Id. at 8-10.
10. Id. at 41.
11. Id. at 51-52.
12. U.N. Doc. S/4214 (1959).
13. 14 U.N. SCOR (848th mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.848 (1959).
14. 11 UNCIO Doc. 713, U.N. Doc. 852/III/1/37(1) (1945).
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and void.' 5 Moreover, although the president at the 1975 meeting (the
Soviet delegate) stated that "a decision taken by one membership of the
Council is binding upon the next membership of the Council," earlier, in
1950, the Soviet delegate had firmly insisted that "the Security Council
decides in each separate' meeting
whether to invite members of the Secre17
tariat or other persons.
Nevertheless, Dr. Kassim alleged that the "invitation" extended by
the Council to the PLO is an authoritative precedent and an innovation.
Innovation it is. But one can, and indeed should, wonder what is its legal
basis and validity. Although there are precedents for inviting states and
even "persons" to participate in the Council's meetings - the latter (by
rule 39) only "to supply it with information or to give other assistance"
never before has an organization been invited to participate on an "as
if a state" basis while not being a state at all."s
Dr. Kassim was not completely unaware of the high hurdles which
lay before him, and his attempt to blindly jump over them was not successful. Although he mentioned" that Professor Leo Gross characterized
the Council's action as null and void,'0 basing that determination on procedural and constitutional grounds," Dr. Kassim either found it too difficult to follow Professor Gross' analysis or preferred to misrepresent it.
Professor Gross did not say, as one would gather from Dr. Kassim's reference, that had the Council (in abuse of its powers) "based" its earlier
invitations to nonmember states and/or organizations on rule 37, or had it
clearly "based" the currently debated "invitation" on that rule, then the
"decision" would have been valid and constitutional. To the contrary,
Professor Gross stated:
[Tihere is no provision in the Charter or in the rules of procedure for
'as if' decisions or actions by the Council, that is for the treatment of
a body as if it were a member state; it follows that the action of the
Security Council was ultra vires the powers of the Council under the
Charter as well as the procedure laid down in the rules of procedure
[and that, therefore,] the action of the Council was, legally speaking,
2
null and void. 2
Hence, relying-as Dr. Kassim did-on earlier invitations which did not,
and indeed could not, confer the rights of a state on the invitees does not
support his argument, for the earlier invitations were intra vires the

15. See note 13 supra.
16. 30 U.N. SCOR (1856th mtg.) 46, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1856 (1975).
17. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1946-1951, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/
1, Case 93, at 131-32 (1954).
18. U.N. Doc. S/PV.1870, supra note 2, at 11; U.N. Doc. S/PV.1859, supra note 1, at 3.
19. Kassim, supra note 4, at 30.
20. Gross, supra note 2, at 479.
21. Id. at 477.
22. Id. at 479. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCEPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 538 (1966),
for a discussion of ultra vires decisions of international organizations.
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Council's powers. Dr. Kassim claimed that the Council's prior practice
was "not homogeneous," which may be true, but he brought no example
of any case in which a non-state invitee was accorded the rights of participation reserved to states. Homogeneity may be relevant in determining
the precedential effect of past practice, but ultra vires decisions can never
serve as precedents, regardless of how many times they may be repeated.
The problem of constitutionality with regard to the Council's "decision" was hardly touched upon by Dr. Kassim. Not only did he ignore the
assertion put by Professor Gross that the "decision" was ultra vires the
Council's powers, but he ignored the argument that the "decision" had, as
mentioned above, two different parts: (1) a technical invitation that
would normally be procedural, and (2) the portion which accorded the
PLO "as if a state" powers, which was substantive. The Council's president was, therefore, acting ultra vires in stating that it was adopted, since
the negative vote of a permanent member had been cast. Although Article
27(3) of the Charter was not expressly invoked in the second case, it still
applies. Neither decision can be considered binding.
II. "RECOGNITION" V. STATUS
The "invitation" was but one link in an ostensible chain of proofs
brought by Dr. Kassim to support his allegation that the PLO has gained
"the status of a participant in international law."' 3 "Recognition" of the
PLO by states and international organizations was, he argued, also part of
the chain. That "recognition," extended to the PLO as a "territorial public body" (a term specially created by him for the purpose) is, he wrote,
"reminiscent of recognition accorded to a new government as traditionally
characterized by international law.' 4 He also discussed the PLO's possible status as a government-in-exile.25
There was much confusion in Dr. Kassim's arguments stemming in
part, it would seem, from the lack of the classical and vital distinction
between the political and legal facets of recognition. According to Professor Kelsen:
The legal act of recognition must in principle be distinguished from
the political act of recognition. The first act ... is the establishment
of the fact that an individual or a body of individuals is actually the
government of a state. The second act is the declaration of willingness
to enter into mutual relations with this government. A goveriment,
according to the norms of international law, is the individual or body
of individuals which by virtue of the effective constitution of a state,
represents the state in its relations with other states, i.e., is competent
to act on behalf of the state in its relations with the community of
states.... A state is ... free to enter or refuse to enter into political
and other relations with a government, that is, it may grant or refuse

23. Kassim, supra note 4, at 32-33.
24. Id. at 29.
25. Id.
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to grant the government political, but never legal, recognition."
Perhaps the basic elements of recognition should be reviewed. First,
from the legal side, the act is declaratory. But, as Professor Kelsen
pointed out, the decision to enter into political relations, (that is, accepting a government as the representative of a state, not, of the people
concerned), lies solely within the discretion of the recognizing state.1 The
result is that while the acts of an unrecognized government may be accorded respect as sovereign acts by the courts of a non-recognizing state
or an international tribunal, the unrecognized government does not enjoy
a separate existence under the law of the non-recognizing state, and has
often been held by courts not to enjoy the power to bring a claim.' 8 Dr.
Kassim's assertion that the PLO had an "undisputed" right to represent
the Palestinian Arabs (not a state) was therefore baseless inasmuch as it
is rooted in the alleged similarity between the PLO as a "territorial public
body" and a government, or a state. Hence, his conclusion that decisions
made by independent states without "addressing" the PLO are "non-authoritative, non-controlling" was also misguided, for there is no obligation
upon states to recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian
Arabs.
Second, statehood is contingent on the body in question's de facto
fulfillment of the criteria for statehood, namely, a permanent population,
a defined territory, a government, and independence (that is, the capacity
to enter into relations with other states).29 Had the PLO fulfilled each
and everyone of these criteria then all states, including those which do
not recognize it, would be required to respect its rights under international law as an independent state. Thus, for example, a non-recognizing
state would be forbidden to threaten or use force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of the non-recognized state in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter. But the PLO does not fulfill these
criteria. It is not in possession and control of a defined territory, and it
does not exercise the powers and authority of an effective government. In
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view of the maverick support of the West Bank population that constantly moves from Jordan to the PLO and back (often under threats and
violence, including murders committed by the PLO against dissidents or
pro-Jordanian West Bankers), and in view of the fact that most of this
population hold Jordanian passports and willingly give allegiance to King
Hussein, it is at least dubious whether the PLO fulfills the criterion of
"permanent population." Finally, "independence" is also lacking, not
only because of what has just been said, but also because Israel has exercised full and exclusive control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
since 1967.
III. A TWIsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE "TERRITORIAL PUBLIC BODY"

Dr. Kassim resorted to an "institution" especially created by him for
the occasion: the "territorial public body." Such entities, according to Dr.
Kassim, "include territorial units the elites of which are in the process of
consolidating their respective nation state units." 0 This brought to mind
the United Nations resolutions he cited, but he extended the concept
much further by contending that "[tihe "target authority. . . of an irredentist elite [constituting a 'territorial public body'... may be either a
national or a foreign (colonial or occupying) government."' He ignored
the well known fact that the United Nations General Assembly has consistently limited its resolutions to "alien," "foreign," or "colonial" domination, insisting on excluding national governments like Israel's.32 Dr.
Kassim, however, included them, thus being directly at odds with the
general rule of international law, repeatedly reaffirmed by such resolutions, that states must refrain from intervention in international conflicts
within other states. 8 What makes these bodies territorial, according to
Dr. Kassim, is the fact that "the revolutionary elite draws its major powers from the territorial population it claims to represent."
And he
brought evidence to corroborate the argument, namely, that some such
institutions and communities have received various degrees of recognition
as subjects of international law. However-and this is the major flaw in
his thesis-he brought no evidence to support his implicit converse pro30. Kassim, supra note 4, at 9.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2649, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 73, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970); G.A. Res. 2787, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 82, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A.
Res. 3246, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 87, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A. Res. 31/91, 31
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 42, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
33. See, e.g., Essentials of Peace, G.A. Res. 290, U.N. Doc. Res. A/1251, at 13 (1949);
Peace through Deeds, G.A. Res. 380, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 13-14, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950); Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 14) 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); Declaration of Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970); Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31)
142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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position, that any body which he characterizes as a "territorial public
body" is entitled to such recognition. Moreover, there is hardly any resemblance between the bodies Dr. Kassim used as examples and the
PLO. The movements mentioned by him all controlled parts of the relevant territory. 8 Dr. Kassim asserted that the Vietcong were in full control of the South Vietnamese population while United States forces were
in full control of the territory of South Vietnam. He also cited the examples of the Algerian Liberation Front and the French forces." But he was
mistaken here too. Each of the movements had effective control of large
parts of the territory in which and for which it fought. In the case of
Algeria there was even an official map, issued by the French Government,
that showed the zones which were controlled by the "Front. 8 7 The cases
of the American Civil War and the American, Cuban and Iranian Revolutions"8 are also completely different from that of the PLO.
Hence, Dr. Kassim's claim that the PLO is entitled to recognition,
despite the fact that it does not control any part of Palestine, is without
precedent.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE UNFOUNDED PROPOSITION:
DE FACTO RECOGNITION

Whether one considers states, international organizations, governments-in-exile, or belligerent communities as bodies sometimes entitled
to de facto recognition, the PLO simply lacks the prerequisites.8 ' As discussed earlier, the PLO is not a state and does not claim to be one. International organizations are composed of states; by distinguishing "territorial" from "non-territorial public bodies" and rightly placing
international organizations in the latter category, Dr. Kassim implicitly
acknowledged that the PLO is not entitled to personality as such an
organization.
The status of a government-in-exile depends on the "legal condition
of the community it claims to represent, which may be a state, a belligerent community, or a non-self-governing people."4 In and of itself a government-in-exile enjoys no legal status. ' The Palestinians are spread all
over the Middle East-including approximately one million in the independent state of Jordan, which is also part of Palestine. What is the legal
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condition of this community? This need not be discussed in this article
because all the governments-in-exile offered by Dr. Kassim as examples i
represented occupied countries as absentee sovereigns,
and their acts had
4
no force or effect inside their home countries.
Who is the sovereign of the West Bank? It is enough for the purposes
of this article to say that the question is debatable. Jordan claims to be
that sovereign, and for nineteen years, from the establishment of Israel in
1948 until the Six-Day War of 1967, Jordan exercised effective control
under a claim of annexation. The vast majority of the population of the
West Bank held Jordanian passports during this time, unlike the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip who were denied Egyptian passports while Egypt
occupied that land. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as well as
the Camp David Accords refer to Jordan as a potential party to a peace
agreement with Israel without making any reference to the PLO. Israel,
on the other hand, claims that she has a better title to the West Bank
than does Jordan, and some prominent scholars support this view." But
all this is practically immaterial. The PLO has decided not to claim the
status of a government-in-exile. In view of that decision, Dr. Kassim's
proposition that the PLO be treated as a quasi-government-in-exile is
both legally meaningless and factually foundless.
Nor does the last possibility, that of a belligerent community, solve
Dr. Kassim's problem. He referred to "anticolonial liberation movements," apparently assuming that all such institutions are subjects of international law.4 5 Dr. Kassim did not employ the term "national liberation movement" at all; rather, he discussed
"insurgents recognized as
46
belligerents" or belligerent communities.
According to international law the following are the criteria for attaining the status of a belligerent community: (1) the belligerents must
control a substantial portion of territory; (2) they must conduct hostilities
in accordance with the laws of war; and (3) there must exist an armed
conflict of a general nature.' 7 The PLO satisfies none of these criteria.
First, as was already pointed out, the PLO has never controlled any por42. Kassim, supra note 4, at 10, 28.
43. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 834 (2d ed. 1962).
44. J. STONE, No PEACE, No WAR INTHE MIDDLE EAST (1969); Rostow, PalestinianSelfDetermination,5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORDER 147 (1979).
45. Kassim, supra note 4, at 11.
46. The difference between belligerency and unrecognized belligerency, or insurgency,
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and the existence of war in a legal sense." The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897). Lauterpacht, cited by Dr. Kassim at 11 n.48, has acknowledged that insurgency "does not confer a
formal status" and that its "recognition" does not go beyond what has actually and expressly been conceded. H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 275 (1947).
See also Sorensen, supra note 39, at 288-89.
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tion of the territory which constituted "Palestine." It is apparently for
this reason that Dr. Kassim's analysis of the juridical status of the PLO
was based on lex ferende rather than lex lata. To avoid acknowledging
the legal consequences of the PLO's inability to establish itself on a piece
of territory, Dr. Kassim invented the term "territorial public body."
Rather than employ the accepted international law test of effective control, he characterized a public body as "territorial" when it "claims to
represent" a "territorial population.' 4 By that standard, virtually any
"revolutionary elite" which identifies with a given population could qualify for "territorial public body" status. Examples would include the
United States-based Estonian government-in-exile; the government of
Taiwan vis-d-vis its claims to mainland China; or the relatives and associates of the former Shah of Iran. Were the law as Dr. Kassim would like it
to be, with states being required to accord legal status to any self-declared group which claims territory but exercises no effective control, the
consequences for the international legal order would be far-reaching and
potentially devastating.
Second, the PLO has repeatedly failed to conduct itself in accordance
with even the most basic principles of the laws of war. Its units have
engaged in airplace hijackings, the taking of non-combatants as hostages,
the indiscriminate murder of non-combatants, and innumerable terrorist
bombings of civilian installations such as open marketplaces.' 9 Such actions violate, inter alia,principles established by the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.50 There is no need to explain
why the third criterion of belligerent community status is also not met by
the PLO.
The PLO thus enjoys no greater claim to belligerent community status than it does to statehood, Dr. Kassim notwithstanding. The organization has not satisfied the requirements for entitlement to de facto status
as a subject of international law, and it does not enjoy any rights other
than those which states voluntarily elect to accord it under municipal law.
States which choose not to accord recognition to the PLO are not violating any international obligation, and their decision not to deal with the
organization, either because of its territorist activities or for other reasons, has no effect on their other international obligations.
Itshould be emphasized that those states which have chosen not to
accord the PLO any recognition are following a practice long accepted
with respect to the recognition of new governments. Recognition is frequently withheld until the government to be recognized has shown a will-
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ingness to comply with the obligations imposed upon states by international law. 1 The PLO has not done this; rather, it has repeatedly
advocated the resort to violence, as shown by Article 9 of its National
Covenant: "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it
is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. . . ." The leaders of
the PLO speak of the destruction of the occupying country [Israeli,5' of
"raising the flag of the revolution by means of the rifle" only,53 and of
"machine guns and rifle bullets" as "the only way to reach understanding
with the Zionist enemy."" This is perhaps why Dr. Kassim found it necessary to engage in an uphill struggle to convince the reader that the
PLO, although not claiming to be a government, should be treated as
such. It has, so he argued, "governmental authority" which expresses itself in war situations, in extradition powers, and in taxation authority. 5
As to the exercise of "sovereign" powers over Palestinians in war situations, Dr. Kassim referred to two irrelevant agreements: the 1969
Cairo agreement between the PLO and Lebanon and the 1970 agreement
between the PLO and Jordan." There is nothing in these agreements to
prove that the PLO really exercises powers over Palestinians-certainly
not "sovereign" powers. Lebanon never surrendered its sovereignty over
any part of its territory to the PLO. It is no wonder that Dr. Kassim, in
order to support his proposition, felt required to omit any reference to
Article 13 of the Cairo Agreement. That provision read: "Lebanese authorities will continue to exercise their complete prerogatives and responsibilities in all regions of Lebanon and under all circumstances." To assume that Jordan had waived any of its rights in favor of the PLO is
simply absurd. Dr. Kassim informed the reader the "PLO institutions"
were granted "complete freedom," that "the civil and military sources of
Jordan were to be utilized to save the cause of the Palestinian liberation,"
and that "no authority would intervene against any member of the Palestine Revolutionary Forces or interfere in their affairs under any circumstances." He then concludes "the PLO achieved the exercise of nearly all
governmental powers.' 7 Perhaps he is simply unaware of the fact that
the PLO units which were forcibly evicted from Jordan during the 19701971 fighting were not permitted to return in the years that follows. Palestinian operations from Jordan into Israel have been virtually non-existent for the past decade, notwithstanding the paper commitments which
may have been made. King Hussein did not even meet with Yasser Arafat
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from 1971 until 1977, must less permit him to direct any Palestinian exercise of "governmental authority."
As for the 1978 accord between the PLO and Jordan cited by Dr.
Kassim,58 more recent events, particularly the appointment of a special
government minister for Palestinian Affairs, have indicated that the
Jordanian Government still views itself, against the vehement protests of
the PLO, as the authority responsible for Palestinians on the West
Bank." Thus Jordan rescinded, for all practical purposes, its consent to
have the Palestinians represented solely by the PLO. Jordan's actions indicate that, as former occupier of the West Bank, it continues to assert
the power to give the PLO a power of attorney or to withdraw it at will.
However, let us suppose that both Lebanon and Jordan were to grant
certain powers to the PLO. This would still not meet the requirement
that the "government" seeking legal status enjoy the habitual obedience
of the bulk of the population. Not only must the "government" itself be
the source of power, but the population referred to must also be that of
the relevant territory, namely, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip-not
Lebanon and not Jordan.
As to taxation, it is hard to understand how the fact that a certain
government agrees to collect taxes for the PLO can be asserted as proof
that the latter enjoys "governmental authority." Dr. Kassim's extradition
argument is likewise faulty. It amounts merely to stating that while there
was no extradition treaty between the PLO and the Arab states to which
he referred, those states decided ex gratia to answer two isolated extradition requests made by the PLO.

V. A SUCCESSOR TO TERRORISM?
It is no wonder, in view of the analysis hitherto made, that Dr. Kassim found himself compelled to resort to another argument: "The PLO"
he wrote, "is the legitimate successor to the Arab Higher Committee and
subsequently to the Government of All Palestine."
He explains that the
Arab Higher Committee (AHC) "was a self-proclaimed entity claiming
the authority of representing a well defined territorial community: the
Palestinian People. . . . The Committee thus met all the juridical requirements necessary for qualifying it as a territorial public body."'
Let us begin with the facts. The AHC was the organization of the
Palestinian-Arab leadership in 1936. It was outlawed for terrorist activities by the British Mandatory Authorities in 1937 but continued to operate in exile until it dissolved in 1939. In 1945 a new AHC was formed, in
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the absence of local agreement, through the good offices of Arab League
representatives. In 1946, rivalry within the AHC led to the formation by
its dissidents of a rival Arab Higher Front. In the summer of 1946 the
Arab League dissolved the two rival committees and appointed a new
AHC which still retains its formal existence." The Arab League, as is
well known, was established in 1945 by the seven Arab states then independent or on the threshold of independence. The Palestinian Arabs were
represented by a notable with observer status. According to the Pact of
the Arab League, member states are bound only by those resolutions of
its Council for which they vote affirmatively."
Dr. Kassim was correct in saying that the AHC appeared before the
British Royal Commission in 1937." It was not, however, invited as such,
certainly not as the sole "indisputable" representative of the Palestinian
Arab community. Although its members were invited to participate, an
invitation was also extended to the Nashashibi opposition.6" It is true
that the British Government invited the new AHC to participate in the
second London Conference of 1946. But it is untrue that it "was received
as the representative of the Palestine Arabs,"" if this is what Dr. Kassim
was hinting at by the words "a similar [to the one inviting participation
at the 1939 Conference] invitation was extended . . . to the Second
London Conference. 6 7 Moreover, the AHC did not actually participate in
the Conference at all "because Britain would not allow the Mufti [a religious leader of Palestinian Arabs and head of the first AHC who has associated himself with Nazi Germany during World War II] to participate.""
Dr. Kassim was correct in stating that in 1947 the United Nations Special
Committee on Palestine asked the new AHC to present the view of the
Arab Palestinians."
What he failed to mention was that the Arab Higher Committee was
not at all times the same body. While sometimes it was the recognized
spokesman for the Palestinian Arabs, at other times it was not. This recognition was entirely dependent on the recognizing body, which was at
complete liberty to recognize and to withdraw recognition at its own discretion. The new AHC had been formed by the Arab League, and the
League approved the limited presence and powers of an unelected Pales-
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tinian Arab appointed by it.
Dr. Kassim was also mistaken in asserting that the AHC was declared to be the Government of All Palestine in 1948.70 That "government
was established by the Arab League under Egypt's leadership, 7 ' and although Dr. Kassim rightly mentioned that five Arab states and Afghanistan accorded it full recognition,7 2 he neglected to mention that neither
Jordan nor any other state in the world community recognized it and
that, in protest, (Trans)Jordanian King Abdullah's response was "to assemble some Palestinian Arab Leaders .... and to obtain a resolution
... which called for the annexation of Arab Palestine by
(Trans)Jordan. ' '17 This "annexation" was effected in 1950, making Jordan an indispensable party to any steps relevant to the Palestine question
both as de facto, though illegal, occupier of parts of Palestine and as
"trustee" (until 1967). As is known but conveniently omitted by Dr. Kassim, the Arab League, after having objected to the "annexation" and
threatening Jordan (one of its members) with expulsion, came to terms
with the situation. The League decided that Jordan should hold the Area
"on trust until a final settlement of the Palestine question was
reached." ' This decision was never, before 1967, expressly or impliedly
revoked or changed.
It is not exactly clear what Dr. Kassim's purpose was in contrasting
the Jewish Agency with the Arab Higher Committee. He was correct in
arguing that the AHC was a self-proclaimed entity while the agency 7was
constituted under the League of Nations Mandate granted to Britain. ' It
is also true that the agency was, and still is, an international public body
as it was, and is, a body representing Jewish (at first only Zionist) parties
and organizations from all over the world, Palestine included. But the
Agency's locus standi was, as was the AHC's, "subject always to the control of the Administration" and its recognition as such an agency was for
"as long as its organization and constitution [were] in the opinion of the
Mandatory appropriate .... ",76 The difference, in this respect, between
the Agency and the AHC lay in the fact that the former derived its legal
standing from an international document under the auspices of the
League of Nations with a view to assisting the Mandatory in fulfilling the
international Mandate with which it had been entrusted, namely, the establishment of a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine. The Agency was
entitled to its standing so long as its organization and constitution remained "appropriate." The authority conferred upon Britain to deter-
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mine "appropriateness" could not, of course, be used arbitrarily and was
subject to judicial review by the Permanent Court of International Justice. The AHC, on the other hand, had no such rights and could, as at
times it was, be deprived of its "legal" standing at Britain's will.
Dr. Kassim asserted that the PLO was the legitimate successor to the
AHC. If this is so, then its rights and obligations as a result of such status
must be identical to those of the AHC. The AHC had no independent
rights and was subject to occasional and limited "recognition." Recognition may be accorded and withdrawn at will. Dr. Kassim's entire argument as to succession is without foundation. There is no general succession in international law,7 only a qualified succession that may occur,
subject to limitations, with respect to states or international organizations.7 8 Neither the AHC nor the PLO was or is such an organization.
The AHC was composed of the leaders of six Palestinian Arab parties,
and the PLO-following the recommendation of the Arab Summit Conference in Cairo in January 1964-was established by some 400 Palestinians headed by Ahmed Shukairi. These Palestinians claimed, as Dr. Kassim put it, to be representative authorities of their respective
communities, 79 but none of them was formally a representative of a state.
The PLO remains an organization composed of several terrorist groups
sponsored by one Arab state or another. For the same reasons, the PLO
did not, and could not, succeed the Government of All Palestine, which,
as was already pointed out, did not replace the AHC. The Government of
All Palestine has never been formally dissolved.
Of equal importance is the fact that in 1964, when the PLO was
founded, "remnants of the old AHC, still led by the Mufti, denounced
Shukairi for seeking a 'fake entity' [i.e. the PLO], arguing that [the 400]
delegates to the Congress [which established the PLO] had been hand
picked."80 Further, the AHC still formally exists and, until recently, had
its own representative in the United Nations alongside the PLO
representative.
VI. STATUS v. REPRESENTATIENEss
It follows from what has been said so far that the PLO is not an
international body and has no status according to contemporary international law. Although some states may have granted it permission to open
offices or accorded its employees quasi-diplomatic immunities, no state is
under any obligation to recognize the PLO either de jure or de facto. Nevertheless, Dr. Kassim argued that the PLO has an "undisputed right" to
serve as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. "No authority,"
he stated, "can legally address the Palestinian community without first
addressing" the PLO.6 '

77. 1 L.
78.
79.
80.
81.

OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
Id. at 21, 166-69, 370-80.
Kassim, supra note 4, at 18.
R. WARD, D. PERETZ, & E. WILSON, THE PALEsTiNE STATE 41 (1970).
Kassim, supra note 4, at 33.

1981

THE ROAD TO LEGAL CHAOS

Without regard to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the
Camp David Accords, Dr. Kassim's argument seems to conceal a latent
threat on the one hand and a prophecy of total failure on the other.
While there is always the possibility that the peace process agreed upon
at Camp David will not succeed, the question we are dealing with is that
of law, not of politics. Let us, therefore, examine the assertion of representativeness, which can very simply be dismissed because there is no
necessary connection between political recognition and representiveness.
By recognizing the Republic of China (Taiwan), the United States did not
necessarily "recognize" its government as the representative of the Chinese people. Even if the United States had so declared, this alone would
not have made the Taiwanese government representative as long as, in
fact, it was not. Likewise, the United States may accord political recognition to a military government which comes to power in Latin America or
elsewhere as a consequence of a coup d'6tat, although such a government
may at best represent the will of a small militant group. And the fact that
the United States refuses to grant recognition to a duly elected government will not, of course, make it nonrepresentative.
Recognition is a political act. Representativeness is a material fact.
The political act of recognition means only that the government recognized is accepted as "enjoying the habitual obedience of the bulk of the
population with a reasonable expectancy of permanence" and, therefore,
as representing the state, not necessarily the people governed. 2 As such it
has rights and responsibilities towards its citizens. The statements and
declarations mentioned in Dr. Kassim's article as having been made by
governments and international organizations as regards the "representativeness" of the PLO may not, therefore, establish representativeness in
fact but may, at most, serve as an explanation or excuse for the political
act of "recognition" that followed.
Moreover, despite the risk of being threatened or even assassinated
by PLO terrorists for "disobedience," considerable segments of the Palestinian population in southern Lebanon, to say nothing of the population
in Jordan, neither acknowledge nor obey the PLO with a reasonable expectancy of permanence. Several of the terrorist organizations which comprise the PLO have withdrawn, claiming that the PLO does not adequately represent the Palestinian Arabs. An example is George Habash's
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. When withdrawing, such
organizations typically proclaim that they will not accept any settlement
which may be agreed upon by the PLO and will continue their armed
struggle against Israel until the Palestine question is "satisfactorily"
solved, that is, when Israel is exterminated.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

For nineteen years (1948-1967) the Palestinian Arabs, through Jordan as their "trustee," were in full control of the West Bank, while Egypt
82. 1 L.

OPPENHIM,

supra note 77, at 131.
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occupied the Gaza Strip. For reasons known to the governments of these
two states and the rest of the Arab world it was decided not to establish a
Palestinian state. Nonetheless, since its birth in 1964, the PLO has "officially" struggled against Israel, and evidently also against Jordan, with
the stated goal of establishing a "secular" independent state in "Palestine." This state would encompass Israel, the territory occupied by Israel
in 1967, and the territory occupied by Jordan before 1969. Establishing
this state under the leadership of the PLO-an international terrorist organization officially encouraged and supported by the Soviet Union-may
lead to the forcible extermination of Israel, a state recognized by the international community and a member of the United Nations. The largest
and most important terrorist member of the PLO, Al-Fatah, approved a
political program at its fourth Congress held in Damascus on May 23-31,
1980, which bluntly stated: "[Fatah's] aim is to liberate Palestine completely and liquidate the Zionist entity politically, economically, militarily, culturally and ideologically."
In view of the above, Dr. Kassim's statement that, with the Security
Council's "decision," the PLO now can exercise its "rights" by "peaceful
means" seems more than hypocritical. Had the PLO really resorted to
peaceful means after the adoption of the Security Council's "decision,"
and stopped its terrorist attacks against Israeli women and children,
Israel would probably have negotiated with it as a relevant factor in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Under the circumstances, Israel, contrary to Dr.
Kassim's view, is under no legal obligation to recognize the PLO as a
"territorial public body," either on the basis of that organization's own
characteristics or its role as a successor to the Arab Higher Committee
and the Government of All Palestine. Nor is Israel under any obligation
to negotiate with the PLO, Dr. Kassim's latent threats notwithstanding.
The Security Council's "decision" to grant the PLO rights "as if" it
were a state is null and void as ultra vires. Moreover, it amounts to an
attempt to acknowledge an organization which openly declares its intention-contrary to the United Nations Charter and international law-to
be the forcible exterminator of a member state. Anyone who joins in such
an attempt should be aware that it is but a landmark on the road to legal
chaos, and indeed to the total destruction of world order and of the
human values most of us take for granted.

A Response to Dr. Evyatar Levine
Ares F. KASSIM
Dr. Levine's reply is perplexing indeed.' In his title, he declares that
the recognition of the PLO is a menace to world public order. However, it
is the world community, which is responsible for the world order, that has
accorded the PLO universal recognition. Over one hundred states have
expressed their recognition of the PLO and have voted for its representative capacity as well as for its right to establish an independent state in
Palestine. This is evidence of the fact that the world public order is better served by recognizing the PLO than by excluding it. Dr. Levine's alleged care for "world public order" is little more than care for "Israel's
public order."
Obviously, Dr. Levine started his reply with the wrong conclusion.
He concluded that the Security Council's decision to invite the PLO to
attend its meetings on the basis of rule 37 of its rules of procedure, and
thus bring the PLO into the realm of public order, was ultra vires. To
support his conclusion, Dr. Levine cited arguments that stand directly
against him. He quoted the representative of the United Kingdom as
saying that granting the PLO exceptional status constituted an "undesirable and unnecessary" precedent. The representative, however, did not
claim that the precedent was "illegal" or "unconstitutional." Further1. Levine, A Landmark on the Road to Legal Chaos: Recognition of the PLO as a
Menace to World Public Order, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 243 (1981). Some of the points
raised by Dr. Levine are not discussed in this article either because they are covered in this
writer's response to Dr. Friedlander or because they fall beyond the scope of this analysis.
However, there are two points that deserve attention in this regard. Dr. Levine, being a
presiding judge in the Military Court of the West Bank, must be fully aware of Israel's
rejection of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to the occupied territories.
Hence, his condemnation of the PLO for not conducting its warfare in accordance with the
rules of combat is hypocritical. For a discussion of Israel's violations of its duties as an
occupying power and a party to the Geneva Conventions, as well as of the practices of military judges, see R. SHEHADH & J. Ku'rruu, THu WEST BANK AND THi RULE OF LAW (1980).
One might even cite the United Nations spokesman who stated that Israeli soldiers killed
five Palestinian guerillas in South Lebanon, stacked their bodies, and blew them apart with
explosives. Int'l Herald Trib., Jan. 3, 1981 at 3, col. 8.
The second point relates to Dr. Levine's insinuation that the Mufti of Palestine had
collaborated with the Nazis. As a matter of record, it was the Zionist organization and not
any Palestinian leader that signed official agreements with the Nazis. The Zionist-Nazi collaberation has been carefully documented by Jewish and Zionist writers, including H.
ARENT, EICHMAN IN JERUSALEM (1963); J. KnMcHu & D. KiMciiz, Thu SuKc
ROADS Tuu
ILLEGAL MIGRATION OF A PEOPLE 1938-1948 (1955); B. HucHT, PEuFDY (1961); R. HiLEuEG,
THx DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (1961); Yisraeli, The Third Reich and Palestine,7
MIDDLE EAST. STUD. 343 (1971). Yisraeli's article was based on his doctoral dissertation,
entitled The PalestineProblem in German Politics, 1889-1945, which was submitted to the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
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more, Dr. Levine's assertion that Article 27(3) of the United Nations
Charter still applies does not support his conclusion. If that article applies, why did the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Italy,
and the United States not invoke it? The invitation to the PLO was extended more than once, and if those representatives missed Article 27(3)
the first time, can Dr. Levine claim that they inadvertently missed it on
subsequent occasions? One may reasonably conclude that their failure to
invoke that article is indicative.
On the issue of recognition, Dr. Levine contested the assertion that
recognition accorded to territorial public bodies is reminiscent of recognition extended to new governments. He quoted Professor Kelsen to support his argument, citing an article published in 1941.2 Professor Kelsen,
contrary to the general trend adopted by international law scholars, had
moved backward from declaratist to constitutivist3 Nevertheless, the

quoted passage is, in substance, supportive of my assertion that states
were not under any legal obligation to do so, but by doing so, those states
have accepted the legal consequences of such recognition, including the
admittance of the PLO in their jurisdictions and the PLO's right to bring
claims before their courts.
By referring to the criteria for statehood, as Dr. Levine suggested,
the PLO earns at least equal marks with Israel. The first two elements of
"permanent population" and "defined territory" are better fulfilled by
the PLO than by the state of Israel. Article 5 of the PLO Charter defines
the PLO's population as being those Palestinians "who were living normally in Palestine up to 1947, whether they remained or were expelled.
Every child who was born to a Palestinian after this date whether in Palestine or outside is a Palestinian." Article 2 of the Charter defines the
PLO's territory as being Mandatory Palestine. The state of Israel on the
other hand has defined neither of these elements. Israel does not accept
the concept that the Israelis living within Israel are its defined "people";
it repeatedly declares that it is the sovereign state of the entire "Jewish
people" regardless of their present location or citizenship." Israel's Nationality Law8 and its Law of Returns (and the respective amendments)
are two good examples. Likewise, Israel officially declares that its "present frontiers" do not derogate from its title to the alleged historical "Eretz Israel." No one can define either the "present" borders (see, for example, the U.N. partition plan, the Armistice lines, the 1950's expansions,
7
and the 1967 borders) or the "Eretz Israel" geographical boundaries.
2. Levine, supra note 1, at 247 n.26.
3. See Kelsen, Th~orie gknkrale du droit internationalpublic: problbmes choisis, in 42
REcUKIL DES COURS 117, 260 (1932).
4. Atty.-Gen. of Israel v. Eichman, Case No 40/61 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem), App. No. 336/
61 (S. Ct. Israel, May 29, 1962).
5. 6 L.S.I. 50 (1952) (amended 1958, 1968, and 1971).
6. 4 L.S.I. 114 (1950) (amended 1954 and 1970).
7. See Kassim, A Response to Professor Robert Friedlander,10 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 237 n.13 and accompanying text.
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As to the element of "government," the PLO, while deliberately shying away from such a label, exercises a wide range of governmental authority, and this has been universally recognized. The absence of the
fourth element of statehood, namely independence, does not detract from
the PLO's status for the reason that an independent Palestine has been
suppressed by the Israeli occupation. It is significant that repeated U.N.
General Assembly resolutions have called for Israel's evacuation of the
West Bank and Gaza in order to enable the PLO to establish its independent state.8
Dr. Levine's comment 9 on the concept of devising an "institution"
called the "territorial public body" to accommodate the PLO is complementary rather that critical. Lawyers, in general, resort to establishing a
legal framework within which they can fit in their "cases." My PLO study
was not an exception. The study, having monitored certain developments
that have take place on the international plane-the American Revolution and Civil War,10 the European Governments-in-Exile, and the Algerian, Vietnamese and African movements-showed that the PLO falls
squarely within the basic pattern of formulation and recognition shared
by its predecessors. Dr. Levine further criticized the concept of a "territorial public body" as lacking the necessary parameters. In all examples
cited in the PLO study, an empirical test was employed to determine the
public body status of the entities discussed. Professor Lauterpacht suggested these empirical criteria: "[I]n each particular case the question
whether a person or a body is a subject of international law must be actual experience and to the reason of the law as distinguished from a
preconceived notion as to who can be subjects of international law."11
Dr. Levine's contention that since the PLO controls no territory, it
would be erroneous to compare it with the Algerian or the Vietnamese
Fronts, is unfounded. Forcefully preventing the PLO from establishing
normal control over its claimed territory by the occupying power is no
different from the French and the Americans forcefully depriving the Algerian and Vietnamese Fronts of their claims. Superiority in military occupation neither gives legal title to the occupying power nor deprives the
population under occupation from their rights.
Finally, Dr. Levine should reconsider the facts he presented with respect to the Arab Higher Committee (AHC). The AHC remained the de
facto representative body of the Palestinian people in spite of the fact

8.The latest resolution adopted by the U.N. General Assembly was Resolution 35/207
of December 16, 1980, and was carried by a vote of 101 to 13, with 30 abstentions. See U.N.
CHRON., Mar. 1981, at 13.
9. Levine, supra note 1, at 248.
10. During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln treated the Confederacy as an
entity of international status rather than as a group of traitors or terrorists. He emphasized
this fact by the issuance of General Order No. 100 (1863), which was a precursor of the
present laws of war as finally codified in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
11. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (1950).
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that the mandatory authorities outlawed it in 1937. The AHC was the
entity that represented the Palestinian people at the London Conference
of 1939 and before the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine in 1947. Dr.
Levine's statement that the AHC was appointed by the Arab League in
1946 is incorrect. The fact is that the AHC was in existence in spite of
pressure exerted by the Arab governments which tried at the time to play
an intermediary role between the AHC and the mandatory power. Furthermore, the allegation that the Nashashibi faction injured the representative capacity of the AHC is not correct, as the AHC was widely regarded as the sole authoritative representative of the Palestinian
community. The authorities cited by Dr. Levine to support these claimed
"facts" do not in fact lend such support."'

12. Dr. Levine cites F. KHoum, Tiei
pages he cites supports his "facts."
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The long standing nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, coupled
with a belief that abatement is not in the offing, lends itself well to scholarly attention and legal discernment. Collectively the materials presented
offer those who deal with this sensitive and delicate set of human relationships an opportunity to think about the issues rather than search for
comments written by others.
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GENERAL BACKGROUND

.The background of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, legal and otherwise, can best be understood by an appreciation of the roles played by
each of the major political actors-the British, the Yishuv (the Palestinian Jewish community), and the Palestinian Arab community. A number
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ARTICLES

Legal Aspects of the U.S.S.R. Grain
Embargo
JAMES R. WALCZAK
I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 4, 1980, in response to the invasion of Afghanistan by the
Soviet Union, President Carter imposed controls on the exportation of
various commodities to the U.S.S.R.' Included among these commodities
were wheat, corn, soybeans, and soybean products. On January 6, exporters of these commodities urged that the Government "step into the
shoes" of the Russians and assume the affected contracts. The following
day, Vice-President Mondale publicly announced the Government's commitment to take over the contracts.
The objective of this article is to explain and analyze the legal and
practical aspects of the embargo and the Government's contract assumption operation. It is not the purpose of the author to examine the wisdom
or effectiveness of the embargo. That subject has already been discussed
rather thoroughly in the popular press, as well as more specialized
publications.2
As with most legal problems, however, a simple bare-bones analysis
of the legal authority for the embargo and the contract assumption operation will shed little light on the true dimensions of the problems which

James R. Walczak is a staff attorney in the Foreign Agricultural and Commodity Stabilization Division, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Agriculture. B.S.F.S.,
M.L.T., Georgetown University; M.A., J.D., University of Denver. The opinions and views
expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent the official
position of the United States Government.
1. The controls were initially implemented by regulations which were issued by the Department of Commerce on January 7, 1980. See Fed. Reg. 1883 (1980). They were subsequently amended on February 4, 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 8289 (1980). The embargo also
included a ban on the sale of American high technology products to the Soviet Union and
the curtailment of Soviet fishing privileges in American waters. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1980, at
1, col. 6.
2. See, e.g., de Borchegrave, Embargo is Failing, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10, 1980, at 60;
Gilpin & Bienen, Economic Sanctions: An Obsolete Weapon?, FORBES, Feb. 18, 1980, at 91;
Morgan, Politics of Grain, ATLANTIC, Feb. 15, 1980, at 29; Paarlberg, Lessons of the Grain
Embargo, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 144 (1980); Wright, Grain Embargo Backfires, NEW STATESMAN,
Feb. 1, 1980, at 157; America's Leaky Grain Embargo, U.S. NEWS & WORLD Rzp., Mar. 24,
1980, at 12.
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faced Government officials on the early days of 1980. For purposes of explication and elucidation, the nature and purpose of the contract assumption operation and related actions will be set forth in some detail. An
examination of various accounts of these actions reveals a wide misunderstanding of: (a) what the Government actually did; and (b) why the Government did what it did.8 In this respect, it is hoped that one of the primary contributions of this article will be an accurate explanation of these
actions. A secondary, but equally important objective is to highlight in a
general way the practical difficulties of imposing and maintaining an embargo of agricultural exports. These difficulties comprise a mixture of economic, psychological, and political factors which were clearly illustrated
by the debate that took place within the Reagan Administration prior to
the lifting of the embargo. 4 In a broader sense, the study of the imposition, implementation, and lifting of the embargo can reveal the practical
limitations on the future exercise of the economic power of the United
States in the international arena.8
II.

IMPOSITION OF THE EMBARGO

A.

Legal Authority to Impose the Embargo
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979.
Within two weeks, the President announced and implemented a complete
range of controls on the exportation of agricultural commodities to the
U.S.S.R., pursuant to authority invested by the Export Administration
Act of 1979.6
The general thrust of the Export Administration Act is set forth in
3. A measure of responsibility for this confusion must be attributed to the government

itself. While the policies described below were formulated within a short period of time,
they were not conceived and implemented simultaneously. Nor were they fully understood
by all the many voices speaking for the various government agencies involved at that time.
Consequently, a fair degree of confusion existed for some time, and still persists to this day.
4. Rightly or wrongly, many farmers and their Congressional representatives viewed the
embargo as a continuing source of harm to the farm economy. They also viewed the embargo as being basically unfair. At the same time, the Reagan Administration has been attempting to project a clearer, "tougher" U.S. position on U.S.-Soviet relations. Not surprisingly, therefore, the embargo was a very sensitive emotional and political issue which
President Reagan had inherited from the previous administration.
5. Further limits may be imposed by the Senate Agricultural Committee. As of this
writing, the Senate is taking steps to make it financially prohibitive for the government to
use a commodity embargo as a foreign policy weapon. If approved, the government would
guarantee 100% parity for their commodities in an embargo of only farm products against a
major export customer. Den. Post., May 13, 1981, at 12, col. 1. See note 50, infra, and accompanying text.
6. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (Supp. IV 1980). It should be noted that actions taken under
the Export Administration Act are exempt from the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act. See Section 13 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412. See generally Dvorin, The
Export AdministrationAct of 1979: An Examination of Foreign Availability of Controlled
Goods and Technologies, 2 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 179 (1980); Note, The Trade Agreement
Act of 1979. Title IX Enforcement Provisions, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 123 (1980); Note,
Reconciliation of Conflicting Goals in the Export Administration Act of 1979-A Delicate
Balance, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 415 (1980).

1981

U.S.S.R.

GRAIN EMBARGO

Section 3 of the Act, which states the policies in furtherance of which the
President may impose export controls. These policies may be broken
down into four general categories: national security, foreign policy, short
supply, and foreign boycotts. For obvious reasons, only the former two
categories served as a basis for justifying the President's imposition of the
Soviet grain embargo.
1. National Security
The national security provisions of the Act are set forth in detail in
Section 5. The authorities of that section may be used only to the extent
necessary "to restrict the export of goods and technology which would
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other
country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental to
the national security of the United States."'7 With respect to agricultural
commodities, this rationale was applied to wheat and corn.'
There is no provision for a Congressional veto of action taken under
the authority of Section 5. Also, although the statute provides for a periodic review of export controls based on national security,' there is no
"sunset" provision automatically causing such controls to lapse after a
certain period of time.
2. Foreign Policy
The foreign policy provisions of the statute are contained in Section
6. For purposes of foreign policy, export controls may be implemented
only to the extent necessary "to restrict the export of goods and technology where necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the
United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations.' 0 This
rationale was applied to all commodities affected by the embargo.
The foreign policy provisions of the Act differ from the national security provisions in at least two important respects. First, if the President
exercises the authority conferred by Section 6 with respect to agricultural
commodities, he is required to "immediately report such prohibition or

7. Section 3(2)(A), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A).
8. Many people question whether this rationale could properly be applied to agricultural commodities in view of the limited purposes of the embargo. They argue that the
shipment of grain to the U.S.S.R. cannot be seen as making a "significant contribution to
the military potential" of the Soviet Union. Conversely, Carter Administration officials argued that the term "military potential" must be read broadly so as to include a willingness
to exert military force as a means of resolving problems in the international arena. In this
respect, the grain embargo does detract from the military potential of the U.S.S.R. to the
extent that it serves as an effective deterrent to further aggressive actions by the Soviet
Union. In any case, as will be seen below, there are some very important differences between
the national security and the foreign policy sections of the Export Administration Act, especially with respect to agricultural commodities.
9. Section 5(c)(3), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c)(3). It should be noted, however, that the
Department of Commerce has yet to promulgate the regulations under which such a review
is to take place.
10. Section 3(2)(B), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(B).
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curtailment to the Congress, setting forth the reason therefor in detail."11
Within thirty days after receipt of the report, Congress may by concurrent resolution disapprove the export controls, in which case the controls
cease to be effective. In the present case, however, no serious attempt was
made in the Congress to invoke this provision of the law in order to lift
the embargo.1"
Secondly, export controls based solely on foreign policy considerations automatically lapse after one year, unless the controls are specifically extended by the President. 8 Such an extension may only be imposed after the President has complied with the procedural and
notification requirements of the Act."' It would therefore appear that the
Congressional veto provisions as to agricultural commodities again became operative when President Carter submitted a report to Congress in
January 1981 extending the export controls then in existence with respect
to agricultural commodities. 6
B. Impact of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement
The embargo imposed by President Carter applied to a wide range of
agricultural commodities. Of all the commodities embargoed, corn and
wheat occupied a special place. In accordance with the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Grain Agreement of 1975,16 eight million tons of wheat and corn were
permitted to be shipped annually to the U.S.S.R."7 Thus, the existence of
the Grain Agreement had a significant impact on the substance and implementation of the embargo.

11. Sections 6(e), 7(g)(3), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(e), 2406(g)(3).
12. As disenchantment with the embargo has grown, however, a number of serious attempts have been made to prohibit expenditures of public funds to enforce the embargo in
the form of amendments to appropriation bills. None of these attempts have succeeded.
13. Sections 6(a)(2), (b), (e), 7(g)(3), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2405(a)(2), (b), (e), 2406 (g)(3).
14. Section 6, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405.
15. This situation raises an interesting hypothetical. If the President exercised his authority to extend controls, and if the Congress acted to veto the extension, could the limitation on wheat and corn be successfully challenged in court on the grounds that the criteria
for exercising the national security export controls authority have not been met?
It could be argued, perhaps, that the case for national security controls in this area has
weakened considerably, since the element of surprise is no longer present and the Soviets
have had time to adjust their internal marketing system and to find alternative sources of
supply. Also, why is the shipment of eight million tons of grain not contrary to the interests
of national security while amounts in excess of that level are? The counterpoint to this
argument is that the primary national security basis of the grain embargo is its deterrent
effect upon the Soviet Union. This rationale would apply regardless of whether the element
of surprise was present, or whether the embargo was total or partial.
16. Agreement on the Supply of Grain, Oct. 20, 1975, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 26 U.S.T. 2972,
T.I.A.S. No. 8206, reprinted in Mayer, The Russian Grain Agreement of 1975 and Future
United States Food Policy, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 1031, 1069 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the
Grain Agreement].
17. Shipments through January 8, 1980, equaled 5,510,000 tons of corn and wheat combined. Thus, approximately 2,490,000 tons of these commodities were permitted to be
shipped to the U.S.S.R. under license after the embargo was imposed.
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1. Structure of the Grain Agreement' s
In form, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement is a relatively simple,
straightforward document. The agreement provides that the Soviet Union
will take delivery of from six to eight million tons of corn and wheat each
year (measured from October 1 through September 30) during the fiveyear life of the agreement.1 9 If domestic grain production falls short of a
certain level, the United States may reduce the amount covered by the
agreement below the six million ton minimum. Conversely, the United
States and the U.S.S.R. may agree on levels of supply higher than eight
million tons. In fact, for the fourth agreement year (October 1, 1979 September 30, 1980) the two countries agreed to a supply level of twentyfive million tons, most of which was to have been corn.2
It is important to note at this point that while the Grain Agreement
is an agreement between nations, no sales are made by the U.S. Government to the Soviet Government. The Grain Agreement provides that
purchases will be made through normal commercial channels. Thus, Soviet purchases are made by the Soviet foreign trade organization Eksportkhleb2 ' directly or indirectly from private grain companies doing
business in the United States. The U.S. Government monitors these sales
through an export sales reporting system under which exporters are required to report export sales of certain specified commodities."'
2. Legal Status of the Grain Agreement
The Grain Agreement is not a treaty. It is merely an executive agreement entered into by the President under his general foreign' affairs authority. It has no standing in domestic law, that is, it creates no rights or
obligations which are enforceable by either the U.S. Government or a pri18. The Grain Agreement came into existence partially as a result of the massive Soviet
grain purchases in 1972 which created a good deal of turmoil in the grain markets. The
purpose of the Grain Agreement is to guarantee that the Soviet Union will be a steady
purchaser of U.S. corn and wheat, and to prevent the Soviets from catching the U.S. grain
markets unawares, as they did in 1972. For a more detailed account, see Comment, Evolving
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain Trading Structure-A Comparison of the 1972 and 1975 Agreements,
4 SvuRcusE J. INT'L L. & Com. 227-57 (1976).
19. Such agreements are becoming more common. The United States has recently entered into similar agreements with China and Mexico.
20. This may not be technically correct. It is the understanding of the author that during the negotiations on the supply level for the fourth agreement year, the United States
informed the Soviets that they could acquire up to 25 million tons of grain from the U.S.
market. The Soviets, however, did not formally commit themselves to purchasing this
amount. Nevertheless, it appears to have been well understood by both sides that the Soviet
Union would purchase this amount, and all involved parties (including the private grain
trade) operated on this assumption.
21. For a description of the Soviet foreign trade system, see Berman & Bustin, The
Soviet System of Foreign Trade, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 987 (1975). See also Berman,
Soviet-American Trade in a Legal Perspective, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 217 (1975).
22. See Agricultural Trade Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. § 612(c)(3) (1976). There are a number
of ancillary provisions in the Grain Agreement, such as a cross-reference to the U.S.U.S.S.R. Maritime Agreement, which are not relevant to the subject matter of this article.
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vate party. Nevertheless, it is an international agreement which creates
rights and obligations under international law between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Did, then, the embargo violate the Grain
Agreement?
The position of the United States is that the embargo did not violate
the Grain Agreement. Article II of the agreement contains the following
provision: "During the term of this Agreement, except as otherwise
agreed by the Parties, the Government of the USA shall not exercise any
discretionary authority available to it under United States law to control
exports of wheat and corn purchased for supply to the USSR in accordance with Article 1.''13 It is the view of the United States that this provision applies only to the six to eight million ton level specified in Article I.
It does not apply to amounts in excess of eight million tons, which are
negotiated under Article VI. Therefore, the embargo did not violate the
Grain Agreement, since the United States did in fact supply eight million
tons of grain to the U.S.S.R. during the fourth year of the agreement.
III. USDA ACTIONS TO OFFSET THE IMPACT OF THE EMBARGO
In his message of January 4, 1980, President Carter directed the Secretary of Agriculture to take all necessary measures to offset any adverse
impacts of the embargo on farmers. This directive eventually lead to the
implementation of a wide range of actions by the USDA. To understand
these actions fully requires a brief description of the grain marketing
system.
A.

The Grain Marketing System
1.

The Physical Flow of Grain
The flow of grain from the American farmer to the foreign purchaser
can easily be traced. Generally speaking, the farmer will harvest the grain
and truck it to a country elevator. The country elevator may be operated
by a local grain merchant, a farmers' cooperative, or a grain company.

23. Article I of the Grain Agreement, note 16 supra, reads as follows:
The Government of the USA and the Government of the USSR hereby
enter into an Agreement for the purchase and sale of wheat and corn for supply to the USSR. To this end, during the period that this Agreement is in
force, except as otherwise agreed by the Parties, (i) the foreign trade organizations of the USSR shall purchase from private commercial sources, for shipment in each twelve month period beginning October 1, 1976, six million metric tons of wheat and corn, in approximately equal proportions, grown in the
USA; and (ii) the Government of the USA shall employ its good offices to facilitate and encourage such sales by private commercial sources.
The foreign trade organizations of the USSR may increase this quantity
without consultations by up to two million metric tons in any twelve month
period, beginning October 1, 1976, unless the Government of the USA determines that the USA has a grain supply of less than 225 million metric tons as
defined in Article V.
Purchases/sales of wheat and corn under this Agreement will be made at
the market price prevailing for these products at the time of purchase/sale and
in accordance with normal commercial terms.
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From the country elevator the grain will be transported by rail to a subterminal or terminal elevator. The latter two types of elevators may best
be described as regional concentration points in the grain marketing system. Eventually the grain will be transferred by rail or barge (for example, down the Mississippi River) to an export elevator located at a port.
The export elevator will then load the grain aboard an ocean vessel for
carriage to the foreign destination.
Two important factors should be noted at this point. First, grain is a
fungible commodity. From the time it leaves the farmer to the time it is
loaded aboard a ship, it is neither earmarked nor identified as being destined for a particular purchaser or as having come from a particular
farmer or elevator. Second, as one moves down the marketing chain toward the port of export, the system is more accurately characterized as a
pipeline, rather than as a storage system. Thus, an export elevator is
strictly a "put-through" facility through which grain from the interior is
transferred to ocean vessels. Grain cannot be stored economically at an
export location.
2.

The ContractualFlow of Grain

The contractual flow of grain is considerably more complex. The
farmer may sell his grain to the country elevator, in which case he will
simply receive a check. On the other hand, the farmer may store his grain
at the elevator, in which case he will receive a warehouse receipt. The
warehouse receipt is a negotiable document which the farmer may sell at
some future date to a grain merchant, broker, or grain company. These
"interior" merchants will in turn sell grain to other intermediaries in the
grain marketing system. Eventually grain will reach a U.S. exporting firm,
which in turn has a sales contract with a foreign purchaser.
This is a highly simplistic description of an extremely complex marketing system. The important point to remember is that with the exception of the farmer and the ultimate foreign purchaser, all of the intermediate actors are "hedging" operations. These actors (grain merchants,
brokers, grain companies, exporters, etc.) attempt at all times to maintain
an "even" position, that is, to have sales precisely match purchases. A
completely "hedged" operation is protected against fluctuations in the
market price of a commodity. They make their profits, like all middlemen, by charging their purchasers a slight premium over the cost of the
commodity. Generally speaking, these actors make their profits on high
volume rather than on high mark-ups or market price fluctuations.
In practice, of course, a middleman is rarely in a precisely even position. There is always a time lag between the time a purchase or sale is
made and the time that purchase or sale is "covered" by a corresponding
sale or purchase in the market. Also, a covering transaction may not precisely match the transaction it is meant to cover; there may be differences
in volume, grade, delivery period, or even type of commodity (the last
being known as a "cross-hedge"). To the extent that a middleman is not
"even," he is in a speculative "short" or "long" position. A short position
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occurs when the middleman has more sales than covering purchases. A
long position occurs when the converse is true.
B. USDA Actions
1. The Short Term Problem
The sudden imposition of the U.S.S.R. grain embargo created both
short term and long term problems which required immediate attention.
The short term problem may be summed up as nothing less than preventing the imminent collapse of the U.S. grain marketing system. This problem was contractual, psychological, and logistical in nature. First, it rapidly became clear that cutting off contracts for approximately 13.8 million
tons and expected options of 3.2 million tons of grain would lead to catastrophic losses for the grain export firms." A number of the firms would
certainly have gone bankrupt, leaving them unable to honor their contracts with interior suppliers. The collapse of these firms would have sent
a tidal wave of losses and bankruptcies back through the marketing
chain. To prevent this collapse, USDA stepped into the gap with the contract assumption operation. This operation is described in detail in part
IV below.
Second, the problem was psychological in nature because everyone
suddenly became aware of the fact that the United States had lost seventeen million tons of export contracts for grain out of a total anticipated
export level of 112.9 million tons. The presence of such a large, unexpected surplus, in the absence of USDA action, would have led to a crash
in domestic grain prices, with a corresponding ruinous effect upon farmers. To offset this effect, USDA publicly pledged to remove and isolate
from the market quantities of grain that were equivalent to the amounts
embargoed. Contrary to a misconception that is still held by many,9 ' the
decision to isolate grain from the market was not synonymous with the
decision to assume export contracts. The difference will be explained in
parts IV and V below.
Third, the problem was logistical in nature because, as discussed
above, the U.S. grain marketing system basically operates on a pipeline
concept. The imposition of the embargo temporarily clogged the pipeline
by suddenly eliminating the Soviet offtake. As a result, many participants
in the marketing chain suffered losses due to rail car, barge, and ship
demurrage, as well as elevator carrying charges.
The logistical problem might have been largely avoided because, even
under the terms of the embargo, there were still over two million tons of
grain left to be shipped to the U.S.S.R. This would have given the mar24. As was previously stated, the United States and the U.S.S.R. had agreed upon a
supply level of 25 million tons for the fourth year of the Grain Agreement. Of this amount,
only 21.8 million tons had been contracted for prior to January 7, 1980. However, it was
widely anticipated that Soviets would continue to make purchases up to the full 25 million
tons.
25. See, e.g., Paarlberg, supra note 2, at 147.
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keting system pipeline a breathing period in which to adjust to the loss of
Soviet exports. Two factors, however, intervened to prevent this from occurring. First, it was necessary to establish an export licensing system in
order to permit shipments up to the eight million ton level. Although the
Department of Commerce did establish a system and issue export licenses, this of course took some time to accomplish. Second, and more
importantly, the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) announced its own total embargo on shipments to the U.S.S.R." It was not
until late February that this problem was really solved through a number
of court injunctions against the ILA, and shipments were completed only
in April.
In fact, there was very little the USDA or anyone else (except the
ILA) could have done to alleviate the physical clogging of the pipeline.
The surplus in the pipeline was eventually worked off by the export marketing system.
2. The Long Term Problem
The long term problem was to assure farmers that they would not
suffer a disproportionate amount of the losses caused by the embargo.
Despite all the actions mentioned above, there was no absolute guarantee
to the farmer that prices would not fall. Indeed, many forecasters had
predicted falling grain prices before the embargo. At the same time, for
reasons totally unrelated to the embargo, farmers were facing rapidly increasing costs. A decline in farm income was inevitable before the embargo, and the contribution of the embargo to this process, if any, is impossible to gauge accurately. A final complicating factor was the
presidential election campaign, and the prospect of the politicization of
the Soviet grain embargo.
At any rate, immediately after the embargo was imposed, USDA announced a number of steps which were designed to directly benefit farmers. These included raising price support levels and modifying the farmerheld grain reserve to make participation in the reserve more attractive.
The latter action did, at the same time, play a significant role in the
USDA effort to isolate grain from the market.27
IV. THE CONTRACT AsSUMPTION OPERATION
A. The Decision to Assume the Grain Contracts
The first question any observer must ask is why it was necessary for
the USDA to undertake the contract assumption operation. The second
essential question is how the grains and soybean complex differed from
other affected agricultural commodities, that is, why the USDA refused to

26. For an interesting discussion of the ILA's role in the grain embargo, see id. at 146,
160-61.
27. A variety of actions similar to these, as well as other types of actions, were taken
throughout the spring and summer of 1980. The degree to which these actions were related
to the embargo is not, in all instances, entirely clear. A detailed discussion of these actions is
beyond the scope of this article.
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assume contracts for frozen chickens, hog carcasses, meat extenders, etc.,
which were also cut off by the embargo. The answer to these questions
are both factual and legal in nature. Both aspects will be discussed in
turn.
1. The Factual Basis for the Decision
The factual basis for the decision was grounded in two overriding
factors: (1) the nature of the grain marketing system; and (2) the magnitude of the amount of sales affected. As has been pointed out above, grain
exporting companies.are hedging operations: they attempt to maintain a
relatively even position as between sales and purchases. This was the case
on January 4, 1980. On that date total outstanding export sales to all
destinations totalled 306 million bushels of wheat (of which fifty-seven
percent were Soviet sales), and 917 million bushels of corn (of which
forty-nine percent were Soviet sales).28 Thus, the imposition of the embargo suddenly placed the grain exporting firms in a "long" (purchases
exceeding sales) position of about 623 million tons of wheat and corn. As
prudent businessmen, the exporters could not have maintained this type
29

of speculative position.

The fact that the exporters were suddenly long 623 million tons of
grain does not, however, fully explain the necessity for assuming their
contracts. It is also necessary to compare the prices at which those contracts were originally hedged with the prices exporters could have expected to obtain upon selling the 623 million tons of grain.
Most of the Soviet purchases (and, consequently, the corresponding
hedging transactions) were made during the summer and fall of 1979. At
that time, prices of corn and wheat were significantly higher than in early
January 1980. Thus, even putting aside the extreme price depressant effect of 623 million tons of grain being dumped on the market, grain exporting firms would have suffered catastrophic losses if they had been
forced to liquidate their long position after January 4.s1
It was the judgment of USDA officials that such a situation would
have had a cataclysmic effect on the U.S. grain marketing system. First,
of the fourteen grain exporting firms involved, many of the smaller firms
(and even some of the larger ones) could have been bankrupted. These
28. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Issue Briefing Paper No. 26: The CCC Assumption of
Grain Exporting Contracts 2-3 (July 18, 1980).
29. Also, the legal requirements of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission and
the financial requirements of the exporters' banks would have forced the exporters to liquidate their long position.
30. By way of illustration, one should also look at what would happen in the converse
situation, i.e., where the hedging price was significantly lower than the market price at the
time an embargo was imposed. In that situation (again putting aside the price depressant
effect of the embargo) the exporter would be in a position to make huge windfall profits.
This would be the case because the exporter would then be holding relatively low-priced
purchase contracts while at the same time being able to resell the grain represented by those

contracts into a relatively high-priced world market. In the above scenario, a windfall profits
tax rather than a contract assumption operation would, arguably, be appropriate.
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firms would have been unable to honor their interior contracts, causing a
domino effect right back to the farmer. Second, virtually all of these firms
would have attempted to liquidate at least a portion of their long position
by refusing to honor their interior contracts, claiming force majeure as a
defense. This too would have swept back through the system like a tidal
wave.
To prevent this disaster from occurring, the Government announced
on January 7, 1980, that it would assume the contracts affected by the
embargo.81 In return, the exporters agreed to act responsibly by: (1) continuing to honor their interior contracts; (2) not liquidating their "long"
position by dumping corn and wheat on the market; and (3) working off
the surplus in the pipeline in order to alleviate congestion at the ports
and in the transportation system.
2. The Legal Basis for the Decision
The contract assumption operation has been described as an "unusual improvisation."8' 2 It was accomplished through an equally unique
governmental entity known as the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC).
In simplest terms, CCC is a wholly owned government corporation
designed to finance price support, commodity stabilization, and a wide
variety of other agriculturally related programs. It operates within the
USDA under the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture.
The existence of the CCC permits the expenditure of money 6n farmrelated programs without the need for specific appropriations or authorizing legislation from Congress. As a technical matter, CCC "borrows"
money from the Treasury to carry on its activities. The CCC is then "reimbursed" for its net realized losses through the annual appropriation
process. Thus, CCC gives the Secretary of Agriculture a very flexible tool
for dealing with unanticipated events such as the embargo. It is extremely
unlikely that a successful contract assumption operation could have been
undertaken in the absence of a mechanism such as the CCC.
Of course, CCC may only make expenditures for those purposes authorized by the CCC Charter Act.s Sections 2 and 5 of the Charter Act
set forth a number of general purposes. The contract assumption operation was implemented under the authority of the Charter Act to remove
surpluses, to stabilize markets, and to protect farm income.8 . It is important to note that the Charter Act contains no authority to indemnify exporters for losses due to adverse government actions.
In this respect, the legal basis for the contract assumption operation
31. It is not clear whether officials in the White House and USDA were fully cognizant
of the necessity for the contract assumption operation prior to the imposition of the embargo on January 4. It is clear, however, that the decision to assume the contracts was not

made until January 6, 1980, after all the exporters had pleaded their case before high level
USDA officials.
32. Paarlberg, supra note 2, at 147.
33. Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1976).
34. Id. §§ 714, 714(b), 714(c).
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highlights the critical difference between grains and the other agricultural
commodities affected by the embargo. First, the magnitude of the sales of
other agricultural commodities in relation to the overall market in those
commodities was very small, as compared to the grains situation. It would
have been very difficult, if not impossible, to make the factual determinations required by the Charter Act.
Second, the other affected commodities are not traded in the same
fashion as grains, soybeans, and soybean products. As has been shown
above, it was necessary to assume the grain, soybean, and soybean product contracts because of the potential collapse of the market. This was
not the case with the other commodities. Most of those commodities were
sold directly from the producer to the Soviet Union. There was no "hedging" of any sort involved. Therefore, even if one could make the factual
determinations concerning surpluses, market stabilization, and the protection of farm income, there would be no justification for purchasing the
commodities in question only from the adversely affected exporter at the
Soviet contract price and specifications, as opposed to purchases in the
open market at market prices. In reality, this would simply have been an
indemnification operation rather than a surplus removal operation, and as
mentioned above, there is no authority for such an operation in the CCC
Charter Act.
B. The CCC-Exporter Agreement
1. Negotiation of the Agreement
The CCC-Exporter Agreement was the product of four weeks of intensive negotiation between the exporters and the USDA. 5 The contents
of the agreement were finalized in early February 1980, and the agreement was signed by twelve of the fourteen companies affected."
After the decision to assume the contracts had been made, the Secretary of Agriculture appointed the General Counsel of USDA to conduct
negotiations with the exporters in order to develop an agreement under
which USDA would assume the contracts. A task force was formed within
the Department to formulate the USDA position, to draft a proposed
agreement, and to negotiate that proposal with the exporters.
An initial draft of the agreement was presented to the exporters during the week of January 15, 1980. After two general meetings between the
exporters and USDA during the following week, it was generally agreed
that the essential terms of a workable agreement had been developed. An
informal committee of five persons,87 was then appointed by the exporters
35. In reality, there are two agreements. The CCC-Exporter Agreement covers wheat,
corn, and soybeans. The CCC Soybean Meal and Oil Agreement covers soybean products.
The latter agreement was negotiated after the first, and contains substantially similar general terms. The second agreement was necessitated by the fact that soybean meal and oil are
not traded on the same basic contract terms as wheat, corn, and soybeans.
36. The formal offer of the CCC to the affected exporters expired on February 15, 1980.
Three firms signed the CCC Soybean Meal and Oil Agreement later that spring.
37. The five members of this informal committee were drawn from the four major ex-
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to work out the final, more minor details of the agreement with USDA.
Thus, by the end of January the agreement had essentially reached its
final form.
2. Term of the Agreement
It is beyond the scope of this article to describe in detail every provision of the CCC-Exporter Agreement. Nevertheless, it should prove useful to describe the general thrust of the agreement, certain of its key provisions, and how it was meant to operate.
a. Structure of the Agreement
The general objective of the agreement was to provide a framework
by which CCC could acquire from the exporters the contract rights to
receive delivery of grain which otherwise would have been shipped to the
Soviet Union, and eventually retender those same contract rights back
into the export market. It is important to note at this point that the subject matter of the agreement is contract rights to receive delivery of grain
at a certain port range during a certain period of time (for example,
"50,000 tons No. 3 yellow corn, Gulf ports, May delivery"). Such rights
are commonly traded between both exporters and overseas purchasers.
Thus, the subject matter of the agreement did not refer to actual, physical stocks of grain.88
The typical contract for the exportation of grain from the United
States is the North American Export Grain Association No. 2 F.O.B. Contract (NAEGA 2). In assuming these contract rights, CCC in effect acquired a massive inventory of basically similar contract rights to receive
delivery of grain at a variety of port ranges 8' for a variety of delivery
periods.
Despite the fact that these contract rights were basically similar,
some important differences did exist between the various exporters and
even between individual contracts made by the same exporter. The CCCExporter Agreement standardized these contracts by converting them to
a single, uniform basis.40 Price adjustments were made to reflect changes
in the original terms of the contract.
The second important objective of the agreement was to establish a
number of special provisions outside the NAEGA 2 framework that would
porters (Cargill, Bunge, Louis-Dreyfus, and Continental) and one smaller company (Tidewater Grain).
38. This distinction is legally important because of various statutory restrictions on the
sale of stacks of grain held by CCC. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1445(e), 1427 (Supp. I 1979). These
restrictions prohibit the sale of commodities held by CCC at prices which are below a certain minimum. The contract assumption operation could not have been successfully implemented if these restrictions also applied to contract rights, since the retendering of the contract rights was an integral part of the operation.
39. The four basic port ranges are Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes, and Pacific.
40. This was accomplished by incorporating in each individual exporter's agreement a
schedule containing the essential terms of the exporter's contracts with the purchaser for
shipment to the U.S.S.R.
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govern the mutual obligations between the exporters and the CCC. These
provisions included certain certifications by the exporter, a profit deduction, a short position deduction, and a rollover provision. These provisions will be discussed below.
b. Specific Provisions of the Agreement
i. Force Majeure Certification
Several specific provisions of the CCC-Exporter Agreement deserve
special attention. The first of these is the certification by the exporter
that it will honor its interior contracts, notwithstanding the imposition of
the embargo or the boycott actions of the ILA."' In effect, the exporter
waived any right to assert a force majeure defense against interior suppliers. This waiver, from the point of view of USDA, was the primary quid
pro quo of the agreement.
ii. Profit Deduction
Another important provision of the agreement is the profit deduction. Under the terms of the agreement, the contract price between CCC
and the exporter is the Soviet contract price (plus or minus an adjustment for standardization of terms) less an undetermined deduction for
profit and short position.42 When settling a contract under the agreement,
therefore, CCC initially makes payment of only ninety-seven percent of
the Soviet contract price to the exporter. 4 3 The final three percent is
withheld pending the determination of an appropriate deduction from the
Soviet contract price for profit and short position.
The profit deduction was included at the insistence of USDA. The
real problem, however, was how to formulate a workable method of determining an appropriate deduction. First, it was clear that there was no way
of calculating a profit on the Soviet sales alone. It is impossible to extract
these sales and corresponding hedges from the overall sales and hedging
operations of all but the smallest exporters.

41. This provision (Section II(C), reads as follows:
C. The Exporter certifies that it and its affiliates have not breached or
failed to perform, and will not at any time in the future breach or fail to perform, any obligation to third parties (exclusive of the original purchasers, in
their capacities as purchasers, under the eligible contracts) in the U.S. agricultural and transportation industries (including but not limited to farmers, warehousemen, elevator operators, and transport operators) on the grounds that
such obligation has been modified, terminated, rescinded, excused, or nullified
by: (1) the imposition of restrictions on the exportation of agricultural commodities by the President on January 4, 1980, and as implemented by the regulations issued on January 7, 1980, at 45 FR 1883, and as may later be
amended; or (2) the refusal of the International Longshoremen's Association to
handle cargo destined for the USSR. Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude
the Exporter and its affiliates from entering into modifications, by mutual consent, of the terms and conditions of existing contracts with third parties in the
U.S. agricultural and transportation industries.
42. Id. § III(B)(1).
43. Id. § II(B)(3). Under NAEGA 2, payment does not occur until delivery of the commodity is made. Thus, provisional payments continued to be made through February 1981.
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Second, it rapidly became clear that there was no way to define
"profit" in a single document that would be applicable to all exporters.
Moreover, the urgency of concluding an agreement would not have permitted the negotiation of a separate provision for each exporter.
To solve this dilemma, the exporters and USDA agreed to establish
an independent board of accountants. One member of the board was appointed by the exporters, one by USDA, and one by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The board was charged with developing standards and procedures for determining the profit margin for
each exporter. Applying these standards, both the exporter and USDA
auditors were to determine a profit margin for the exporter. If there was
any disagreement between the two figures, USDA and the exporter would
attempt to negotiate a mutually acceptable figure. If they were unable to
do so, the dispute would be presented to the board for resolution.
iii. Short Position Deduction"
Theoretically, to the extent that an exporter was "short" on January
4, 1980, the imposition of the embargo did not have an adverse effect on
that particular exporter. In other words, the "short" position could absorb some of the "long" position that was created by the imposition of the
embargo. Therefore, if CCC assumed all of the affected contracts, exporters who were short on January 4, 1980, would remain short. They could
then move into a falling market (falling as a result of the embargo) and
garner undeserved windfall profits because of the decline in the market.
From a practical point of view, however, the fact that a particular
exporter was short on January 4, 1980, would have had very little to do
with whether a high-priced Soviet contract had been covered by a comparably high-priced hedge several months earlier. An exporter might have
been "long" or "even" during all of 1979 and still have been short on
January 4, 1980, for reasons totally unrelated to its Soviet sales (for example, a sale made that day to Japan or the EEC). This problem was
resolved by providing for a short position deduction based on the smallest
amount by which the exporter was short between the date of the exporter's last Soviet sale and January 4, 1980. The amount of any such
short position would be pro-rated to the exporter's Soviet business and
then converted to a monetary deduction from the Soviet contract price.
iv. Rollover Provision"
The rollover differential is the cost of changing a delivery period on a

44. Id. § III(B)(2).
45. This provision of the Agreement (Section III(B)(5), reads as follows:
(5) CCC may, at its option, change the delivery period in any given contract or a portion thereof to a later period of its choice, but no later than
March 31, 1981. If CCC exercises this option, the contract price shall be increased or decreased by the amount of the market differentials for the later
delivery period as of the date of the exercise of the option. However, for delivery periods beginning prior to March 1, 1980, the relevant market differentials
(cents per bushel) shall be:
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contract. Generally speaking, the longer a delivery is deferred, the greater
the differential. The rollover differential is treated as an adjustment in
the contract price.
It was clear from the outset of the negotiations on the CCC-Exporter
Agreement that it would be impossible for USDA to begin immediately to
liquidate the contract rights it was about to acquire. It was therefore necessary to "roll over" contract delivery dates from earlier months to later
months. The agreement provided for rollovers through June 1980 at specified differentials. Rollovers into later months were based on market price
differentials in existence at the time the rollover option was exercised by
46
USDA.
C. Retendering of Contract Rights
With the exception of calculating the appropriate profit and short
position deductions, the contract assumption operation was basically
completed with the successful retendering of the contract rights back into
the export market. Beginning in late March, USDA held tenders twice
weekly for each commodity in which it accepted bids on its inventory of
contract rights. Bids were accepted or rejected based on an evaluation of
current market prices and conditions. The retendering process was completed in midsummer 1980. Delivery of grain on the retendered contracts
continued through February 1981. Consequently, payments to exporters
(as well as payments to USDA from the purchasers of the contract rights)
continued through that date.
Original Period

Later Period
March, 1980

April, 1980

May, 1980

June, 1980

Corn

Corn

Corn

Corn

20
20
10

27
27
17

30
30
20

38
38
27V2

Wheat

Wheat

Wheat

Wheat

December, 1979

6V

16

18

21 /

January, 1980
February, 1980

6
2

16
113

18
14

21
15

Soybeans

Soybeans

Soybeans

Soybeans

December, 1979
January, 1980

18
18

30
30

39
39

56
56

February, 1980

8

21

27

434

December, 1979
January, 1980
February, 1980

CCC shall give notice to the Exporter that it is exercising its option under this
provision not less than 30 days before the beginning of the original delivery
period, or not more than 30 days after the signing of this Agreement, whichever is later.
The differentials given in the schedule above were based on the differentials as they existed
on January 4, 1980.
46. The total rollover cost was approximately $170 million.
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REMOVAL OF SURPLUS COMMODITIES

The contract assumption operation was not in and of itself a surplus
removal operation. Indeed, attempting to take delivery on export contracts would have added another layer of complexity to an already difficult situation. Delivery could not be accomplished at export locations
since these elevators are not storage facilities. Conversion of the contracts
to interior delivery, where storage was available, would have required incredibly complex and time-consuming negotiations.
The surplus removal aspect of the operation was accomplished by direct USDA purchases of wheat and corn and by entry of corn into the
farmer-held reserve.47 By the end of April 1980, USDA had purchased 4.1
million tons of wheat. 48 Also, by midsummer, USDA had purchased 4.1
million tons of corn and farmers had placed 7.2 million tons into the
farmer-held reserve. These figures are clearly in excess of the amounts of
wheat and corn that were affected by the embargo. The figures are even
more impressive when it is considered that total U.S. exports of wheat
and corn actually declined very slightly from the levels that were forecast
prior to the embargo, and were much higher (by volume) than during the
previous year.

VI.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The grain embargo of 1980 vividly demonstrated how the use of export controls can be a two-edged sword. In attempting to influence Soviet
behavior, the President placed the entire U.S. grain marketing system
into an extremely precarious position overnight. A collapse of the system
was only averted through the swift and prudent actions of administration
officials and the grain exporting firms. One can only speculate as to what
might have happened had some exporters panicked, or had the Government reacted less quickly to the needs of the moment.
From a strictly operational point of view, the contract assumption
operation can probably be described as extremely successful, despite the
fact that CCC lost over $450 million in the process.49 The CCC-Exporter
Agreement did achieve its immediate goal of preventing the collapse of
the market. It was negotiated over a very short period of time, and was
implemented without any major difficulties. Almost overnight, USDA acquired contract rights to receive 8.9 million tons of corn, 4.3 million tons

47. The farmer-held reserve is a mechanism by which farmers agree to hold a commodity off the market until prices reach certain predetermined levels. In return, the farmer
receives a non-recourse price support loan, which is practically interest free, as well as storage payments. See 7 U.S.C. § 1445(e) (Supp. I 1979).
48. Under the authority of a statute recently passed by Congress, the wheat will be
placed into an international emergency reserve for use in food aid programs during times of
short supply or to meet urgent humanitarian needs of an unanticipated nature. Food Security Wheat Reserve.Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-494, 94 Stat. 2578 (1980).
49. The total value (Soviet price) of the contract rights acquired by the USDA was $2.4
billion. Counting rollover costs, it is anticipated that total CCC losses will be around $460
million.
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of wheat, 710,318 tons of soybeans, 400,000 tons of soybean meal, and
30,000 tons of soybean oil, and within seven months had retendered these
contracts back into the export market without adversely affecting the
market.
Nevertheless, when the danger to the United States grain marketing
system and the eventual costs to the Government are considered, it must
seriously be questioned whether food exports really do constitute, because
of domestic considerations, a potentially effective and credible foreign
policy tool. Indeed, one might argue that food exports, rather than a foreign policy tool, are a foreign policy liability because of the dependence
of the agricultural sector of the domestic economy on such exports. In
this respect, the essential lesson of the grain embargo may be that as the
United States becomes more economically interdependent with the rest of
the world, its ability to take unilateral actions such as grain embargoes is
correspondingly diminished. To a certain extent, the United States is in
need of Soviet purchases just as much as the Soviets are in need of U.S.
grain. Thus, the concept of food as a weapon may be largely illusory.
Moreover, even if the economic ramifications of an embargo can be
managed, it is not at all clear that the political and psychological impacts
of an embargo on agricultural commodities can likewise be contained.
Rightly or wrongly, many farmers view such embargoes as an unfair and
ineffective method of attempting to influence the behavior of foreign
countries.
It is not surprising, therefore, that this issue has extremely complex
political overtones. The embargo was clearly a significant issue in a number of states during the 1980 presidential campaign. Predictably, a number of bills were introduced in the present session of Congress either to
end the embargo (which is now a moot point) or to restrict the freedom of
the President to impose embargoes on agricultural commodities in the
future." In addition, it can be argued that the debate over the embargo
detracted from the consideration of other major farm policy questions.5 1
At the same time, President Reagan, who during the 1980 campaign
expressed a desire to lift the embargo, was unable to do so immediately
because of the crisis in Poland.5" This also demonstrated an important
aspect of the use of embargoes in general. They are an easily identifiable
and highly visible type of foreign policy action. The lifting of an embargo,
as well as its imposition, may therefore have very significant foreign pol50. In the 97th Congress, 1st Session, see, e.g., S. Res. 63, S. 355, H.R. 2233, and H.R.
2243 (1981).
51. Several important provisions of major farm statutes expire at the end of the 1981
crop year. Consequently, Congress is now actively considering various proposals for inclusion in the 1981 omnibus farm bill.
52. President Reagan initially refused to lift the embargo because he felt that it would
be sending the "wrong signal" to the Soviet Union during the Polish crisis. See Wash. Post,
Apr. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 5. The President did, however, lift the embargo on April 24, 1981.
See Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 1981, at 1, col. 5.

1981

U.S.S.R. GRAIN EMBARGO

297

icy and domestic political ramifications. In this respect, embargoes can be
a relatively inflexible foreign policy tool.
This is not to say that the imposition of export controls on agricultural commodities can never be utilized as a foreign policy tool or as a
means of strengthening national security by deterring aggression by other
countries. The grain embargo of 1980 does demonstrate, however, that
such actions have extremely important domestic ramifications which
must be weighed more carefully in the future against the objectives and
probability of success.

United Nations Measures to Combat Racial
Discrimination: Progress and Problems in
Retrospect
ISAAK I. DORE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The concern of the United Nations with the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is an expression of the
ever-increasing interest of the international community in ensuring that
these rights and freedoms shall be enjoyed by all human beings everywhere.' Although the principle of freedom from discrimination on
grounds of race has occupied the attention of the United Nations as only
part of its overall concern with the protection of human rights, racial disIsaak I. Dore is Assistant Professor, School of Law, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. LL.B., LL.M. (Zambia); LL.M., J.S.D. (Yale). Formerly he was a Human Rights
Officer and Special Consultant to the Division of Human Rights, United Nations, Geneva,
Switzerland (1978-79). The views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Human Rights Division or the U.N. Secretariat.
1. The roots of the contemporary concern for human rights may be traced to various
traditions, philosophical concepts, and events going as far back as, for example, the humanist traditions of the Renaissance and the issuance of the Magna Carta by King John of
England in 1215. The twentieth century saw the manifestation of international concern for
human rights in international legal documents. In the first half of the twentieth century,
international concern with human rights found expression in certain provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as, for example, the obligation to endeavor to secure and
maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children, and also to
ensure the just treatment of the indigenous inhabitants of colonies. COVENANT OF LEAGUE OF
NATIONs art. 23 (a)-(b). In addition, some of the post-1919 peace treaties and declarations
created a system for the protection of linguistic, racial, and religious minorities under a
guarantee of the League of Nations. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace with Hungary, signed June 4,
1920, part III, sec. 6, arts. 54-60; Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed July 24, 1920, part I,
sec. III, arts. 37-45; Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland,
signed June 28, 1919; Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and
Czechoslovakia, signed Sept. 10, 1919; Declaration by Finland in Respect of the Aaland Islands, June 6, 1921; and the Declaration by Lithuania, May 12, 1922. See generally J.
GREENVILLE, THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREATIEs 1914-1973, ch. 2, Peace Settlements and
The League of Nations, 1919-23, which discusses these treaties in the context of international human rights.
The Second World War had a major impact on human rights developments in the second half of the twentieth century. The war demonstrated the close relationship between
outrageous behavior by the government of a nation toward its own citizens and aggression
against other nations as well as the relationship between respect for human rights and the
maintenance of international peace and security. The experience of the war was reflected in
various human rights clauses of the present U.N. Charter, including the provision that together with its other purposes, the United Nations shall strive to achieve international cooperation in "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
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crimination has been and is considered to be one of the most odious of
human rights violations.
It comes as no surprise that, in 1948, when the United Nations began
using the treaty approach to combat specific human rights violations, the
first such treaty was designed to combat a problem essentially racial in

character. This was the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide.2 Although binding on its parties, this convention
contained no machinery for implementation at the national level and no

prevision for the United Nations to supervise and evaluate the effectiveness of domestic implementing legislation.8 The United Nations treaty
approach to human rights therefore had a modest, if not timid, beginning.
Subsequent attempts within the United Nations utilizing the treaty
approach to combat racial discrimination have been more bold. These

treaties are the subject of this article. The substantive law of the treaties
and their machinery for implementation and supervision will be examined critically to assess progress made so far, as well as to identify the
chief obstacles standing in the way of further progress.
The analysis begins with a discussion, in section two, of the crystallization of the contemporary norm against discrimination. Sections three

and four deal in turn with the Convention Concerning Discrimination in
the Field of Employment and Occupation,' created under the auspices of
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and with the Convention
Against Discrimination in Education,

5

a product of the United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Sections
five and six examine the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination' and the international convention
of the same name,7 while section seven explores the question of international action against apartheid in southern Africa. The conclusion evaluates the effectiveness of the United Nations as an international catalyst

2. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for
signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). Under article II,
the parties agree to prevent and punish acts intended to injure or destroy in whole or in
part any national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The convention marked a significant
departure from previous action which was limited to nonbinding resolutions and
declarations.
3. The lack of enforcement provisions is ironic in view of the widely shared belief at the
time that state opposition to the convention would be minimal since genocide had long
before received universal condemnation. See also the treaties cited in note 1 supra.
4. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation,
June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter cited as Employment Convention].
5. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Dec. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93
[hereinafter cited as Education Convention].
6. United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 35, U.N. Doc. A/5603 (1963) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Declaration on Racial Discrimination].
7. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [here-

inafter cited as 1965 Racial Discrimination Convention].
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for progress and offers suggestions for the course of future action in the
worldwide fight against racial discrimination.

II.

CRYSTALLIZATION OF THE CONTEMPORARY NORM AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION

A.

Primary Instruments
The contemporary prohibitions against group categorization by
"race" originated in the United Nations Charter. Article 1(3) of the Charter provides that one of the purposes of the United Nations is "promoting

and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." This pur-

pose is reaffirmed in articles 13(1)(b),8 55(c) and 56,' and 76(c). 10
Four other major international instruments, together with the Charter, essentially constitute an international bill of human rights. These are
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;" the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;1 2 the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights;18 and the Optional Protocol to the Interna8. Article 13(1)(b) of the U.N. Charter provides: "1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of: . . . b. promoting international
co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in
the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion."
9. Article 55(c) of the U.N. Charter reads:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United
Nations shall promote:
c. universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.
Article 56 reads: "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55."
10. Article 76(c) of the U.N. Charter provides:
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall
be:
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and
to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the
world ....
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948). Article 2 stipulates that the Declaration's protections are to be extended
"without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." Article 7 provides
for equal protection before the law "without any discrimination."
12. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967), entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. Articles 2(2) and 12 deal with racial discrimination.
13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
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tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.14 These four instruments
give detailed expression to those fundamental human rights which the
Charter was unable to articulate.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the earliest of the
four, and is one of the most comprehensive international statements recognizing human rights in the post-World War II era. The Declaration
proclaims that all people are born equal in dignity and right, and that
each person has the right to life, liberty and security of the person. It also
proclaims the freedom from slavery, torture, and arbitrary arrest, freedom of thought, expression, and association, and the right to education,
work, leisure, and a decent standard of living. Under article 2, "everyone
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status."
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
affirms a number of rights, among them the right to work, the right to
freely choose one's place of employment, the right to fair working conditions, and the right to form trade unions. Under article 2, all the rights
enumerated in the Covenant are declared to belong to all persons "without discrimination of any kind" according to the same criteria appearing
in article 2 of the Universal Declaration.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights gives more
detailed expression to many of the rights contained in the Universal Declaration. Again, the same formula against discrimination appears. Both
Covenants contain procedures for national implementation under the supervision of the United Nations.
The Optional Protocol goes a step further and provides that under
certain circumstances an individual can complain to the United Nations
for the failure of his government to implement the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
B. United Nations Organs with Primary Concern over Human Rights
Among the organs of the United Nations with primary responsibility
in the area of human rights are the General Assembly, the Economic and
Social Council, the Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on
the Status of Women, and the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The Security Council and the Trusteeship Council are also concerned with human rights matters. Finally,
within the Secretariat of the United Nations, the Division of Human
Rights has a continuing responsibility for human rights issues.
The Division of Human Rights provides substantive services and
1966, id. at 52, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. Articles 2, 4, 20, and 26 deal with racial
discrimination.
14. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, id. at
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documentation on human rights questions of concern to a number of
United Nations organs, including the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. It also operates as the working staff of the
Commission on Human Rights, the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Human Rights Committee, and their
respective subsidiary bodies. The Division's tasks include the preparation
of studies, reports, and publications on human rights, the administration
of advisory services, and the implementation of the Program for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (1973-1983).
Four of the specialized agencies of the United Nations have a special
interest in the protection of specific human rights and freedoms: ILO,
UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).
In the area of racial discrimination, the primary responsibility falls
on the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities." The work of the Subcommission has resulted in substantial
progress in promoting and implementing the principle of nondiscrimination at the national and international levels. For example, it was on the
recommendation of the Subcommission that the ILO studied the question
of employment and occupation discrimination, and in 1958, adopted the
Convention Concerning Discrimination in the Field of Employment and
Occupation. It was also at the suggestion of the Subcommission, and as a
result of its Study of Discrimination in Education, that UNESCO
adopted the Convention against Discrimination in Education at its General Conference in December 1960.
III.

THE CONVENTION CONCERNING DISCRIMINATION IN RESPECT OF
EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION

The Employment Convention requires "equality of opportunity and
15. The Subcommission was established by the Commission on Human Rights in 1947,
and was authorized to "undertake studies, particularly in light of the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights, and to make recommendations to the Commission on Human Rights
concerning the prevention of discrimination of any kind relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms and the protection of racial, national, religious and linguistic minorities."
See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.3/370/Rev.1, at 35 (1970).
Pursuant to the terms of its establishment, the Subcommission has conducted and forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights a number of studies on the problems of discrimination. See, e.g., the Study of Discrimination in Education, the Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, the Study of Discrimination in Respect
of the Right of Everyone to Leave Any Country, Including his Own, and to Return to his
Country, the Study of Discrimination against Persons Born out of Wedlock, and the Study
of Equality in the Administration of Justice. See also the Special Study on Racial Discrimination in the Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Spheres, a revised and updated version of which was published under the title "Racial Discrimination." U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/370/Rev.1 (1977). The latter study was prepared by Hernhn Santa Cruz, Special Rapporteur of the Subcommission. On the most recent meeting of the Subcommission, see Hannum, Human Rights and the United Nations: Progress at the 1980 Session of the U.N.
Sub-commission and Protection of Minorities, HUMAN RIGHTS Q., Feb. 1981, at 1-17.
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treatment in respect of employment and occupation""6 and specifically
prohibits any discrimination "on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, po' 17
litical opinion, national extraction or social origin.

The Convention obligates each member of the ILO "to declare and to
pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to

national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment
in respect of employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating any
discrimination in respect thereof."18 In particular, each member und-

dertakes to seek the cooperation of employers' and workers' organizations, enact legislation, promote educational programs, and repeal statu-

tory provisions and modify administrative instructions or practices which
are inconsistent with the prescription of equality of opportunity and

treatment in employment and occupation.'9
A.

Supervision of Implementation

The Employment Convention provides for the regular and systematic
monitoring of progress in the implementation of its provisions. Each

member undertakes to provide annual reports on the application of the
Convention, indicating action taken in pursuance of Convention policy

and the results secured by such action.' 0 The Convention's annual reporting requirements constitute one of several unique procedural devices in
the ILO Constitution' designed to allow supervision of the implementation of conventions and recommendations. In addition to the reporting
requirements, the ILO conducts regular observation of the activities and
obligations of member states through two committees, the Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations and
the Conference Committee.22 While the Committee of Experts analyzes
all reports from governments, the Conference Committee confines itself to
consideration of a limited number of cases where the Committee of Ex-

perts has noted serious violations of adopted conventions.
The documentation available to the Committee of Experts includes,
16. Employment Convention, supra note 4, art. 2.
17. Id. art. 1(1)(a).
18. Id. art. 2.
19. Id. art. 3. Under article 8, Employment Convention binds only those members of
the ILO who have ratified it, not the ILO membership at large.
20. Id. art. 3(f).
21. Under article 22 of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization, a
member state undertakes to report annually "on the measures which it has taken to give
effect to the provisions of Conventions to which it is a party." Under article 19, para. 5(e), a
member state has to report at appropriate intervals as requested by the Governing Body,
the position of its law and practice in regard to the matters dealt with in the Convention,
showing the extent to which effect has been given, or is proposed to be given, to any of the
provisions of the Convention by legislation, administrative action, collective agreement or
otherwise and stating the difficulties which prevent or delay the ratification of such
Convention.
22. See General Introductory Paper Prepared by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.924, at 37 (1978), submitted by the U.N. Secretary-General to the World Conference
to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (Geneva, Aug. 1978).
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inter alia, the information supplied by governments, legislative texts, collective agreements or court decisions directly relevant to the implementation of international labor standards (including that of nondiscrimination), comments made by employers' and workers' organizations, and
conclusions of other ILO bodies. The Committee sets forth its findings in
its reports, which often lead to requests for further information on particular questions. These requests are communicated directly to governments
which have either failed to file an annual report or have supplied incomplete information in their reports.
B.

Experience under the Supervisory Machinery

In its reports, the Committee of Experts publicly names the countries
in question and comments on their activities. It will, for example, take
note of the fact that a particular government had failed to submit a report and to respond to further requests. In one 1971 case, after determining that the domestic law of a particular government was inconsistent
with the Employment Convention, the Committee requested the government in question to indicate what steps it had taken to eliminate the
inconsistency.2 3 Broad reviews of the progress and obstacles in the implementation of the Employment Convention have also been carried out by
the Committee of Experts, with more requests being made directly to
governments for further information on implementation at the national
level.24
Public scrutiny of domestic legislation by an international body, coupled with a correlative international obligation on the part of governments to submit information and justify particular aspects of internal
laws, can be a source of political embarrassment to a nonconforming
state. Repeated citation by the Committee of Experts of uncooperative
behavior can also have a similar impact. In effect, these procedures have
their own built-in sanctions to induce national conformity with international instruments. In one example of an impressive result of the Employment Convention's implementation machinery, a 1971 citation by the
Committee of Experts to the effect that the domestic law of a member
government was inconsistent with the Convention resulted the following
year in an announcement that the law would be suitably amended.
While the Employment Convention, read in conjunction with the
ILO Constitution, provides a system of international scrutiny of domestic
legislation as well as a unique mechanism for persuasive rather that coercive enforcement, it contains automatic safeguards against any kind of
supranational tyranny. Since members undertake to pursue by "methods
appropriate to national conditions and practice" their general and specific
obligations under the Convention, 25 it is presumably the individual state

23. ILO, Report of International Labour Conference, 56th session 175 (1971).
24. See, e.g., ILO, Report of International Labour Conference, 63d session (vol. 3, pt.
4A, 1977).
25. Supra note 4, arts. 2 & 3, and the text accompanying note 18 supra.
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or government that is the sole judge of which implementation methods
are "appropriate" to national conditions and practice.
For example, in 1975 the Committtee of Experts expressed its concern with legislation in a member state which required female employees
in the public sector to resign upon marriage. The government in question
simply informed the Committee of Experts that due to a high level of
unemployment, it was unable at that stage to implement a change in this
policy. The Committee of Experts thereupon merely expressed its hope
"that this matter would be reviewed as soon as possible and that steps
would be taken in order to bring the legislation and practice into line
with the Employment Convention in this respect.""
The effectiveness of the Employment Convention is limited, of
course, by the fact that it binds only those states which are members of
the ILO and whose ratifications have been registered with the ILO Director-General. Also, member states have the right under article 9 of the
Convention to denounce it ten years after its entry into force.
Apart from the ten-year time limit, the Convention does not specify
the substantive conditions under which a party may denounce. The act is
therefore within the sole discretion of the denouncing state. If a state has
not denounced within the year following the expiration of the first tenyear period (that is, by 25 June 1969, since the first period expired on 25
June 1968), it becomes automatically bound for another ten years and
may denounce only after the expiration of each ten-year period by registering its denunciation with the Director-General. Following this procedure, denunciation becomes effective one year after the date it was
registered.
IV. THE CONVENTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION
As in the case of the Employment Convention, the Convention
Against Discrimination in Education 7 (the Education Convention) was
the result of the initiative of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The purposes of the Education
Convention are to eliminate discrimination in education and to ensure
equality of opportunity. 8

26. ILO, Report of the 60th Session of the Committee of Experts, part 4A, at 165
(1975).
27. Note 5 supra.
28. Two provisions in the Education Convention underline the goal of equality of opportunity. Article 1 defines discrimination as including
Any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference which, being based on race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic condition or birth which has the purpose or effect. . . of depriving any person or group of persons of access to education of any type or at any
level . ...
Article 3 obligates states party to the convention to undertake "[t]o ensure, by legislation
where necessary, that there is no discrimination in the admission of pupils to educational
institutions . . . [and] [t]o give foreign nationals within their territory the same access to
education as that given to their own nationals."
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A.

Supervisory Procedures
UNESCO monitors compliance with the Education Convention
under the authority of its Constitution, which obligates member states to
report periodically to the organization on the progress they have made."9
In addition to monitoring compliance through reporting procedures,
UNESCO has taken specific action with regard to the Convention. In a
resolution adopted in May 1965, the Executive Board of UNESCO decided that reports of member states should be examined by a Special
Committee of the Board and then be transmitted, with the Board's comments, to the General Conference of UNESCO. 0
B. Experience under the Supervisory Procedures
As a result of the 1965 decision, a questionnaire covering all the provisions of the Education Convention was sent to the thirty member states
then parties to the Convention. The questionnaire sought information on
(a) discrimination, (b) equality of opportunity and treatment, (c) educational activities of national minorities, and (d) aims of education. 1 The
Special Committee's first report, issued after an analysis of government
replies, did not evaluate the progress made in the implementation of the
Education Convention,' 2 either because not all questions had been answered by governments or, if answered at all, because the answers were
too vague. The Special Committee, now called the Committee on Conventions and Recommendations in Education, thereupon decided to communicate directly with governments
to seek clarifications and statistical in8
formation where necessary. "
Although the second report of the Committee on Recommendations
contained some critical remarks," its effectiveness remains questionable
due to its general nature. In contrast, the ILO regularly prepares a critical
analysis of each country's reports. Such repeated and public criticism of
identified countries can operate as an effective sanction. The third report
of the Committee was, if anything, even more uninformative."
C. Difficulties under the Supervisory Procedures
One reason why detailed analysis of the reports on a country by
country basis is not possible is the poor response from governments. The
reason for this phenomenon stems from the fact that, unlike the instru29. UNESCO CONST. art. VIII provides:
each member state shall report periodically to the organization, in a manner to
be determined by the general conference, on its laws, regulations and statistics
relating to educational, scientific and cultural life and institutions, and on the

action taken upon the recommendations and conventions referred to in article
4, paragraph 4.
30. U.N. Doc. UNESCOi70.EX/Decisions/5.21 (1965).
31. Id.
32. U.N. Doc. UNESCO/C.14/29/Add.1 (1966).
33. Id.
34. U.N. Doc. UNESCO/C.17/15, at 41-49 (1972).
35. U.N. Doc. UNESCO/C.18/21-22 (1974).
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ments adopted by the ILO, the Education Convention does not require
the reports of states party to be communicated first to the competent
national professional organizations for verification. Moreover, UNESCO
procedures fail to provide effective measures against inadequate reporting. In contrast, ILO procedures provide that when a country fails to supply adequate information, an ILO emissary visits that country to obtain
the missing information personally. It is apparent, therefore, that the ILO
has the superior information-gathering scheme.86 The prospect of an international investigation into domestic practices may induce more cooperation in supplying information to the ILO, quite apart from its value as
an informal sanction. In other instances, the poor response of states may
have been due not to lack of will, but to difficulties created by the unavailability of trained personnel to study individual national problems in
implementing the Education Convention, and indeed, to compile statistics and other information in response to the questionnaires of the Committee on Recommendations. In this regard, the Committee's recommendation that member states be free to request the assistance of UNESCO
consultants is a constructive one.8 7 As the request for assistance comes
directly from the country concerned, this procedure would not be used in
any manner inconsistent with the government's wishes.
D.

Resolution of Disputes
1. I.C.J. Jurisdiction

Just as the consensual element underlies the recommendation that
member states be free to request the assistance of UNESCO consultants,
so too is it present in the dispute resolution mechanism provided under
the Education Convention. Article 8 deals with procedures for resolving
disputes between parties over the interpretation or application of the
Convention. The dispute may ultimately be submitted to the International Court of Justice for resolution. But the jurisdiction of the Court
can be invoked only "at the request of the parties to the dispute."" Thus
the article stops short of imposing the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on
the disputing parties. Insofar as any one party is incapable of unilaterally
submitting a dispute to the Court, the effect of article 8 is diluted

36. It would, however, be unfair to conclude that the above efforts within UNESCO
have not yielded any positive results. In the words of the committee's second report:
While admitting that the universal right to education is not fully implemented,
particularly in working class and rural environments, the replies [of governments] reveal an acute awareness of the problems which exist and a firm resolve to meet the educational aspirations of all young people and even to create
conditions which will make life-long education possible for all sections of the
population.
The measures already taken or planned for this purpose by the majority of
member states whose reports have been studied, represent, without any doubt,
a great step forward.
U.N. Doc. UNESCO/C.17/15, at 45 (1972).
37. Id. at 48.
38. Education Convention, supra note 5, art. 8.
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considerably.
In spite of the inherent weakness of article 8, the very fact that this
procedure is available (with adequate "safeguards") is an advance. The
supervisory mechanism of the ILO-sponsored Employment Convention
makes no reference to the World Court.
2. Alternative Machinery
In 1962 the General Conference of UNESCO adopted a Protocol creating a Conciliation Commission,8" to be responsible for settling disputes
arising between states parties to the Education Convention. This appeared to be an attempt to provide alternative machinery for dispute resolution in the event that recourse to the International Court of Justice is
not possible, due to opposition from one of the disputing parties.
Under article 12(2) of the Protocol, if bilateral negotiations fail to
resolve the dispute, either party may unilaterally submit the matter to
the Conciliation Commission. The Commission can request such further
information from the two parties as it deems necessary. It can then make
available its good offices to the states in an attempt to reach an "amicable" solution.40 The Conciliation Commission is also obliged in every case
to draw up a report indicating the facts and its recommendations. The
most significant aspect of this procedure is that these reports are to be
published following their transmission to the Director-General."1 As
stated earlier, publicity can cause concern on the part of states for their
external image, and this may operate as a noncoercive sanction.
An even more significant provision is contained in article 18 of the
Protocol: the Conciliation Commission may recommend to the Executive
Board of UNESCO or to its General Conference that the matter be submitted to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Although an advisory opinion is not binding on the parties, the very fact
that the judicial process of the World Court has been invoked can exert
very persuasive influence on the alleged breaching party to take corrective
measures. This procedure is unique to the UNESCO-sponsored Convention and Protocol Against Discrimination in Education.
Finally, another advance under the UNESCO Convention and Protocol is that both are open to accession by UNESCO members and by those
non-members who are invited by the Executive Board.' s In contrast, the
Employment Convention is open for ratification only to members of the
ILO. If the goal is to promote participation by the maximum number of
states, then opening participation to non-members at the invitation of the

39. Protocol Instituting a Conciliation and Good Offices Commission to the Convention
Against Discrimination in Education, adopted Dec. 10, 1962, by the 12th General Conference of UNESCO, 651 U.N.T.S. 362, entered into force on Oct. 24, 1968 [hereinafter cited as
1962 Protocol]. The Protocol was ratified by 15 states in accordance with article 24 of the
Protocol.
40. Id. art. 17(1).
41. Id. art. 17(2).
42. Education Convention, supra note 5, art. 13; 1962 Protocol, supra note 39, art. 23.
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Executive Board is a useful innovation. The Education Convention also
provides that the Executive Board's power to invite non-member participation is not restricted in any way,'4 and it is to be hoped that it will be
used liberally.
V.

THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL

FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

In addition to the role played by the Subcommission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in initiating the two conventions discussed above, the Subcommission also took an active part in
the preparation of the 1963 U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination" and the 1965 International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 5
A. Limitations on JuridicalForce
The 1963 Declaration confines itself to a broad statement of the principles of nondiscrimination and contains nothing more than moral exhortations to states to take steps to eliminate discrimination.' This is attributable to two factors. First, there are inherent limitations on the
constitutional powers of the General Assembly as defined by the Charter
of the United Nations. The Charter limits these powers to discussion and
recommendation. 7 While it is arguable that a "decision" of the Security
Council may be binding on all United Nations member states (for example, under article 25), a "recommendation" of the General Assembly is
43. Education Convention, supra note 5, art. 13.
44. Note 6 supra. The Declaration was drafted by the Subcommission.
45. Note 7 supra. This Convention is discussed in Section VI infra.
46. The preamble to the Declaration affirms the necessity of worldwide eradication of
all forms of racial discrimination and of securing understanding of and respect for the dignity of the human person. The Declaration, enumerating the principles for the elimination
of racial discrimination, states in article 3(2) that all persons shall have equal access to any
place or facility intended for use by the general public. It provides in articles 4 and 9 that
states shall take effective measures to revise governmental and other public policies, to rescind offending laws and regulations and pass legislation prohibiting discrimination by private persons and groups. Article 5 specifically cites the policy of apartheid as a form of
discrimination which should be speedily eradicated.
The Declaration further states in article 6, that no discrimination by reason of race,
color or ethnic origin shall be admitted in the enjoyment by any person of political and
citizenship rights in his country, in particular the right to participate in elections through
universal and equal suffrage. It also declares, in article 7(1), that everyone has the right to
equality before the law and to equal justice under the law, and that everyone without distinction as to race, color or ethnic origin, has the right to security of person and protection
by the state against bodily harm. Finally, article 7(2) provides that a victim of discrimination "shall have the right to effective remedy . . .through independent national tribunals
competent to deal with such matters."
The Declaration, in article 8, urges immediate steps in the fields of teaching, education
and information with a view to promoting nondiscrimination and racial tolerance. Articles
9(1) and 9(3) call for the condemnation of all propaganda based on theories of racial or
ethnic superiority, and urge states to take "immediate and positive" measures to prosecute
or outlaw organizations which promote or incite racial discrimination or racial violence.
47. U.N. CHARTER, ch. IV, art. 10, para. 1; art. 13, paras. 1 & 2.
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not considered legally binding.
Second, the 1963 Declaration was not adopted or sponsored by the
General Assembly in the form of a treaty or convention that could be
made open to states for ratification. The juridical force of the -Declaration
is, hence, generically different from that of a treaty.
B. Enhancing the JuridicalForce of the Declaration
While it would be unrealistic to hope that the members will, through
a change of heart, confer on the General Assembly powers to bind states,
it is conceivable that the 1963 Declaration could be made open for signature in much the same way that the ILO and UNESCO sponsored the
two conventions discussed above. If the Declaration were opened for signature as a binding instrument, certain amendments would be required.
For example, in order to effectively implement the Declaration on the national level, additional machinery for international supervision would
have to be established.
Article 7 of the Declaration could also be improved. Article 7 proclaims the desirability of having an effective remedy against discrimination available "through independent national tribunals."4 The article
could be amended to provide for the inclusion of an international body
charged with the responsibility of monitoring policy implementation, or a
conciliation commission where individual grievances could be aired, either
in confidence or in public.
C. The Normative Effect of the Declaration
The moral influence of the Declaration remains undiminished even
though it is not in treaty form. 4 ' Moreover, the Declaration should be
viewed in light of the process of crystallization of new norms within the
United Nations General Assembly.50 As one of the principal bodies for
48. U.N. Declaration on Racial Discrimination, supra note 6, art. 7(2).
49. The moral authority of United Nations instruments is not without consequence. An
increasing number of problems that, until recently, were considered "national" and therefore beyond the realm of legitimate international concern are becoming recognized as proper
areas for international inquiry and action.
50. If a state continues to ignore the fundamental values, beliefs, and laws accepted by
the international community, it does so at its own perih As an eminent judge of the International Court of Justice has warned:
[Iln doing so it acts at its peril when a point is reached when the cumulative
effect of the persistent disregard of the articulate opinion of the [United Nations] Organization is such as to foster the conviction that the State in question has become guilty of disloyalty to the Principles and Purposes of the
Charter. Thus [a] ... State which consistently sets itself above the solemnly
and repeatedly expressed judgment of the Organization, in particular in proportion as that judgment approximates to unanimity, may find that it has
overstepped the imperceptible line between impropriety and illegality, between
discretion and arbitrariness ...and that it has exposed itself to consequences
legitimately following as a legal sanction.
Advisory Opinion on Voting Procedure and Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions
Concerning the Territory of South-West Africa, [1955] I.C.J. 67 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J.), reprinted in [1955] INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 651, 687.
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the articulation of new desires, new goals and new norms, the Assembly
has given expression to a number of newly emergent norms which,
through the sheer weight of international public opinion, have acquired
the status of opiniones juris sive necessitatis. Other organs of the United
Nations-its specialized agencies, for example-have also contributed to
the emergence of new norms. Action in the General Assembly and other
international bodies has resulted in the transformation of international
society from a sovereignty-centered system, operating solely through bilateral convention, into a community-centered system, operating through
international organizations. As many legal scholars have noted, the emergence of new norms through international organizations has resulted in
states incurring international obligations which are not based on a strictly
consensual basis. 1
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
A. The Substantive Law
Unlike the 1963 Declaration, the 1965 International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination goes beyond mere
description of prohibited activity. It attempts to deal with the causes of
discrimination and to devise procedures which may serve the purposes of
preventing and deterring discrimination, while rehabilitating already exacerbated situations."3
1. The Concept of Racial Discrimination
As defined under the 1965 Convention, the concept of "racial discrimination" is multifaceted.53 It involves three principal elements: (1)
there must occur a certain act or omission involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference; (2) the act or omission must be based on
grounds of race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin; and (3) the
act or omission must have the "purpose or effect" of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms in virtually any sphere of life. Since the concept of racial
51. See, e.g., I. RoSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TI INTERNATIONAL Courr 5-6
(1965); Falk, The South-West Africa Cases-An Appraisal, 12 INT'L ORG'N 22 (1967).
The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo-

nial Countries and Peoples, the Proclamation of Teheran, General Assembly Resolution
1803 of December 14, 1962, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, and the
Lagos Declaration of August 1977 are just a few examples, which, insofar as they have been
acclaimed by the near unanimous agreement of the international community of states, may
be taken to be authoritative statements of contemporary international customary law.
52. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human Rights:
Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 919, 1061 (1975).
53. Article 1 of the Convention, note 7 supra, defines racial discrimination as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying
or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
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discrimination is fundamental to the scope and effect of the instrument
involved, the reach of the 1965 Convention is far wider than that of the
ILO and UNESCO conventions. While the ILO Employment Convention
is limited to discrimination in employment and occupation, and the
UNESCO Education Convention to discrimination in education, the 1965
Convention covers discrimination in regard to "human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life."
With regard to the second element of the concept, after stating its
objective as the elimination of "all forms of racial discrimination," the
Convention adds to the concept of race the ancillary concepts of "colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin." The use of this formula suggests
that the negotiating parties intended that the Convention should embrace
biological and cultural classifications. Because the term "colour" is undefined, it should be given the broadest possible interpretation, encompassing all gradations of human complexion. The concept of "national origin,"
as distinguished from "nationality," has been asserted to include both
"politico-legal" and "ethnographical" (or "historico-biological") senses."
The concept includes a person's prior identificatiion with larger cultural
groups, often described as "nations," which transcend any particular
state. As for the term "ethnic origin," this too includes both the biological
and cultural aspects. Finally, "descent" is a term unique to the Convention. It does not appear in any of the group characterizations in previous
United Nations instruments on the subject, including the Charter, the
Universal Declaration, and the two human rights Covenants.
The foregoing observations illustrate that the concept of discrimination is to be given the broadest possible interpretation. The broad formulae used-"colour," "national origin," "ethnic origin," "descent"-all indicate the intention that not a single discriminatory act should escape
condemnation on the grounds that it is not "racial discrimination" as defined by the Convention."
It should also be noted that the concept of racial discriminatipn includes both attempts at discrimination regardless of effect and discriminatory effects regardless of purpose. Article 1(1) contains the phrase "any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference. . . which has the purpose
54. P. Wins, NATIONALrrY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1956). See also
Schwelb, The InternationalConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & Coup. L.Q. 996, 1006 (1966).
55. The broad generalizations contained in the definition of racial discrimination are
reinforced by article 5, which contains a detailed itemization of the protected rights, intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive, including, for example:
(a) The right to equal treatment before the tribunals . . . ; (b) The right to
security of person and protection... against violence or bodily harm, whether
inflicted by government officials or by any individual, group or institution; (c)
Political rights, in particular the rights to participate in elections - to vote
and to stand for election - on the basis of universal and equal suffrage... ;
[and, (d) and (e)] other civil. . . [elconomic, social and cultural rights ....
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or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise,
on an equal footing, of human rights . . . ." Mere purpose, without proof
of success, may constitute discrimination, and an act or omission whose
actual consequence or "effect" is discriminatory is prohibited even if
there is no purpose or intention to discriminate.
2. Scope of the Convention
Although the Convention does not apply to "distinctions, exclusions,
restrictions or preferences made by a State Party . ..between citizens

and noncitizens,"s aliens are protected by the Convention. Exclusions or
restrictions on foreigners due to their race, color, descent, or national or
ethnic origin are prohibited. The only exclusions or restrictions permitted
under the Convention are those imposed on aliens qua aliers." The wideranging rights under article 5 of the Convention are declared to belong to
"everyone," while under article 6 states are obligated to grant protection

and remedies "to everyone within their jurisdiction." These references
should be read to include nationals as well as aliens residing within individual state jurisdictions.
3. ProhibitionaryFormulae under the Convention
a. Attempts to Incite Discrimination
Article 4 of the Convention prohibits attempts to incite discrimination." In addition, article 4(a) obliges states parties to the Convention to
treat the act of inciting to racial discrimination as "an offence punishable
by law."' However, the prohibition against incitment is qualified by the
requirement that it should operate "with due regard to the principles em-

56. 1965 Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(2).
57. Id. The same analysis applies to article 1(3), relating to laws of nationality, citizenship, and naturalization.
58. Under article 4, states parties:
condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic
origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination
in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures
designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination ....
This article has caused some controversy because of conflict with the domestic law of
some countries. It has been said that the article "flies in the face of [the] First Amendment
freedoms" of the Constitution of the United States. Hauser, United Nations Law on Racial
Discrimination, [1970] PROC. Am.Soc'Y INT'L L. 114, 118. See also Reisman, Responses to
Crimes of Discriminationand Genocide: An Appraisal of the Convention on Eliminationof
Racial Discrimination,1 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 29, 49-51 (1971), and McDougal & Arens,
The Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REv. 683 (1950), for reviews of
some pertinent U.S. Constitutional questions arising over the ratification of the Genocide
Convention. See also R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 157, 167
(1979).
59. Article 4(a) obligates parties to:
declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of
violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of
another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof . ...
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bodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and to the detailed list of rights set forth in acticle 5 of the Convention.
b. Official (Public) and Unofficial (Private)Discrimination
Consistent with its goal of the total elimination of racial discrimination, the Convention prohibits official (public) as well as unofficial (private) discrimination. For example, the former is covered by article
2(1)(a): "Each State Party undertakes to engage in no act or practice of
racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions
and to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national
and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation." Article 5(f) prohibits discrimination in public places that may be privately owned, such
as hotels, restaurants, theaters, and parks.
Private discrimination-in public as well as non-public places-is
covered by the broad reach of article 2(1)(d): "Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation
as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group
or organization .

. . ."

This provision is by itself a considerable advance;

no other international instrument goes as far in condemning private
discrimination. 0
4. Positive Obligations
Among the positive obligations imposed by the 1965 Convention, article 7 deserves special mention. An embodiment of a number of interrelated obligations, article 7 seeks to prevent, deter, and provide remedies
for discrimination. Among other things, states parties undertake "to
adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of
teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating
60. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 11, art. 2, which states
in part that everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms "set forth in this Declaration."
Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, note 13 supra, after
declaring the equality of all persons before the law, adds the qualification-tautological
though it may appear-that the law shall prohibit discrimination "in this respect." As one
authority has observed, this has had the result of rendering the prohibition against discrimination in that article meaningless. Schwelb, supra note 54, at 1018-19.
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, done at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950,
entered into force, Sept. 3, 1953, Europ. T.S. No. 5, also concentrates on protecting only
those rights and freedoms contained in that Convention. When the final statement of the
Fourth Protocol to the European Convention was being considered, a proposal for the inclusion of a general nondiscrimination clause was expressly rejected. Schwelb, supra note 54, at
1020. Similarly, the ILO Employment Convention focuses attention on prohibiting discrimination on only those sectors "under the direct control of a national authority." Supra note
4, art. 3(d). The UNESCO Education Convention also concentrates on discrimination in
public educational institutions. Note 5 supra. While under article 3(b) of the Education
Convention the prohibition could conceivably be extended to private educational institutions, it is obvious that the ban would, in view of the inherent purpose of the convention, be
limited to the field of education only. For these reasons, article 2(1)(d) of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, note 7 supra, which by its simple
and forthright language obliges states to prohibit all forms of discrimination whether public
or private, official or unofficial, is a significant advance over previous instruments.
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prejudices which lead to racial discrimination ...
5. Special Protective Measures
Despite the large span of the prohibitionary formulae in the Convention, it has its own built-in flexibility whereby not all differentiations are
unlawful. It has been aptly observed that "discrimination," in international legal usage,
has come to acquire a special meaning. It does not mean any distinction or differentiation but only arbitrary, invidious or unjustified distinctions, unwanted by those made subject to them. Moreover, it does
not forbid special measures or protection designed to aid depressed
groups ... so long as these special measures are not carried on longer
that is reasonably necessary .... 1
Thus, under article 1(4) of the Convention, special measures for the sole
purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic
groups would not be deemed discrimination if they meet certain conditions: the group requires such protection for the equal enjoyment of
human rights; the measures do not lead to the maintenance of separate
rights for different racial groups; and the measures are not continued after the objectives for which they were instituted have been achieved."1
6. The Need for a Comprehensive Program
The need for a comprehensive approach is especially urgent in light
of two goals. First, programs must be designed to combat the complex
problem of the discriminated minority internalizing beliefs of its own inferiority as a result of longstanding discrimination.1s Where the discriminated person actually adopts the image the discriminator holds of him, a
piecemeal approach will be insufficient. Second, the creation of the optimum state of factual equality further implies equality for all in the pursuit of all goals of life, whether they be material, spiritual, emotional or

61. McKean, The Meaning of Discriminationin Internationaland Municipal Law, 44
Y.B. INT'L L. 177, 185-86 (1970).
62. Article 2(2) of the Convention also addresses the issue of protective measures:
States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social,
economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure
the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms ....
The requirement that the special measures be discontinued once the purpose for which
they were instituted has been achieved is part of the overall goal of achieving equal rights
for all. In a study, Subcommission Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti asserted that
whereas equality and nondiscrimination imply a formal guarantee of uniform treatment,
and protection of minorities implies preferential treatment for members of minority groups,
the purposes of both approaches is to institute factual equality between all members of all
groups. "This shows that the prevention of discrimination, on the one hand, and the implementation of special measures to protect minorities, on the other, are merely aspects of the
same problem: that of fully ensuring equal rights to all persons." Capotorti, The Rights of
Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, Chapter V, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/384/Add.5, para. 27 (1974).
63. Reisman, supra note 58, at 46.
BRIT.

1981

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: THE

U.N.

IN RETROSPECT

other.
Hence, the elimination of discrimination requires a comprehensive
program of action, the goals of which should include the enlightenment of
discriminated minorities so that they not only become aware of their
rights and cease to regard themselves as inferior, but also cease to hate
their oppressors because of the race of the latter. Moreover, the creation
of genuine equality for all requires a comprehensive program of action in
areas beyond the immediate purview of the 1965 Racial Discrimination
Convention.
7.

Remedies

Article 6 of the Convention provides for remedial action at the national level. Parties are obliged to "assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through competent national
tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination . . . ." The remedies are to include "the right to seek from such
tribuials just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as i result of such discrimination."
B. Implementation of
Supervision

the

Convention

and the

Machinery of

To supervise the implementation of the Convention at the national
level, the Convention established a Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The Committee consists of "eighteen experts of high
moral standing and acknowledged impartiality" serving in their "personal
capacity."" The Committee has a four-fold competence: (1) to appraise-in reports to the General Assembly-national action at the legislative, judicial, administrative, or other levels for the implementation of
the Convention;6 5 (2) to receive and act on complaints brought by one
state party against another for noncompliance with the Convention;" (3)
to deal with petitions by individuals under the conditions specified in article 14; and (4) to cooperate with other United Nations organs in matters
concerning petitions from inhabitants of Trust, non-Self Governing, and
67
other dependent territories.
1. Appraisal of Reports
The procedure and nature of supervision is not very different from
that provided under the other international instruments discussed in this
article. However, there are some points of departure.
A significant procedural aspect of the supervisory function of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is contained in

64. 1965 Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 7, art. 8(1).
65. Parties to the Convention are obliged to submit such periodic reports under art.
9(1). For further discussion of the reporting requirements under the Convention, see Buergenthal, Implementing the Racial Convention, 12 TEx. I1rr'L L.J. 187, 190-221 (1977).
66. 1965 Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 7, arts. 11-13.
67. Id. art. 15.
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rule 64(A) of its provisional rules of procedure.s8 Under this rule, the
Committee initiated at its sixth session the practice of notifying, through
the Secretary-General, the states parties concerned of the dates on which
their respective reports are to be considered so that their representatives
could participate in the deliberations." The Committee reported in 1975
that a representative of each reporting state was present and participated
in the consideration of every report submitted under article 9 of the Convention and considered by the Committee at its eleventh and twelfth
70
sessions.
Encouraging the participation of representatives from reporting
states by sending notice of the date for Committee consideration could
prove to be an effective procedure in furthering the goals of the Convention. Actual representation may create fears of embarrassment for noncompliance, which may in turn foster a more cooperative attitude on the
part of parties in the supply of information to the Committee. Public exposure, or the threat of exposure, may also compel states to take more
effective steps to implement the Convention.
Supervision of compliance with the Convention under rule 64(A)
could be rendered more effective in two ways: (1) by changing the provisional rules so as to allow representatives of other parties to the Convention to attend the sessions where the reports are considered; and (2) by
changing the rules so as to require the attendance of a representative of
the party whose report the Committee is to consider.
Permitting one or more representatives from among other parties to
attend the Committee sessions where reports are under consideration
would mark a change in the current rule, which limits attendance to representatives whose states' reports are being considered on that particular
day. If attendance of even one representative from among other parties to
the Convention were possible, and even though the representative may be
limited to having observer status, the threat of exposure could become a
more powerful psychological sanction. A requirement that a representative from the party whose report is scheduled for consideration attend the
session would improve the current rule in yet another way: it would
strengthen a supervisory system that is otherwise inherently weak, as
there can never be certainty of participation under the present voluntary
system."

68. Rule 64(A) of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 37, U.N. Doc. A/8718 (1972).
[The Committee will hereinafter be cited as CERD.]
69. Id.
70. 1975 Report of CERD, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 24, U.N. Doc. A/10018
(1975).
71. Experience has demonstrated the pitfalls of purely voluntary representation. At the
eleventh and twelfth sessions of the Committee, only 19 of the 28 states whose reports were
considered sent representatives. 1976 Report of CERD, 37 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 15,
U.N. Doc. A/31/18 (1976). There was, however, a considerable improvement in attendance
at the Committee's fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth sessions. See 1977 Report of CERD,
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To date, the Committee has carefully considered all reports
presented to it and has not hesitated to point out deficiencies in the information supplied. It has also pointed out to individual governments the
need to take positive steps in certain fields."' In numerous instances the
Committee sought and received answers from governments concerning
their stands on apartheid and their links with South Africa.73 In many
cases the Committee has requested entire texts of legislative provisions
and has examined the extent to which they comply with the provisions of
74
the Convention.
2. Interstate Complaint Procedure
The interstate complaint procedure under articles 11, 12, and 13 of
the Convention can be compared to the 1962 Protocol instituting a Conciliation Commission under the auspices of UNESCO's Education Convention.7 5 The Racial Discrimination Convention also provides for a conciliation commission to be set up ad hoc for the amicable resolution of
disputes between state parties concerning the implementation of the
Convention.
Under the 1962 Protocol either party to a dispute can, after failure of
bilateral negotiations, submit the matter directly to the Conciliation
Commission. Under the 1965 Convention it is the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination which decides whether it is necessary for the dispute to be decided by a conciliation commission and
whether it should appoint such a commission. 7 ' Under both the 1962 Protocol and the 1965 Convention, this procedure can be invoked only after
the exhaustion of all available domestic remedies. 77 This presumably refers to a remedy provided by the municipal law of either party and is
accepted by both parties to the dispute as a satisfactory solution.

37 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 23, U.N. Doc. A/32/18 (1977).
72. In 1975, for example, the Committee criticized the bland statement by Bolivia that
"there is no statutory provision sanctioning discrimination since there is no racial discrimination" in that country. The representative of the country was informed that "even a satisfactory de facto situation did not remove the need for the sanction of certain laws, particularly in connection with such articles of the Convention (as article 4) which are mandatory
in nature and which require positive legislative measures." 1975 Report of CERD, note 70
supra. In the following year this country was again cited for not supplying the information
required under article 9 of the Convention. 1976 Report of CERD, supra note 71, at 16-17.
In the case of Tonga, the Committee asked detailed questions on court procedures, the
methods of imposition of fines, the effectiveness of the institution of ombudsmen in cases
involving racial discrimination on migrant workers, and the implementation of article 7 of
the Convention. The representative of the country in question assured the Committee that
these questions would be answered in future reports. Id. at 29.
73. See, e.g., 1976 Report of CERD, supra note 71, at 18-19, 35-36, 42; 1977 Report of
CERD, supra note 71, at 27, 31, 36, 38, 49-51, 57.
74. See, e.g., 1976 Report of CERD, supra note 71, at 27-28, 31-32; 1977 Report of
CERD, supra note 98, at 35.
75. See text, sec. IV(D)(2) supra.
76. 1965 Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 7, art. 12(1)(a).
77. 1962 Protocol, supra note 39, art. 14; 1965 Racial Discrimination Convention, supra
note 7, art. 11(3).
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A significant difference is that while under the 1962 Protocol the
matter can, at the recommendation of the Conciliation Commission, be
submitted to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion,
there is no such provision under the 1965 Convention. Apart from that
procedure, there is provision in the Education Convention itself for invoking the contentious jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
While this is contingent upon the prior consent of both parties to the
dispute, a decision of the court exercising its contentious jurisdiction
would be legally binding on the parties concerned, whereas an "advisory"
opinion is ex hypothesi nonbinding. The 1965 Racial Discrimination Convention does not empower either the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination or an ad hoc conciliation commission to seek an
advisory opinion. Nor does the Convention contain any provision for the
submission of a dispute directly by the parties to the World Court.
While it is desirable to have specific references in the Convention for
international judicial guidance, the absence of any such reference does
not negate the possibility of judicial resolution. Under article 96 of the
United Nations Charter, the General Assembly, the Security Council, and
other organs of the United Nations authorized by the General Assembly
can request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.
Thus the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination could
be authorized to request an opinion of the Court. Alternatively, the parties to a dispute could directly invoke the contentious jurisdiction of the
Court by filing ad hoc declarations accepting the Court's jurisdiction in
matters related to the implementation of the 1965 Convention."6
The express involvement of the World Court would render the overall machinery of supervising the implementation of the Convention more
effective, and would at the same time stimulate states to take more active
measures to combat racism and racial discrimination. At the same time,
however, adequate attention should be given to the problem of maintaining the delicate balance achieved under the system of voluntary reporting, participation, and cooperation as set up in the 1965 Convention as
presently worded. The Committee's primary goal must be to guide, counsel, and persuade. Stringent or embarrassing obligations could do more
harm than good to the system of consensual reporting. Thus, should present language be revised, any reference of matters to the International
Court of Justice must, under the present system of international organization, give adequate attention to the principle of consensus, so that the
Court would serve primarily as an auxiliary organ of the Committee
rather than assume the role of the Committee itself. As time goes on, the
Committee should be encouraged by its superior organs as well as the
older and more experienced supervisory agencies of the United Nations to
evolve its own standard format of reporting by states. This would minimize instances of inadequate information and establish a practice of di-

78. See I.C.J. STAT. art. 36.
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rect contact with governments. As a result, the Committee could establish
its own jurisprudenceconstante, so as to develop a stable pattern of expectations between the Committee and the reporting states.
C. Petitions by Individuals

Under the conditions specified in article 14, the Committee has competence to deal with petitions by individuals. This was a bold though cautious attempt to provide an international forum for the airing of private

grievances. The effectiveness of the provision under which the Committee
may deal with petitions by individuals is constrained by two qualifications. First, before article 14 operates against any state party, the latter
must declare its recognition of the competence of the Committee to re-

ceive and consider communications from individuals or groups of individuals within its jurisdiction. No communication can be received by the

Committee concerning a state party which has not made such a
declaration.
Second, the Committee can become competent to exercise this particular function only when a minimum of ten states parties have filed declarations under article 14(1). While some ninety-seven states have filed
instruments of ratification, accession or succession, only seven states have

filed these declarations.7 ' The Committee is thus unable to exercise any
function under article 14. It is to be hoped that more states will file such

declarations in order to utilize this ingenious and promising method of
combating racial discrimination.
VII.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA

Apartheid,"0 the policy of strict racial segregation and discrimination,

79. Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. A/32/186, at 2-3 (1977).
Under article 14(2), a state may set up an internal body to receive petitions. Yet even this
provision is of limited value because (a) it applies only to those states which have filed
declarations under article 14(1), and (b) compliance [with article 14(2)] is entirely on a voluntary basis. See Richardson, Will the Rapidly Accumulating Body of U.N. Law on Racial
DiscriminationTruly Be Effective?, [1970] PROC. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 110, 110-14. See also R.
LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 58, at 173-74.
80. The policy of apartheid is characterized by class division along racial lines. Political
and economic power is monopolized by a minority racial class. The majority is denied effective participation in political life not only in terms of holding office but also of voting. Freedom of movement is severely restricted through the system of "pass laws" which results in
the denial of the right to choose one's own place of work and residence. This system also
results in the fragmentation of families and creates severe social and psychological stress
within the deprived class. Inter-racial activity, social and political, is prohibited and enforced through arrest and detention.
Educational institutions are segregated and unequal. Resources expended in providing
educational facilities for the privileged minority are grossly out of proportion with coresponding expenditures for the deprived groups. The facilities available to the latter are
therefore not only inadequate but vastly inferior. Illiteracy is widespread and there is an
almost total absence of opportunity for the development of any kind of organizational and
managerial skills among the majority. Apart from a highly discriminatory educational pol-
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has been elevated in South Africa to the status of a national ideology.
Because of its particularly vicious form of institutionalized repression,
coupled with the present state of political ferment in the region, the practice of apartheid in South Africa poses one of the greatest challenges to
the organized international community in the present era.
The institutionalized repression of apartheid is based exclusively on
racial criteria and involves systematic and total deprivation of individual
freedom regarding such fundamental aspects of human existence as
choice of residence, employment, education, political participation, marriage, thought, expression, and movement. As a system of entrenching
class rule along racial lines apartheid appears not only in South Africa
but also, with some modifications, in South African occupied Namibia.
A. International Action against Apartheid
1. Action in the U.N. General Assembly
The United Nations has been concerned with the problem of
apartheid since its inception. In the early years (1946-1952), discussion
centered chiefly on the rights of people of Indo-Pakistani origin. Between
1952 and 1959, the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions
condemning the policy of apartheid and declared that governmental policies not directed toward racial equality were inconsistent with article 56
of the United Nations Charter.6 ' The tone of the language of the resolutions became progressively sharper as South Africa's intrasigence became
manifest.6 " At its fifteenth and sixteenth sessions, the Assembly noted
that apartheid endangered international peace and security, and called
upon states to take individual and collective measures to bring about an
end to that policy. 8 Since 1962, the Assembly has specifically called on
states to break off diplomatic relations, close their ports to South African
ships, boycott South African goods, and stop trading with South Africa."
The Assembly has also condemned the violations of the rights of detainicy, the flow of information and publication of educational and other materials is controlled
by rigid censorship.
The cumulative effect of these inequalities results in a considerably lower standard of
living for the nonwhite groups when compared with that enjoyed by the ruling class. Malnutrition and disease are common, while inadequate medical facilities and poor housing continue to exacerbate the already unbearable situation.
81. G.A. Res. 616B, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 8, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952). On article 56 of the Charter, see note 9 supra.
82. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 721, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 6, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953);
G.A. Res. 820, 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 9, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954); G.A. Res. 917, 10
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19) 8, U.N. Doc. A/3116 (1955).
83. G.A. Res. 1568, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 33, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); G.A.
Res. 1663, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 10, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
84. G.A. Res. 2054A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 16, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); G.A.
Res. 2202, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 20, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); G.A. Res. 2307, 22
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 19, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); G.A. Res. 2396, 23 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 18) 19, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2506, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30)
23, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 3055, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 25, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973).
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ees in South Africa and the exportation of apartheid to Namibia.8"
2. Action in the U.N. Security Council
In addition to the General Assembly, other United Nations organs
and sub-organs have examined apartheid. For example, in the wake of the
Sharpeville massacre, the Security Council considered the policy of
apartheid for the first time in 1960. It deplored the policies of the Union
Government which had created the disturbances and recognized that if
left unchecked, the situation could endanger international peace and security.8' Numerous other resolutions were adopted by the Council which,
inter alia, called
upon member states to impose an arms embargo against
87
South Africa.

Following the brutality of police action against school children during
the unrest of June 1976 in Soweto and other townships, the Security
Council adopted a resolution by which it strongly condemned the police
action and recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of its victims." The
Council has also severely condemned all the various aspects of apartheid
and has requested the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Special
Committee against Apartheid, to monitor the situation and report to the
Security Council. s9
An historic step was taken by the Security Council in November
1977, when it adopted a resolution which expressly invoked Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter.' 0 Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
Council has powers to take enforcement measures in the event of a threat
to peace, breach of peace, or an act of aggression. 91 The resolution "determined" that the acquisition by South Africa of arms constituted a "threat
to the maintenance of international peace and security." Under Chapter
85. G.A. Res. 2144, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 46, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); G.A.
Res. 2439, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 47, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2440, 23
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 48, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2547, 24 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 30) 55, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2671, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28)
31, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2775, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 41, U.N. Doe.
A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2923, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
On current developments, see, e.g., Assembly, in Resumed Session, Calls for Total Sanctions against South Africa, U.N. CHRON., May 1981, at 5.
86. S.C. Res. 134, 15 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/15/Rev. 1
(1960).
87. S.C. Res. 181, 18 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/18/Rev. 1
(1963); S.C. Res. 182, 18 U.N. SCOR, id. at 8; S.C. Res. 191, 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. &
Dec.) 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/19/Rev. 1 (1964); S.C. Res. 282, 25 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. &
Dec.) 12, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970); S.C. Res. 311, 27 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 10,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/28 (1972).
88. S.C. Res. 392, 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 11, U.N. Doc. SINF/32 (1976).
89. S.C. Res. 417, 32 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 4, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977).
90. S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977).
91. Article 39 of the Charter, the first article in chapter XII, provides: "The Security
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
aaccordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security."
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VII, this "threat" to peace must be accepted as an authoritative finding
of fact by a competent United Nations organ charged with the "primary"
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."
In the same resolution, the Council decided "that all States shall cease
forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related materiel of
all types . . . ." This must be interpreted as a "decision" under article 25
of the Charter and, as such, binding on all states. 93 Under the same resolution, all states are bound to refrain from cooperating with South Africa
in the development of nuclear weapons. In December 1977, the Security
Council passed another resolution setting up a Committee consisting of
all its members to monitor progress in the implementation of the earlier
resolution."
3.

Action in Other United Nations Bodies

Beyond adopting resolutions, the General Assembly and the Security
Council have established a number of committees and study groups to
report on South Africa and to recommend action against it.95 The Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council have
played an important part in initiating many studies." Various international seminars on apartheid have been held in response to resolutions of
the General Assembly. Seminars have also been held under the auspices

92. Article 24, paragraph 1 of the Charter provides: "In order to ensure prompt and
effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf."
93. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter provides: "The Members of the United
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter."
94. S.C. Res. 421, 32 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 6, U.N. Doc. SJINF/33 (1977).
95. For a more extensive discussion, see Santa Cruz, note 15 supra.
96. See, e.g., the study by Espiell (Special Rapporteur to the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities), Implementation of United Nations
Resolutions Relating to the Right of Peoples Under Colonial and Alien Domination to SelfDetermination, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/390 (1978).
97. Important seminars and conferences on apartheid include: (1) International Seminar on Apartheid, Brasilia, Brazil, Aug. 23-Sept. 4, 1966; (2) Seminar on Apartheid, Kitwe,
Zambia, Aug. 1967; (3) International Seminar on the Eradication of Apartheid and in Support of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa, Havana, Cuba, May 1976; (4) World
Conference for Action Against Apartheid, Lagos, Nigeria, Aug. 1977; (5) World Conference
Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa, Lisbon, Portugal, June
1977; and (6) World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, Geneva,
Switzerland, Aug. 1978.
The latter conference was one of the most important actions taken by the United Nations during the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. On the
Decade for Action, see G.A. Res. 3057, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 70, U.N. Doc. A/OR/
28/S.30/v.1 (1973). Annexed to this resolution was the Programme of Action for the Decade,
which provided:
As a major feature during the Decade, a world conference on combating
racial discrimination should be convened by the General Assembly ....
The
Conference should have as its main theme the adoption of effective ways and
means and concrete measures for securing the full and universal implements-
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of specialized agencies such as the ILO and UNESCO. In 1977, UNESCO
sponsored a meeting of government representatives in Paris at which it
submitted a working paper containing a draft UNESCO Declaration on
Peace and Racial Prejudice, which included rules for its implementation
by member states."8
4. International Anti-Apartheid Year
Carrying forward the momentum of these events, the General Assembly on December 14, 1977, adopted a comprehensive resolution on the
policies of apartheid of the government of South Africa.'9 This resolution
proclaimed the year beginning March 21, 1978, as the International AntiApartheid Year, and endorsed the program recommended by the Special
Committee Against Apartheid. The program was designed to mobilize
world public opinion through increased publicity against apartheid, to
discourage any form of collaboration with South Africa, and to increase
support for the liberation movements and the victims of apartheid. To
these ends, the program set forth a detailed description of measures to be
taken by the Secretary-General, governments, specialized agencies, nongovernmental organizations, trade unions, and the Special Committee
Against Apartheid.
The General Assembly expressed its concern over the detention and
treatment of political prisoners in South Africa and urged states to cut
ties with the Republic. Specific recommendations were made on the matter of military and nuclear collaboration. The "Bantustan" policy of development of "separate Bantu states" was also condemned. 100 The resolu-

tion of United Nations decisions and resolutions on racism, racial discrimination, apartheid,decolonization and self-determination, as well as the accession
to and ratification and enforcement of the international instruments relating to
human rights and the elimination of racism and racial discrimination.
Id., Annex, para. 13(a).
At all of these meetings, there was unanimity in the condemnation of apartheid and call
for complete isolation of the racist regimes of southern Africa, including the termination of
military and economic ties with South Africa. For a review of all the above conferences
except the last, see Progress Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts Prepared in
Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 6 and Economic and Social
Council Decision 236, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1270 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Human Rights
Progress Report].
98. UNESCO Meeting of Government Representatives (Category II) to Prepare a Draft
Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, Working Paper, U.N. Doc. 77/CONF.201/1
(1977). In recent months, extensive hearings have been held in preparation for the May 1981
International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa. Topics discussed include oil
shipments and bank loans to South Africa, the South African mining industry, the situation
of South African women and youth, and legal aspects of the campaign against apartheid.
See, e.g., U.N. CHRON., May 1981, at 16-21. On the action taken at the most recent session of
the Human Rights Commission (Feb. 2 to Mar. 13, 1981), see id. at 30.
99. G.A. Res. 32/105 B, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 31, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977).
100. In the aftermath of the Sharpeville tragedy, the notion of self-government for separate Bantu states accelerated in South Africa. For a recent discussion of the legal aspects of
the "Bantustan" policy, see Dugard, South Africa's "Independent" Homelands: An Exercise in Denationalization,10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 11 (1980).
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tion declared the Assembly to be "firmly convinced that mandatory
economic sanctions, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, are essential to facilitate the speedy eradication of apartheid." '
On the question of investments in South Africa, the Assembly noted
"with regret that the Security Council has been unable to reach agreement on steps to achieve the cessation of such investments . . . . "0 It
further noted that "a number of foreign economic and financial interests
have continued and increased their investments [in South Africa]." ' 0 8
B. The Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid
In recent years the United Nations, in a series of bold moves, has
been trying to break away from the tradition of condemning apartheid by
mere resolution. It has sought to impose more positive obligations on
states, while at the same time bringing more pressure on South Africa.
Most notably, the General Assembly approved the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (the
Anti-Apartheid Convention).' 0 '
The Convention begins by declaring that apartheid is a "crime
against humanity" and a "serious threat to international peace and security." 10 5 It defines apartheid as including the following deprivations
against persons by virtue of their membership in a particular racial group:
(a) a denial of life and liberty through murder, bodily or mental harm,
and arbitrary arrest; (b) deliberate imposition upon a racial group of living conditions calculated to cause its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (c) legislation preventing racial groups from participation in political, social, economic, and cultural affairs, including denial of the right to
work, to form trade unions, to education, to have one's own residence,
and to express one's opinion freely; (d) measures dividing populations
along racial lines, including, the prohibition of mixed marriages, the creation of segregated residential areas, and the expropriation of landed property belonging to members of racial groups; (e) exploitation of the labor
of members of racial groups, particularly by subjecting them to forced
labor; and (f) persecution of organizations and persons by depriving them
of their human rights because of their opposition to apartheid.'" This
enumeration is expanded by the statement that the crime of apartheid
"shall include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in southern Africa."107
The "crime against humanity" declared in the first article is not just

101. G.A. Res. 32/105 0, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 41, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977).
102. Id. part 0.
103. Id.
104. G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Anti-Apartheid Convention].
105. Id. art. I(1).

106. Id. art. II.
107. Id.
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a moralistic condemnation; it is a legal formula describing an international crime. Article III provides that "international criminal responsibility" shall apply regardless of motive to individuals, members of organizations, institutions, and state representatives, whatever their residence, if
the acts in question fall within article II or if they directly abet, encourage, or cooperate in the commission of the crime of apartheid.
It is clear that the Convention's prohibitions were intended to be
broad in scope. First of all, "motive" is irrelevant; if the act in question
results in deprivation of virtually any kind, it is illegal and gives rise to
criminal responsibility. This is a unique example of a criminal offense the
proof of which does not require specific proof of mens rea. It is indeed
arguable that the crime of apartheid involves acts which are so blatantly
discriminatory that the accused must be deemed to have intended the
consequences of his acts. In this sense, focusing on effects and consequences may be a more forceful way to promote the policy and purpose of
the Convention than concentrating on the narrower and often problematic questions of motive and intention.
1. Jurisdiction over the Crime of Apartheid
Further confirmation of the legal nature of the concept of apartheid
as an international crime is contained in the jurisdictional provisions of
the convention: persons accused of the crime can be tried by any state
party to the Convention or by an international penal tribunal."" However, the international penal tribunal can have "jurisdiction [only] with
respect to those States Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction."10 9 Not only is this phrase ambiguous, it is likely to provide a ready
loophole for evading the purpose of the Convention. For example, its imprecise language may be construed such that a person who has committed
the crime cannot be tried before the international tribunal because the
state of the accused person does not accept its jurisdiction. Even if such a
person could be tried before the international tribunal, he can be tried
before any domestic tribunal regardless of any objection to its
jurisdiction.
Under article IV of the Convention, states must take the necessary
measures to prosecute persons accused of the crime "whether or not such
persons reside in the territory of the State in which the acts are committed or are nationals of that State or of some other State or are stateless
persons." This would suggest that the domestic prosecution of an accused
alien cannot be frustrated by jurisdictional objection from the state whose
nationality or protection the accused person enjoys. It is unfortunate that
such a categorical statement cannot be made in respect of an international criminal prosecution.
2. Self-Regulation and Reporting Systems of the Convention
The Convention sets up its own reporting system under which re-

108. Id. art. V.
109. Id.
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ports from states on the implementation of the Convention are examined
by a group of three members of the Commission on Human Rights. In
order to coordinate its action with that to be taken under the 1965 Racial
Discrimination Convention, article X of the Convention authorizes the
Commission on Human Rights to request United Nations organs to examine complaints concerning the enumerated acts constituting apartheid.
Also under article X, the Commission on Human Rights is charged
with preparing a list of individuals, organizations, institutions, and state
representatives which are alleged to have committed prohibited acts. The
Commission has indicated that it would soon be in a position to undertake actively and effectively this function,'"0 and has noted the preliminary list of persons alleged to have committed the crime of apartheid
drawn up by the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Southern Africa. " ' The Commission suggested that the names of these persons be
widely circulated.'
3. Effectiveness of the Anti-Apartheid Convention
The machinery created under the Convention is still relatively new
and only time will show its effectiveness. However, the constitutive document makes an original contribution to the fight against racism and
apartheid at the national and international levels. This, together with the
experience over the past quarter century of other institutions and bodies
dedicated to similar goals, should enable the Commission on Human
Rights to make a promising beginning.
VIII. EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The international political and legal order, when compared with most
contemporary municipal systems, is relatively unstructured. It has no
specialized machinery for the creation and enforcement of norms. The
machinery that does exist has had a tortuous evolution, due to the vicissitudes of international relations characterized by instances of conflict and
competition between states. At the same time, however, there have been
opportunities for actual cooperation between states, bilaterally or multilaterally, for the pursuit of exclusive as well as common goals.
In the absence of well-defined standards of international conduct
prescribed by a determinate law-making and law-enforcing authority, the
external conduct of states has been conditioned primarily by their perceptions of their own interests and of how other states should behave in
relation to those interests. When these interests are threatened, states
sometimes resort to force to bring about patterns of conduct which either
increase their own aggregate security or which at least do not threaten

110. Draft Report of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Implementation of the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 34
U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.1370/Add.5 (1980).
111. Human Rights Progress Report, supra note 97, at para. 567.
112. Draft Report of the Commission on Human Rights, supra note 110, at 3, para. 9.
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their existing interests and do not disturb existing power relationships.
Preservation of the status quo is thus perhaps the most salient feature of
the post-World War II international order. The organization created in
1945 to protect that order, the United Nations, suffers from inherent limitations in its ability to act-limitations that arise not so much from "defects" in its constitutional structure, but from the status quo-oriented nature of the contemporary international order.
The Anti-Apartheid Convention, which came into force in July 1976,
is a good illustration of the difficulties faced by the United Nations in
proceeding against an objectionable element within the entrenched world
status quo. In the face of years of frustration caused by the intrasigence
of South Africa and its silent allies, the United Nations, through the
Anti-Apartheid Convention, is trying to do indirectly what it cannot do
with other sanctions.
Pockets of idealism within the United Nations have always had to be
suitably tempered with a sober evaluation of the obstacles to progress.
Thus the success of programs motivated by idealism should not be exaggerated, and actions proposed for the future should also reflect a sober
awareness of the difficulties involved.
What then is the potential of an organization such as the United Nations in the fight against racism and apartheid? It may be observed at the
outset that the fact that the United Nations has been expressly charged
with this task, not only by its Charter but by the overwhelming condemnation of racial discrimination and apartheid by the organized community of nations as expressed in various international bodies, augers well
for the United Nations as an international instrument for change. As
stated above, within the framework of international relations based on
conflict and competition, there have been instances of interstate cooperation for the realization of common goals. It can be maintained that the
elimination of racism, discrimination, and apartheid is the common goal
of an overwhelming majority of states. Yet the opinion of the majority
seems to be set on a colllision course with the status quo-oriented regime
of the United Nations. Fundamental change, especially in southern Africa, is unlikely without a fairly radical transformation of the existing
world power balance. It is a matter of historical record that the powers
with economic and military interests in that region have never been particularly enthusiastic about change there, and have resorted to frequent
vetoes to prevent the Security Council from taking action.
It may be possible for the force of public opinion to compel the
Western powers in the Security Council to adopt a more neutral attitude
to certain kinds of non-military measures against South Africa under
Chapter VII of the Charter. Evidence of this trend is the 1977 resolution
of the Security Council imposing a mandatory arms embargo against
South Africa-a resolution which the Western bloc, after years of resis-
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tance, finally agreed not to veto." 8 The Council should not retreat from
its present posture and it should make every effort to increase pressure to
enact further mandatory enforcement measures against South Africa, including the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions. This action
could be complemented with the drafting of conventions in the style of
the Anti-Apartheid Convention, obliging states to take additional measures against South Africa.
More thought should be given to the question of United Nationssponsored conventions on sporting, economic, and military links with
South Africa. Other conventions could deal with the protection of minorities within nations, including migrant workers and other ethnic, religious,
and linguistic minorities. There is also need for a convention on individual access to international tribunals for the airing of individual complaints of discrimination at the national level. An agency could be designated within the United Nations to receive all individual complaints of
state violations of any of the U.N.-sponsored conventions discussed
above, particularly in the fields of education and employment. This function would complement parallel work already being done by the Commission on Human Rights. In this regard, the final provision in article 14 of
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination rendering the entire article on individual complaints inoperative is unfortunate.
The United Nations has by no means exhausted all the possibilities
of change. The fight against racism, racial discrimination, and apartheid
in a systematic way has only begun with the proclamation of the Decade
for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination." 4 The Program
of Action for the Decade has two basic aims: isolating racist regimes and
combating racial discrimination. These aims could be pursued simultaneously on three fronts: sponsorship of new international instruments, publicity, and continued action by United Nations organs, particularly the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. Continued
backup support from the Council would add a greater sense of urgency to
the calls of the various watchdog organs. The potential of the United Nations in the fight against racial discrimination and apartheid lie's in its
ability to direct international condemnation against those nations who
contribute to apartheid. It is those countries which directly and indirectly
support apartheid that must face the moral opprobrium of the international community. In the long run it will be the gradual building of public
opinion not so much against apartheid-for that has already crystallized-but against its external economic and military supporters that is
most likely to create conditions for peaceful change.

113. S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 5, U.N. Doc. S/TNF/33 (1977).
114. G.A. Res. 3057, note 97 supra.

STUDENT COMMENT

Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the
Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea
GEORGE
I.

A.

PIERCE

INTRODUCTION

The tenth session of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) opened in New York March 9, 1981 marked
by the eleventh-hour firing of the United States UNCLOS delegation,'
and in the shadow of the Reagan Administration's recent decision to prevent the conclusion of negotiations at what had been hoped would be the
final session.2 The document in question is the Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea, Informal Text (the Draft Convention), which has been
more than seven years in the making.3 The Draft Convention contains
some 320 primary articles and seven annexes. It is a highly complex and
comprehensive codification of both new and customary principles of international law" covering a range of activities as vast as the area of the
world's surface with which it deals."
Given its complexity and comprehensiveness, it is axiomatic that disputes as to the scope, construction, and efficacy of the Draft Convention
will arise. Without appropriate methods of dealing with these disputes, it
will become a lifeless document of greatly diminished significance. The
purpose of this comment is to suggest a method of analysis of the dispute
settlement provisions in the Draft Convention. In light of the recently
revived potential for modification of the Draft Convention, the comment
George A. Pierce is a J.D. candidate at the University of Denver College of Law. B.A.,
1972, University of Colorado; A.M., 1975, University of Northern Colorado.
1. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
2. Id., Mar. 10, 1981, at 4, col. 3.
:. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/
WP.10/Rev.3/Add.1 [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention]. For a history of previous conferences on the law of the sea, see Sohn, Problems of Dispute Settlement, in LAW OF THE
SEA: CONFERENCE OUTCOMES AND PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION 223 (E. Miles & J. Gamble
eds. 1977).
4. See, e.g., Hazou, Determining the Extent of Admissibility of Reservations: Some
Considerations with Regard to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 69 (1980).
5. For a survey of the many potential uses of the oceans, see Nanda, Some Legal Questions on the Peaceful Uses of Ocean Space, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 343 (1969).
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will also offer an alternative which hopefully will facilitate dispute settlement without destroying the delicate balance of compromise which has
been so tediously hammered out over the course of the UNCLOS
negotiations.
The comment will begin with a description of the basic structure of
the dispute settlement provisions of the Draft Convention. The efficacy of
these procedures will then be considered in the context of varying degrees
of national sovereignty, ranging from unqualified or absolute sovereign
rights to disputes arising in areas over which national sovereignty is specifically precluded. The present form of dispute settlement has grown
through compromise and from the fears of what the Group of 77 perceives
as the legal chicanery of the developed world. The result is that dispute
settlement is being allocated largely to (1) the national forums, where the
dispute arises concerning an area over which there is national sovereignty,
and (2) the international political forum, regarding disputes in areas over
which national sovereignty is impossible. Although this comment is critical of the dispute settlement scheme as it presently exists, the structure
appears to be necessary if a workable agreement is ever to be reached.
Therefore, a recommendation is made which would leave the delicate balance of compromise upon which the Draft Convention is based intact,
while facilitating settlement in what appears to be the least threatening
forum to the Group of 77: the international political arena.
II. BASIC STRUCTURE OF DRAFT CONVENTION DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The Draft Convention imposes a basic obligation on member states
to settle disputes by peaceful means,' but allows considerable freedom of
choice as to the forum or method to be employed.7 The Draft Convention
provides for the following alternatives for the settlement of disputes: the
Law of the Sea Tribunal (LOST);8 the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber
(SBDC) of the Law of the Sea Tribunal; 9 the International Court of Justice (ICJ);' 0 an arbitral tribunal;"1 a special arbitral tribunal;"' conciliation;13 or any other procedure to which the parties have agreed." Member

6. Article 279 of the Draft Convention states: "The States Parties shall settle any dispute between them relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 2, and shall seek a solution through the peaceful means
indicated in paragraph 1 of Article 33, of the Charter of the United Nations." Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 279.
7. Article 280 sets forth: "Nothing in this Part shall impair the right of any States
Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them relating to the interpretation
or application of this Convention by any peaceful means of their own choice." Id. art. 280.
8. Id. art. 287(1)(a).
9. Id. art. 186.
10. Id. art. 287(1)(b).
11. Id. art. 287(1)(c).
12. Id. art. 287(1)(d).
13. Id. art. 284.
14. Id. art. 280. For a survey of potential means of dispute settlement, see Haubert,
Toward Peaceful Settlement of Ocean Space Disputes: A Working Paper, 11 SAN DIEGo L.
REv. 733, 740-46 (1974).
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states may agree to submit to dispute settlement before the LOST, the
ICJ, an arbitral tribunal, or a special arbitral tribunal either at the time
of signing, or at anytime thereafter.1 5 Therefore, maximum flexibility is
allowed as to the forum and method of dispute settlement.' 6
Two systems of dispute settlement are included in the Draft Convention. These systems are generally referred to as the general system and
the functional system." Prior to bringing a dispute before either a functional or general forum, however, or where a settlement procedure has
terminated without a settlement of the dispute, member states are required to "exchange views regarding settlement of the dispute through
negotiations in good faith or other peaceful means." 5 Member states also
have the option of seeking settlement through conciliation, 9 or other procedures under general, regional, or special agreements."' Where these alternatives have failed to bring about a resolution of the dispute involving
member states, settlement is referred to the appropriate functional or
general forum.
A.

The Functional System

The functional system is designed to allow the parties to a specific
type of dispute access to a forum which is specialized in that field.21 The
functional system is contained in two places, annex VIII on special arbitration procedure, and section 6 of part XI on the SBDC.
Article 1 of annex VIII provides that
any party to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of
the articles of this Convention relating to (1) fisheries, (2) protection
and preservation of the marine environment, (3) marine scientific research, and (4) navigation, including pollution from vessels, may submit the dispute to the special arbitration procedure provided for in
notification addressed to the other party or parties to
this annex by
22
the dispute.
Annex VIII also provides for separate lists of experts in each of the above
four special areas. 28 Special arbitral tribunals are then formed as needed
by selecting members from the appropriate list in accordance with the

15. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 287(1).
16. See Mirvahabi, Fishery Disputes Settlement and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 57 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, DE SCIENCES
DIPLOMATIQUES ET PoLrrIQUEs 45, 50 (1979).
17. Id.
18. Draft Convention, supra note 3, arts. 281, 286.
19. Id. art. 284.
20. Id. art. 282.

21. For a discussion of the general and functional systems approach, see Adede, Settlement of Disputes Arising Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 69 AM. J. INT'L L.' 798, 799
(1975); Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Arising Out of the Law'of the Sea Convention, 12 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 495, 506-07 (1975).
22. Draft Convention, supra note 3, annex VIII, art. 1.
23. Id. annex VIII, art. 2.

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 10:331

procedure set out in article 3.4 In this way, the treaty allows parties to a
dispute of an appropriate nature to submit to settlement by a specialized
arbitral tribunal, the members of which are experts in the field of the
dispute.
The SBDC is a functional tribunal established for resolution of certain disputes arising within or relating to the area.2" Basically, the SBDC
has jurisdiction over disputes between: (1) member states concerning the
interpretation or application of part XI;2 e (2) a member state and the
authority concerning acts or omissions of either which are allegedly in
violation of part XI or acts of the authority "alleged to be in excess of
jurisdiction or a misuse of power";2 (3) parties to a contract, including
member states, the authority, or enterprise, state entities and natural or
juridical persons concerning interpretation of the contract and acts or
omissions of any party thereto;"' (4) the authority and a prospective contractor who has been sponsored by a state;" and (5) the authority and a
state party, a state entity, or a natural or juridical person sponsored by a
state party where the authority is alleged to have incurred liability for
"wrongful damages arising out of the exercise of the powers and functions
of the Authority."' s The SBDC is composed of eleven members of the
1
LOST who are selected by a majority vote of the LOST.3
Provision is also made for an ad hoc chamber of the SBDC to deal
with particular disputes which may be submitted thereto upon the request of any party to the dispute."2 Ad hoc chambers are composed of
three members of the SBDC who are selected in accordance with article
37 of annex VI.38

24. Id. annex VIII, art. 3. Subparagraph (a) contains the basic provision:
[Tihe special arbitral tribunal shall consist of five members. Each party to the
dispute shall appoint two members, one of whom may be its national, to be
chosen preferably from the appropriate list or lists relating to the matters in
dispute. The parties to the dispute shall by agreement appoint the President of
the special arbitral tribunal who shall be chosen preferably from the appropriate list and shall be a national of a third State, unless the parties otherwise
agree.
25. Id. art. 288(3).
26. Id. art. 187(a).
27. Id. art. 187(b).
28. Id. art. 187(c).
29. Id. art. 187(d).
30. Id. art. 187(e).
31. Id. annex VI, art. 4(5). For a critique of the procedures for election of members to
the LOST and the SBDC from the perspective of developed nations, see Bernhardt, Compulsory Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea Negotiations: A Reassessment, 19 VA. J.
INT'L L. 69, 71-73 (1978).

32. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 188(1)(b).
33. Id. annex VI, art. 37. The basic provision is contained in paragraph 1, which
provides:
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber shall form an ad hoc chamber, composed of
three of its members, for dealing with a particular dispute submitted to it in
accordance with article 188, paragraph 1(b), of Part XI of this Convention. The
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As an alternative to settlement by the SBDC, disputes between
states parties regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty
may be submitted to a Special Chamber of the LOST upon the request of
the disputing parties. s 4 Special Chambers are composed of three or more
members selected from among the members of the LOST. Special Chambers are used for dealing with particular categories of disputes and for
determination of which disputes may be resolved by summary
procedure.8 5
Binding commercial arbitration provides another alternative to dispute settlement before the SBDC. Disputes involving the interpretation
or application of a contract or plan of work may be submitted to binding
commercial arbitration at the request of any party to the dispute.8 6 The
commercial arbitral tribunal, however, has no jurisdiction to determine
any question of interpretation of the convention. 7 Questions as to the
interpretation of part XI must be submitted to the SBDC for a ruling. 8
B.

The General System

In contrast to the functional system of dispute settlement, the general system allows for the settlement of any dispute arising out of the
Draft Convention to be settled in the general forum of the parties'
choice. 9 General forums include the LOST, the ICJ, and an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with annex VII.
The LOST is composed of twenty-one members,"' no two of whom
may be from the same state."' Each member state is allowed to submit
two nominations for election to the LOST. Two-thirds of the member
states are required to establish a quorum for LOST member elections,
and "the persons elected to the Tribunal shall be those nominees who
obtain the largest number of votes and a two-thirds majority of votes of
the states parties present and voting, provided that such majority shall

composition of such a chamber shall be determined by the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber with the approval of the parties.
34. Id. art. 188(1)(a).
35. Id. annex VI, art. 15.
36. Id. art. 188(2)(a). This article provides:
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a contract referred to in article 187, subparagraph c(1), shall be submitted, at the request of
any party to the dispute, to binding commercial arbitration, unless at any time
the parties to the dispute otherwise agree or have agreed. A commercial arbitral tribunal, to which such dispute is submitted, shall have no jurisdiction to
determine any question of interpretation of the Convention. When such a dispute also involves a question of the interpretation of Part XI and the relevant
annexes, with respect to activities in the Area, such question shall be referred
to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber for a ruling.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Mirvahabi, supra note 16, at 50.

40. Draft Convention, supra note 3, annex VI, art. 2.
41. Id. annex VI, art. 3.
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include at least a majority of the States parties."4' 2
Arbitral tribunals are composed of five members from a list of arbitrators which is compiled and maintained by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations."' Each member state is entitled to nominate four arbitrators to the list." Arbitrators are then selected for each panel in accordance with the procedures in article 3 of annex VII."'
III. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND DisPuTE SETTLEMENT
It is apparent that a major portion of the dispute settlement procedures of the Draft Convention involve potential conflicts of national interest. Therefore, it is essential to any analysis of the dispute settlement
provisions of the Draft Convention to consider changes of national inter-

ests brought about by UNCLOS.
One of the dominant characteristics of the Draft Convention is a tremendous increase in the area of ocean space which is made subject to
some form of sovereign national jurisdiction.4 This expansion of national
jurisdiction comes about primarily through an increase in the breadth of
the territorial sea,'" the creation of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),"
and recognition of the rights of coastal states to the resources of their
continental shelves. 4" National jurisdiction over these areas takes the
form of varying degrees of sovereign rights, where the term "sovereign
rights" has different meanings in different contexts.5 0 For the purposes of
this paper, the dispute settlement provisions of the Draft Convention will
be analyzed in the context of three possible degrees of sovereign rights:
(1) unqualified national sovereignty;

42. Id. annex VI, art. 4.
43. Id. annex VII, articles 2 and 3(a).
44. Id. annex VII, art. 2.
45. Id. annex VII, art. 3. Subparagraph (a) sets forth the basic provision:
[T]he arbitral tribunal shall consist of five members. Each party to the dispute
shall appoint one member, who shall be chosen preferably from the list and
may be its national. In the case of the party requesting arbitration, such appointment shall be made at the time of the request. The other three members
shall be appointed by agreement of the parties and shall be chosen preferably
from the list and shall be nationals of third States, unless the parties otherwise
agree. The parties to the dispute shall appoint the President of the arbitral
tribunal from among these three members.
46. The continental shelf and slope of the United States alone covers an area of 1.2
million square miles. See Hearings on S.7 and S.544 Before the Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 961
(1969).
47. Draft Convention, supra note 3, at art. 3. This article sets forth that: "Every State
has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12
nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this convention."
48. Id. art. 57. This article sets forth that: "The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured."
49. Id. arts. 76 and 77.
50. See Rosenne, Settlement of FisheriesDisputes in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 73
AM. J. INT'L L. 89, 97 (1979).
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(2) national sovereignty qualified by or subject to international rights;
and
(3) non-sovereignty.
From these three levels of national sovereignty, four possible dispute
situations arise:
(1) disputes regarding an exercise of unqualified national sovereignty;
(2) disputes regarding a qualification or limitation of national
sovereignty;
(3) disputes arising within, or regarding an area of non-sovereignty;
and
(4) disputes regarding the delimitation of boundaries between areas
subject to some form of national sovereignty."
A.

Unqualified National Sovereignty

Dispute settlement provisions relating to an exercise of unqualified
sovereign jurisdiction are the least effective of those contained in the
treaty. An illustration of this may be found by examination of the sovereign rights of the coastal state over the EEZ. Within the EEZ, the coastal
state has
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living,
of the sea-bed and with regard to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of
energy from the water currents and winds.62
Article 56(2) requires the coastal state to have "due regard for the
rights and duties of other States" when exercising its own rights within
the EEZ5 3 Although the "due regard" standard of article 56(2) appears to
be a qualification upon the unrestrained exercise of sovereign rights to
economic exploitation of the EEZ by the coastal states, it clearly is not in
the areas of scientific research and fishing rights.
1. Fishing Rights in the EEZ
Article 61(1) provides that "the coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone.""
Article 62(2) continues that the coastal state "shall determine its capacity
to harvest the living resources" of the EEZ, and where the coastal state
does not "have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall
. . . give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch."56 In
the event of an excess allowable catch, reference is specifically made to
land-locked states, states with special geographical characteristics," and

51. Dispute settlement regarding the delimitation of boundaries goes beyond the scope
of this paper. Relevant provisions of the Draft Convention are set forth in articles 15, 50, 59,
74, and 83.
52. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 56(1)(a).
53. Id. art. 56(2).
54. Id. art. 61(1).
55. Id. art. 62(2).
56. Id. art. 70(2). This article defines states with special geographical characteristics.
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"States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone, or which have
made efforts in research and identification of stocks," as states to receive
special preference for the surplus allowable catch.57
The allowable catch, and the capacity to harvest however, are both
determined solely by the discretion of the coastal state. Under article
296(3)(a) of part XV on dispute settlement, the discretion of the coastal
state regarding these matters is not subject to third party review absent
its consent.58 The result is an unqualified sovereignty which allows the
coastal state to effectively exclude all foreign exploitation of living resources within its EEZ by establishing an allowable catch which is
equivalent to its capacity to harvest."

For the purposes of this Convention, "States with special geographical characteristics" mean coastal States, including States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, whose geographical situation makes them dependent upon the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive zones of other States in the
subregion or region for adequate supplies of fish for the nutritional purposes of
their populations or parts thereof, and coastal States which can claim no exclusive economic zones of their own.
57. Id. art. 62(2). This article provides that:
The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of
the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other
arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions and regulations referred
to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch
having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in
relation to the developing States mentioned therein.
58. Id. art. 296(3)(a).
Unless otherwise agreed or decided by the parties concerned, disputes relating
to the interpretation or application of this Convention with regard to fisheries
shall be settled in accordance with this section, except that the coastal State
shall not be obliged to accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute
relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including its discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions established in its
convention and management regulations.
59. Article 296(3)(b) of the Draft Convention provides for mandatory submission of disputes to conciliation upon any of the following three allegations:
(i) a coastal State has manifestly failed to comply with its obligations to ensure
through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance
of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not seriously
endangered;
(ii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to determine, upon the request of
another State, the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest the living resources with respect to stocks which that other State is interested in fishing;
(iii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to allocate to any State, under the
provisions of articles 62, 69, and 70 and under the terms and conditions established by the coastal State consistent with this Convention, the whole or part
of the surplus it has declared to exist.
However, article 296(3)(c) states that: "In any case the conciliation commission shall
not substitute its discretion for that of the coastal State." Further, even if the conciliation
commission were to make findings, article 7(2) of Annex V on Conciliation provides that:
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Scientific Research

An analogous' situation exists with respect to scientific research conducted within the EEZ. Article 238 provides that "all States, irrespective
of their geographical location, and competent international organizations
have the right to conduct marine scientific research subject to the rights
and duties of other States as provided for in this convention." 60 Significant limitations, however, to this basic right are found in article 245
which gives coastal states "the exclusive right to regulate and conduct
marine scientific research in their territorial sea,"" and in article 246(1),
which allows coastal states to "regulate, authorize and conduct marine
scientific research in their exclusive economic zone and on their continental shelf."'
Article 246(2) requires the consent of the coastal state to engage in
the conduct of marine scientific research in the EEZ and on the continental shelf.63 However, article 246(5) allows the coastal state to withhold its
consent as a matter of discretion.04 As is the case with fisheries, article
296(2)(a) exempts from third party dispute settlement "the exercise by
the coastal State of a right or discretion in accordance with article 246,""
and additionally "a decision by the coastal State to order suspension or
cessation of a research project in accordance with article 253."1" The result again is unqualified sovereignty, which is not subject to third party
7
review.6

"The report of the Commission, including any conclusions or recommendations, shall not be
binding upon the parties." Therefore, there is no effective third party review of the unqualified sovereignty of a coastal state over the fisheries within its EEZ.
60. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 238.
61. Id. art. 245.
62. Id. art. 246(1).
63. Id. art. 246(2).
64. Id. art. 246(5). This article provides that:
Coastal States may however in their discretion withhold their consent to
the conduct of a marine scientific research project of another State or competent international organization in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of the coastal State if the project:
(a) is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, whether living or non-living;
(b) involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives or the introduction of harmful substances into the marine environment;
(c) involves the construction, operation or use of artificial islands, installations
and structures referred to in articles 60 and 80;
(d) contains information communicated pursuant to article 248 regarding the
nature and objectives of the project which is inaccurate or if the researching
State or competent international organization has outstanding obligations to
the coastal State from a prior research project.
65. Id. art. 296(2)(a).
66. Id. Article 253 additionally provides that the coastal state may require suspension
of any scientific research projects in progress in the EEZ, or on the continental shelf.
67. Article 296(2)(b) provides for submission of disputes concerning scientific research
to conciliation. However, as is the case with fisheries (see note 59 supra), certain discretionary acts of the coastal state are beyond review even by a conciliation commission, and in any
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3. Conclusion and Alternatives
In areas of unqualified national sovereignty, recourse to third party
dispute settlement appears to be possible only upon the consent of the
sovereign. The disputing party, therefore, may be forced to seek settlement by some other means. Possible alternatives to third party settlement include:
(1) recourse to the national courts of the sovereign;
(2) diplomatic settlement of disputes; or
(3) settlement by private agreement with the sovereign.
An increase in the jurisdiction of the national courts of most coastal
states would probably follow from the expanded sovereignty of the
coastal states over their adjacent ocean space. Therefore, resort to a national forum may provide an alternative means of dispute settlement
where the sovereign has refused- third party dispute settlement. Difficulties which may be encountered by the plaintiff in exercising this alternative, such as standing and partiality, go beyond the scope of this comment. Recourse to a national forum is raised only as a possible alternative
which may be useful in certain cases."8
A more likely means of dispute settlement where an exercise of national sovereignty is excluded from third party review appears to be resolution through diplomatic means such as direct negotiations between disputing member states, or the use of good offices. Good offices contemplates the involvement of a third party who serves as a facilitator to
negotiations but does not interfere with the negotiations or impose a settlement upon the parties."9 Resolution by diplomacy is encouraged in the
Draft Convention, and is generally a prerequisite to settlement before a
70
third party forum.
Private agreements between foreign private industry, and the government or private industries of the coastal state may provide one of the
event, the commission's decision is not binding upon the parties. Thus, unqualified sovereign rights over scientific research within the EEZ are also beyond effective third party
dispute settlement.
68. Many of the nations which took part in the third UNCLOS expressed the view that
disputes arising within an area of national sovereignty should only be amenable to settlement in the national courts of the sovereign. See notes 131 and 132 infra.
69. See Haubert, supra note 14, at 741. See generally Darwin, Mediation and Good
Offices, in INTERNATIONAL DisPmTEs: THm LEGAL ASPECTS 83 (1972).
70. Draft Convention, note 3 supra. Article 281(1) provides: "If a dispute arises between States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the
parties to the dispute shall proceed expeditiously to exchange views regarding settlement of
the dispute through negotiations in good faith or other peaceful means." Article 286, referring to section 1 (which contains article 282), states:
Subject to the provisions of articles 296 and 298, any dispute relating to the
interpretation or application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has
been reached by recourse to the provisions of section 1, be submitted, at the
request of any party to the dispute, to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction
under the provisions of this section.
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more practical means of dispute settlement, particularly in disputes in-

volving scientific research, or fishing privileges. As is the case with resort
to a national forum, the subtleties and difficulties of making private
agreements in light of the various regulations imposed by the coastal
states go beyond the scope of this paper. They are raised as possibilities
that may be useful in certain situations. 1

B. Qualified National Sovereignty
1. Some Qualifications and Problems
Paragraph 1 of article 296 sets out several areas of qualified sovereignty with respect to the EEZ. These qualifications are the "freedoms
and rights of navigation or overflight or the laying of submarine cables
and pipelines and other internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in
article 58,"' 7" and specified international rules for the protection and pres-

ervation of the marine environment.""
Disputes relating to these qualified sovereign rights are submitted to
the dispute settlement procedures of the Draft Convention without limitation or exception made for coastal state discretion. Therefore, in contrast to unqualified sovereign rights, the third party dispute settlement
forum is free to examine the conduct and policies of parties to a dispute
concerning qualified sovereignty in total.
This apparently expansive jurisdiction over disputes relating to qualified sovereign rights does not, however, insure access to third party dispute settlement procedure. One major impediment to third party review
is article 298. Paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of article 298 allow, respectively,
exceptions to settlement procedures for disputes concerning military activities, and disputes in respect of which the United Nations Security

71. For a discussion of the use of private, or "non-governmental" agreements in the
settlement of fisheries disputes, see Mirvahabi, note 16 supra. For a discussion of United
States legislation regulating private agreements between United States and foreign fishing
concerns, see Christie, Regulation of InternationalJoint Ventures in the Fishery Conservation Zone, 10 GA. J. INT'L L. 85 (1980).

72. The Draft Convention, supra note 3, article 58(1), states:
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of the navigation and overflight and of the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea
related to these freedoms such as those associated with the operation of ships,
aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other
provisions of this Convention.
At this point, a logical contradiction in the structure of the Draft Convention should be
noted. Article 286 is "subject to the provisions of articles 296 and 298." See note 76 infra.
However, paragraph 1 of article 296 begins with the language "notwithstanding the provisions of article 286." Additionally, section 2 of part XV, which includes article 296, sets
forth the compulsory dispute settlement regime of the Draft Convention. Article 296 places
limitations on the applicability of section 2, although paragraph 1 does not appear to function as a limitation itself.
73. Id. art. 296(1).
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Council is involved. 7' A recalcitrant state could thus couch its interference with, for example, the rights of innocent passage, in terms of military activities so as to fit within the escape provisions of article 298(1)(b).
The Draft Convention does not define what constitutes a military activity; thus, the claiming state would appear to have unfettered discretion
when arguing its actions were military activities. Therefore, even if a
member state were to submit to third party dispute settlement in general,
the escape provisions of article 298 have the potential of removing a large
number of disputes -relating to qualified sovereignty from the dispute set7
tlement system. 5
A second major impediment to third party review is the lack of an
effective compulsory settlement procedure for disputes between member
states. Article 286 is the basic compulsory dispute settlement provision of
the Draft Convention. Under article 286, where diplomacy or conciliation
has failed to produce a settlement, any party to the dispute can submit
the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction.7 6 Jurisdiction over
member states, however, appears to be based upon the consent of parties,
with the exceptions of the SBDC7 7 and an arbitral tribunal constituted in
78
accordance with annex VII.
There are some serious deficiencies in the use of arbitration for compulsory dispute settlement due to the potential for delay, and the lack of

74. Id. art. 298(1). This article sets forth in pertinent part:
1. Without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, a State Party
when signing, ratifying or otherwise expressing its consent to be bound by this
Convention, or at any time thereafter, may declare that it does not accept any
one or more of the procedures for the settlement of disputes specified in this
Convention with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes:
0

(b) Disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and disputes
concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign
rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal
under article 296, Paragraphs 2 and 3;
(c) Disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the United Nations is
exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United Nations,
unless the Security Council decides to remove the matter from its agenda or
calls upon the parties to settle it by means provided for in this Convention.
75. See Bernhardt, supra note 31, at 95-99.
76. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 286. This article provides:
Subject to the provisions of articles 296 and 298, any dispute relating to the
interpretation or application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has
been reached by recourse to the provisions of section 1, be submitted, at the
request of either party to the dispute, to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under the provisions of this section.
77. Id. art. 287(2): "Any declaration made under paragraph 1 shall not affect or be
affected by the obligation of a State Party to accept the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber of the Law of the Sea Tribunal to the extent and in the manner provided for in
section 6 of Part XI."
78. Id. art. 287(3): "A State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration in force, shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with annex VII."
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procedure in the Draft Convention for enforcement of awards. Article 3 of
annex VII sets out the procedure for formation of an arbitral tribunal.79
Each party to the dispute is to select one arbitrator.80 The other three
arbitrators forming the tribunal are then selected by agreement of the
parties." In the event a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within thirty
days from the date of the receipt of the request for arbitration, or the
parties cannot agree upon the other arbitrators to be appointed to the
tribunal within sixty days from the date of receipt of the request for arbitration, procedures are available to effect the necessary appointments."2
In a dispute where prompt resolution is a matter of necessity, a sixty-day,
or even a thirty-day delay could well result in a moot controversy.
Even assuming the controversy does not become moot during the delay, there is no effective procedure for enforcement of the award. Rather
article 11 of annex 3 merely provides that the award "shall be complied
with by all the parties to the dispute."8 Although article 12 of annex VII
does contain procedure for resolution of disputes as to implementation of
the award, it does not contemplate enforcement as such.
The only compulsory forum for dispute settlement in the Draft Convention is arbitration. However, the escape provisions of article 296, the
potential for delay, and the lack of enforcement procedures may render
arbitration ineffective in many situations.
2. Other Potential Problems: Land-locked States and the Territorial Sea
Part X of the Draft Convention qualifies national sovereignty by providing land-locked states a right of access to the sea in the form of freedom of transit through the territory of transit states." Paragraph 3 of
article 125, however, provides that "Transit States, in the exercise of their
full sovereignty over their territory, shall have the right to take all necessary measures to ensure that the rights and facilities provided for in this
Part for land-locked States shall in no way infringe their legitimate
interest."8 5
Article 125 appears to provide a balance between the rights of the
land-locked states, and those of the transit state whose sovereign rights
are qualified. Regrettably however, it is doubtful that the legal character
of the balance will be allowed to develop through any means other than
direct negotiations between the parties. Any attempt by a land-locked
state to resolve a dispute through the settlement procedures of the Draft

79. Id. annex VII, art. 3.
80. Id. annex VII, art. 3(a). See note 45 supra.
81. Id.
82. Id. annex VII, art. 3(c)-(d).
83. Id. annex VII, art. 11.
84. Draft Convention, supra note 3, at art. 125(1). Transit states are defined by article
124(1)(b) as "a State, with or without a sea-coast, situated between a land-locked State and
the sea through whose territory 'traffic in transit' passes."
85. Id.
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Convention would meet with the same stumbling blocks of a lack of effective compulsory jurisdiction, and application of an article 296 escape
mechanism as were discussed above. 6
Article 2 of the treaty subjects the sovereign rights of the coastal
state over the territorial sea to qualification by "this Convention and to
other rules of international law."'87 The principal qualifications to the sovereignty of the coastal state over its territorial sea are the right of innocent passage, 8' transit passage, 8 ' immunities of warships,"0 the right of
land-locked states to access to the oceans, 91 obligations imposed upon the
coastal state regarding civil jurisdiction over foreign ships within its territorial sea,' 2 and qualifications based upon principles of generally recognized international law. 93
Disputes which can be defined in terms of one of the above qualifications come under the general system of dispute settlement of the treaty.
Therefore, the parties to a dispute are left to their own devices to agree
upon an acceptable third party dispute settlement forum, or are relegated
to arbitration. In either case, the Draft Convention is less than fully
adequate.
C.

Dispute Settlement Alternatives

Although there is a provision for "compulsory" arbitration, the Draft
Convention does not provide an effective dispute settlement system for
any dispute involving the qualification of a sovereign right. The parties
again appear to be left largely to their own means to find an acceptable
and effective forum. Therefore, as is the case with disputes relating to
sovereign rights, the parties may often be relegated to seeking resolution
in either a national forum, by diplomatic means, or through private
settlement.
IV. NON-SOVEREIGN DisPuTEs
Those portions of the ocean space which have not been relegated to
some form of national sovereignty are the high seas and the "regime of
the area."

86. For a discussion of the interests of land-locked states relative to the UNCLOS, see
Comment, UNCLOS III: Last Chance for Landlocked States?, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637
(1977); Hassan, Third Law of the Sea Conference Fishing Rights of Landlocked States, 8
LAw. AM. 686 (1976); Childs, The Interests of Land-Locked States in Law of the Seas, 9
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 701 (1972).
87. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 2.
88. Id. art. 24. The coastal state, however, may regulate innocent passage in accordance
with article 21.
89. Id. art. 34. The coastal state may, however, as with innocent passage, regulate
transit passage in accordance with articles 41 and 42.
90. Id. art. 32.
91. Id. art. 125(1).
92. Id. arts. 28 and 292.
93. Id. art. 2(3).
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A.

The High Seas
The regime of the high seas is contained in part VII of the Draft
Convention. At present no international body has been established to
deal with criminal acts committed upon the high seas; hence the treaty
defers to national jurisdiction for criminal punishment.
National jurisdiction over criminal acts includes penal jurisdiction in
matters of collision,94 jurisdiction over acts of piracy, 9 over the transport
of slaves," regarding unauthorized radio broadcasts, 7 and the right of hot
pursuit." The most significant of these provisions is article 97 on penal
jurisdiction in matters of collision, which is a legislative reversal of the
Lotus case. 99 However, the Draft Convention appears to do little else beyond a codification of customary international law regarding criminal jurisdiction on the high seas other than to reduce the spatial area of the
high seas. 100

94. Id. art. 97.
95. Id. art. 105.

96. Id. art. 99.
97. Id. art. 109(2).

98. Id. art. 111.
99. The S.S. Lotus, [19271 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 32. The Lotus case illuminates the
significance of article 97:
[F]ollowing the collision which occurred on August 2nd, 1926, on the high seas
between the French steamship Lotus and the Turkish steamship Boz-Kourt,
and upon the arrival of the French ship at Stamboul, and in consequence of
the loss of the Boz-Kourt having involved the death of eight Turkish nationals,
Turkey, by instituting criminal proceedings in pursuance of Turkish law
against Lieutenant Demons, officer of the watch on board the Lotus at the
time of the collision, has not acted in conflict with the principles of international law, contrary to Article 15 of the Convention of Lausanne of July 24th,
1923, respecting conditions of residence and business and jurisdictipn.
In contrast, article 97(1) provides:
In the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation concerning a ship
on the high seas, involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the
master or of any other person in the service of the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against such person except before the judicial or administrative authorities either of the flag State or of which such person is a national.
For a discussion of the Lotus case, see C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
304-05 (1967).
100. Article 91(1) may potentially effect the present customary international law regarding nationality of ships. It provides that:
Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for
the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships
have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must
exist a genuine link between the State and the ship. (Emphasis added.)
A genuine link requirement would significantly affect the use of "flags of convenience," however, given the weak dispute settlement provisions of the Draft Convention, it is doubtful
that any stringent genuine link requirement will develop.
For discussions of the flag of convenience problem, see B. BOczEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE (1962); Dempsey & Helling, Oil Pollution by Ocean Vessels-An Environmental
Tragedy: The Legal Regime of Flags of Convenience, IMCO MultilateralConventions, and
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Disputes falling outside of national jurisdiction include those related
to the basic freedoms of navigation, 0 1 overflight,1 0 2 laying of submarine
cables and pipelines,108 construction of artificial islands,104 fishing,"0 5 and
scientific research. 06 All states are required to exercise these freedoms
with due consideration for the interests of other states, and rights under
the UNCLOS with respect to activities in the area. 07 Disputes regarding
the exercises of these freedoms are relegated to the general dispute settlement system.
B.

The Area

The regime of the area is contained in part XI of the Draft Convention. Part XI comprises a major amount of the Draft Convention, and
deals with that portion of the ocean floor which is not subject to some
form of national sovereignty under provisions relating to the EEZ,' 0 ' or
continental shelf.' 09
Jurisdiction over the area is relegated to the Authority, which exercises exclusive control over the administration of the area's resources." 0
This control is exercised primarily by two of the administrative organs of
the Authority, the Assembly and the Council."'
The Assembly is the supreme organ of the Authority to which all
other organs are held accountable."" The Assembly exercises the power

Coastal States, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 37 (1981); Herman, Flags of Convenience-New
Dimensions to an Old Problem, 24 McGILL L.J. 1 (1978).
101. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 87(1)(a).
102. Id. art. 87(1)(b).
103. Id. art. 87(1)(c).
104. Id. art. 87(1)(d).
105. Id. art. 87(l)(e).
106. Id. art. 87(1)(f).
107. Id. art. 87(2).
108. Id. art. 56.
109. Id. art. 77. Article 137(1) provides: "No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or
sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or
juridical person, appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or
sovereign rights, nor such appropriation shall be recognized."
110. Id. art. 137(2):
All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on
whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to alienation. The minerals derived from the Area, however, may only be alienated in
accordance with this Part and the rules and regulations thereunder.
111. Id. art. 158(1). In addition to an assembly, and a council, article 158(1) provides
for a secretariat. Article 158(2) provides for an operational organ referred to as the
Enterprise.
112. Id. art. 160(1):
The Assembly, as the sole organ of the Authority consisting of all the members, shall be considered the supreme organ of the Authority to which the
other principal organs shall be accountable as specifically provided for in this
Convention. The Assembly shall have the power to establish general policies in
conformity with the relevant provisions of this Convention on any question or
matter within the competence of the Authority.
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to establish general policies of the Authority,' 3 and among its specific
powers elects members of the Council."'
The Council is the executive organ of the Authority, and establishes
the specific policies of the Authority."' The Council is composed of representatives from various interest groups in a complex and balanced
scheme which is designed to insure that no one group is capable of gaining control, or at least the ability to overly manipulate the Council to its
own ends." 6 The interest group structure of the Council is of tremendous
significance in light of the limited possibilities for judicial review of the
7
Authority's actions."
The SBDC is established as a functional forum with dispute settlement jurisdiction over the area. All member states are obligated to accept
the jurisdiction of the SBDC."' However, jurisdiction of the SBDC regarding decisions of the Authority is limited to determination of whether
application of rules, regulations, or procedures made by the Authority
conflict with the obligations of the parties under the treaty or contract;
claims concerning lack of competence or misuse of power by the authority; and claims for damages or any other legal remedy for failure to comply with the terms of the contract or the treaty."' The SBDC is foreclosed from review of the discretionary acts of the Authority, and "in no
case shall it substitute its discretion for that of the Authority."'' 0 The
SBDC is also foreclosed from deciding whether the rules, regulations, or
procedures adopted by the Authority are in conformity with the provisions of the treaty.'2 '
The Draft Convention does not appear to contemplate judicial review
of the Authority, other thanregarding contracts by the Authority which
may be submitted to commercial arbitration,"' in any forum dther than
the SBDC.'2 s The result of these exclusions to SBDC jurisdiction thus is
a complete preclusion of judicial review in the excluded area. Therefore,
disputes regarding matters which are not within the jurisdiction of the

113. Id.
114. Id. art. 160(2).
115. Id. art. 162(1).
116. Id. Article 161(1) sets out the various interest groups which compose the Council.
For a discussion of the development of interest groups in the Council in relation to the
Group of 77, see Adede, The Group of 77, 7 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L.J. 31, 56 (1979).
117. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 190: "The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber shall
have no jurisdiction with regard to the exercise by the Authority of its discretionary powers
in accordance with this Part; in no case shall it substitute its discretion for that of the
Authority." While it is unclear which acts of the Council are considered as discretionary acts
of the Authority, were the Council to be dominated by any one interest group, the potential
for unchecked abuse is obvious.
118. Id. art. 283(2).
119. Id. arts. 187 and 288(3).
120. Id. art. 190.
121. Id.
122. Id. art. 188(2)(a).
123. Id. art. 288(3).
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SBDC may only be resolved in the political forums of the organs of the
Authority.

V. THE INFLUENCE OF THE GROUP OF 77
One of the most significant influences on the UNCLOS has been
from the group of developing and less developed countries.1 24 This group
is referred to as the Group of 77, and as of 1978 was composed of 122
countries,1 2 5 the majority of which are located in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. 2 6 The Group of 77 was founded in Algiers in October 1967 "as
an ad hoc grouping of 77 developing countries of the world which found it
useful to harmonize their negotiating positions on matters of trade and
development, particularly in relation to the sessions of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development."' 7
It would be a mistake to attempt an analysis of the dispute settlement provisions of the Draft Convention, or indeed of the UNCLOS as a
whole, from the perspective of a simple "Group of 77 versus developed
nations" dichotomy. The Group of 77 is in many respects more diverse
than coalescent, and as such is subject to internal conflict and compromise. 2' Therefore, while no precise formulation of "Group of 77 policy"
can safely be made, certain generalizations are possible and may prove
useful.
The Group of 77 has exhibited two general characteristics which are
significant with respect to dispute settlement under the Draft Convention. First, a main source of Group of 77 unification is derived from what
one commentator has referred to as "western intransigence," or "the common enemy principle.' ' 2 9 Second, there is a strong commitment to the
development of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). 3 0 The influence of these characteristics on the dispute settlement provisions of the
Draft Convention appear to have been manifested in three ways:
(1) a tremendous increase in the jurisdiction of national courts over
areas of the ocean subject to national sovereignty;

124. See Friedman & Williams, The Group of 77 at the United Nations: An Emergent
Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555 (1979). See generally Ferreira, The
Role of African States in the Development of the Law of the Sea at the Third United
Nations Conference, 7 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L.J. 89 (1979); Pohl, Latin America's Influence
and Role in the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, 7 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L.J. 65 (1979).
125. [1978] Y.B. INT'L ORG. No. B0728. In comparison, as of 1978, there were 149 member states of the United Nations.
126. See Friedman & Williams, supra note 124, at 559.
127. [19781 Y.B. INT'L ORG. No. A3383f.
128. While a comprehensive analysis of Group of 77 internal dynamics is beyond the
scope of this paper, the reader is cautioned that statements herein regarding Group of 77
positions are generalizations which are subject to the same degree of error as all generalizations regarding a complex sociological entity. For an analysis and model of Group of 77
internal dynamics, see Friedman & Williams, supra note 124, at 570-73.
129. Id. at 573-74.
130. See Juda, UNCLOS III and the New International Economic Order, 7 OCEAN
DEV. INT'L L.J. 221 (1979).
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(2) the lack of a strong compulsory third party dispute settlement
procedure in areas of qualified sovereignty; and
(3) a steadfast insistence on total non-sovereignty of the area, along
with limited judicial review of the authority.
The common element of all three of these manifestations is that they
serve to optimize the control of the Group of 77 over the vast resources of
the ocean.
A.

National Courts
The expansion of national sovereignty over the EEZ and continental
shelf was accompanied by the expectation of many Group of 77 nations of
a subsequent increase in the jurisdiction of their national courts to resolve disputes arising within these areas. 131 Consistent with the desire to
expand competence of the national courts is the view that immunity from
third party compulsory dispute settlement regarding matters within national competence is the only way in which the integrity of both the national courts, as well as that of the national sovereignty may be insured.18 2 It is submitted that prohibitions on review of coastal state
discretion in the areas of fishing rights and scientific research within the
EEZ are manifestations of this Group of 77 attitude.
B.

Third Party Dispute Settlement
The reluctance of the Group of 77 to submit to compulsory third
party dispute settlement is apparent in other multinational conferences
as well. As one commentator recently observed regarding the Group of 77
position on the dispute settlement provisions of a Code of Conduct for
the Transfer of Technology being negotiated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD):
A major difference in the techniques is found in the extent to which
the parties are willing to give up their flexibility and right to control

131. Statement by Mr. Gayan (Mauritius), 5 UNCLOS Off. Rec. 36, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.62/WP.8/WP.9/Add.1 (1976). Mr Gayan succinctly stated this position:
Disputes could be expected to arise in two areas: first, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf of a State; and secondly, all areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction.
Since the coastal State exercised sovereign rights over the first area, it was
natural that the national tribunals of that State should be the only forums for
the settlement of disputes arising in that area; that principle was intrinsic to
the basic notion of State sovereignty.
132. Statement by Mr. Njenga (Kenya), 5 UNCLOS Off. Rec. 34, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/
WP.8/WP.9/Add.1 (1976):
All matters relating to that zone were exclusively within the competence of the
coastal State, and to accept the possibility of compulsory third-party settlement would mean that the coastal State might be subjected to constant harassment by having to appear before international tribunals at considerable loss of
time and money. Similarly, where the coastal State had been given clearly defined jurisdiction by the convention, particularly with respect to the preservation of the marine environment, its power would be negated if it could be subjected, each time it exercised such power, to compulsory dispute settlement
systems on matters which could be dealt with through the local courts.
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the outcome of a dispute. . . . The developed countries advocate almost complete party autonomy as to means of dispute settlement; the
developing countries, on the other hand, take the position that only
the technology-receiving country should exercise legal jurisdiction.
These positions reflect the basic ideologies involved and illustrate the
difficulty of hypothesizing a mutually acceptable method of
settlement."
As is the case with the UNCTAD Code of Conduct, a basic difference
in the position of the Group of 77 and the developed nations has necessitated compromise." The compromise taken appears to be submission of
disputes in areas where some form of national sovereignty is exercised to
compulsory arbitration rather than compulsory judicial determination.'"
Compulsory arbitration allows the disputing states parties a degree of
control over the composition of the arbitral tribunal.'* However, in the
event the parties to a dispute are unable to agree upon the composition of
an arbitral tribunal either the president of the LOST or, if the president
is a national of one of the parties to the dispute, then the next senior
member of the LOST will appoint the members. 7 The numerical superiority of the Group of 77 allows these nations significant control over election of the LOST and its president,1 3 8 therefore leading one publicist to
conclude: "Because less developed States generally control the election of

133. Christie, Techniques for Settlement of Transaction Disputes Involving Transfer
of Technology, 14 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 264, 266 (1979).
134. See Geneva Session of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference:
Hearings Before the National Ocean Policy Study of the Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1975):
The basic problem is an ideological gap between those possessing the technological ability to develop deep seabed minerals and those developing countries
which insist that the international Authority directly and effectively control all
deep seabed mining and associated activities, and ultimately become the exclusive operator on the deep seabed. The developing countries' position in this
area is reflective of their general concern expressed in other international forums for reordering the economic order with respect to access to and control
over natural resources, particularly with respect to their price and rate of
development.
Id.
135. In contrast to the positions of Mr. Gayan, note 131 supra, and Mr. Njenga, supra
note 132, consider the position of Mr. Learson (United States), 5 UNCLOS Off. Rec. 31,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.8/WP.9/Add.1 (1976):
A comprehensive system for third-party settlement of disputes was an indispensable part of the future convention ....
While the dispute settlement
system should extend to all parts of the convention, it would be necessary to
provide for certain limited exceptions, which should be defined carefully and as
restrictively as possible. His delegation was not prepared to exclude the economic zone from the settlement procedures.
See also 62 DEP'T STATE BULL. 737 (1970); 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 382, 384 (1972).
136. Draft Convention, supra note 3, annex VII, art. 3(a).
137. Id. annex VII, art. 3(e).
138. See note 31 supra. Provisions for election of the members of the LOST and its
president are contained respectively in Draft Convention, supra note 3, annex VI, articles 3
and 12.
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the President, they also indirectly influence the President's choices regarding arbitral tribunals. Again, developed States are in jeopardy under
13
the current scheme." '
A final example of the Group of 77 reluctance to accept third party
dispute settlement may be found in the escape provisions which are available to avoid even compuslory settlement by arbitration, along with specific exceptions from review of certain exercises of national sovereignty. 14 0
The result therefore is to maximize national control over the outcome of
disputes involving some form of qualified sovereignty.
C. Nonsovereignty of the area
The Group of 77 has consistently insisted that the area remain not
subject to any form of national sovereignty.14 Nonsovereignty is essential
to Group of 77 control of the area due to the inadequate technological
position of the Group of 77 nations to exercise sovereign rights. In contrast to the EEZ and continental shelf, where the technology to exploit
the resources located therein is either already possessed by Group of 77
nations or is comparatively easy to obtain, technology necessary to exploit
the resources of the area is enormously expensive and presently still in
the developmental stage. 43 Further, many Group of 77 nations derive a
substantial portion of their gross national product from the export of
minerals." 3 Therefore, any regime allowing national sovereignty over the
area would have the following detrimental effects on Group of 77 nations:
(1) A potential for reduction of the GNP of certain mineral exporting
Group of 77 nations if technologically advanced nations were allowed
to mine the deep seabed as a sovereign right.
(2) Even if Group of 77 nations were given sovereign rights over certain portions of the area, they would not be able to directly exploit
them due to their inferior technological position, and would again be
in a position of foreign exploitation of their national resources.
(3) It would probably be beyond the technological capabilities of most
Group of 77 nations even to detect intrusion into any part of the area
over which they were given sovereign rights, or to defend these sover-

139. Bernhardt, supra note 31, at 76.
140. Draft Convention, supra note 3, at art. 296.
141. Letter dated April 24, 1979 from the Chairman of the Group of 77 to the President
of the Conference, 11 UNCLOS Off. Rec. 80, 81-82, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/77 (1979):
The principle that the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction and the resources of the area are the heritage
of mankind, and the complementary principles according to which the area is
incapable of being appropriated, the need for an international regime including
international machinery which would guarantee the activities carried on in the
area for the benefit of all mankind and not only for that of some States, its
peaceful use and other principles contained in the Declaration - all these
form a normative unity that is indivisible and applicable to the area.
142. See generally Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Minerals,Materials and Fuels of
the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
143. See Juda, supra note 130, at 239-43.
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eign rights if infringed upon.
Therefore, Group of 77 control over the area is conceived in political
terms rather than sovereign rights.
Here, the integrity of national sovereignty is not in question; rather
there is a fear of abuse or misuses of power which may result if a smaller
14
judicial body were to control the authority through judicial review. '
Limited judicial review of the actions of the Authority, therefore, is consistent with maximization of Group of 77 control over the Authority, and
consequently, the area.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The dispute settlement provisions of the Draft Convention are inadequate. Significant areas of ocean space are given over to national sovereignty, without meaningful compulsory third party review of national actions. An even greater area of the ocean floor is placed under the
exclusive control of a politically charged body whose members may well
be concerned more with their own national interests than with the faithful administration of the vast resources of the area as the common heritage of mankind. The Draft Convention is the result of the peculiarites of
the democratic process wherein the members acting in their own self-interests purport to reach an agreement which is to the benefit of all.
It is important, however, to recognize the arguments against a strong
compulsory dispute settlement system in criticizing the dispute settlement provisions of the Draft Convention. There appear to be two major
problems-the creeping jurisdiction problem and the self-destruct problem.
A.

The Creeping Jurisdiction Problem

There is a substantial likelihood that a significant number of the
Group of 77 nations would not ratify the Draft Convention if it contained
a strong third party compulsory dispute settlement system. The alternative of including a strong compulsory dispute settlement as an optional
protocol is contrary to the concept of the "package deal," and would also
be unacceptable to a large number of the Group of 77 nations,14 ' Therefore, the issue becomes whether the other benefits to be derived from the
Draft Convention outweigh the detriments of a weak dispute settlement
system.

144. See Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
Eighth Session (1979), 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 18 (1980). See also Statement by Mr. Ranjeva
(Madagascar), 5 UNCLOS Off. Rec. 33, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.8/WP.9/Add.1 (1976).
145. See Letter dated March 23, 1979 from the Chairman of the group of African States
to the President of the Conference, 11 UNCLOS Off. Rec. 77, 78, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/72
(1979):
The African States reaffirm their determination not to accept any convention
on the Law of the Sea, unless the package of all issues, without exception, have
been satisfactorily resolved in a comprehensive treaty. They will not recognize
any piecemeal agreements and consider that no customary law would be established by the provisions of these agreements.
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Perhaps the most significant benefit of the treaty is the establishment of firm limits on the amount of ocean space which is subject to
national sovereignty. A gradual but relentless expansion of national
claims to, or "creeping jurisdiction" over the ocean space has taken place
in recent years. " ' As world population grows, so does the demand on the
finite resources of the planet. Without a stable regime of the sea, the
probability of continuously expanding national jurisdiction by unilateral
action is tremendous. Perhaps the clearly defined limits to national sovereignty in the Draft Convention can stop, or at least retard further extensions of national claims to the oceans.
B. The Self-Destruct Problem
Another argument against a strong compulsory dispute settlement
provision in the Draft Convention is that in certain situations nations
clearly would disregard an adjudication if it were sufficiently contrary to
their national interests. In this regard, the escape provisions of article 298
are of great significance. Disobedience of a series of judgments could literally cause the Draft Convention to self destruct, and its efficacy to be
diminished with every judgment that is ignored. Therefore, strong compulsory dispute settlement could prove a greater detriment than aid to
the international community.

VII. RECOMMENDATION
The recent decision of the Reagan Administration to prevent conclusion of the UNCLOS negotiations has prompted both concern and opposition in the international community.1 4 7 The dangers in delay include potentially diminished chances of ratification by the already skeptical
Senate, " as well as the possible destruction of the delicate web of compromise which holds the Draft Convention together. However, the Draft
Convention in its present form is essentially devoid of any procedure for
modification.1 4 9 Without the ability to adapt to the inevitable political
and technological changes of the future, what today is a viable package of
compromise may tomorrow become a lifeless document which decreases
in significance with every change of conditions.150
There are basically two ways in which the Draft Convention might be

146. See Friedman & Williams, supra note 124, at 561. See also Morin, Jurisdiction
Beyond 200 Miles: A Persistent Problem, 10 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 514 (1980); Martens,
Evolution of Coastal State Jurisdiction: A Conflict Between Developed and Developing
Nations, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 531 (1976).
147. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1981, at 6, col. 1; id., Mar. 8, 1981, at 4, col. 1.
148. See id., Mar. 9, 1981, at 18, col. 1; 66 A.B.A.J. 1192 (1980).
149. Although the Draft Convention, note 3 supra, provides in articles 154 and 155 for
periodic review and for a review conference, this is only with respect to portions dealing
with the area, not the Draft Convention in its entirety.
150. See Oxman, supra note 144, at 18-19: "Article 295 repeats the traditional rule in
the Statute of the International Court of Justice that a decision has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect to that particular dispute." Therefore, the Draft Convention could not be altered through judicial construction as that any adjudication would not
set a binding precedent for future disputes of that nature.
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altered so as to avoid this pitfall. The first alternative is to provide for
change through judicial construction and interpretation. This would,
however, necessitate a strong system of compulsory third party dispute
settlement which, at present, is foreclosed by political circumstances.
Also, reliance on judicial construction as a primary vehicle of change
would appear to be contrary to generally accepted principles of customary
international law.
The second and better alternative is to provide for an amendment
procedure. In this way, the Draft Convention could be given the adaptability needed to remain effective over the long run, without risking destruction of the present agreement.
Ideally, a permanent convention should be established which could
meet at regular intervals to review and amend the text. Amendment
should only be possible with a large number of affirmative votes of the'
member states, and should be self-executing. This procedure would satisfy the Group of 77, as their control would remain substantial, and
within a political rather than a judicial forum. A high vote threshold
would also satisfy the developed nations because the Group of 77 could
not amend the Draft Convention without the approval of the developed
nations. However, to avoid allowing a single nation the power to block
amendment, a unanimous affirmative vote should not be required.
The most positive feature of an amendment procedure would be to
keep lines of communication and negotiation open at the multilateral
level. The present Draft Convention substantially places the burden of
finding an acceptable means of dispute settlement on the parties. While
the recommended amendment procedure would not change this, it should
facilitate communications between disputing parties, and therefore be an
aid to dispute settlement, if not a means of resolution of issues which are
otherwise excluded from any other form of settlement.

DEVELOPMENTS
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: Providing Federal
Jurisdiction for Human Rights Violations
through the Alien Tort Statute
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
held that deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority
violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human
rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. The court based its
holding on a rarely invoked provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, passed
by the First Congress of the United States (the Alien Tort Statute).' As
has been noted by Judge Philip C. Jessup, the Alien Tort Statute was "an
action which may well be considered to have come before its time."' In
this holding, the court of appeals ruled that when an alleged torturer is
found and served with process by an alien within the borders of the
United States, the Alien Tort Statute provides federal jurisdiction. The
case shows that it is now recognized that nations owe duties not only to
other nations, but also directly to individuals within their borders.
In Filartigav. Pena-Irala,sDr. Joel Filartiga, a citizen of Paraguay,
brought an action in the Eastern District of New York against Americo
Norbeta Pena-Irala (Pena), also a citizen of Paraguay, for wrongfully
causing the death of Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year-old son. Dr. Filartiga
charged that Pena, then Inspector General of police in Asuncion, Paraguay, had tortured and killed Dr. Filartiga's son in 1976 in retaliation for
Dr. Filartiga's political activities and beliefs." Dr. Filartiga had been unable to achieve adequate relief in the Paraguayan courts.
In 1978 Pena entered the United States under a visitor's visa. However, he remained in the United States beyond the term of his visa. Dr.
1. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, para. 9(h), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1976)).
2. Jessup, Revisions of the InternationalLegal Order, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 3
(1980).
3. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
4. Dr. Filartiga described himself as a longstanding opponent of the government of
President Alfredo Stroessner which has held power in Paraguay since 1954. Id. at 878.
5. Dr. Filartiga commenced a criminal action in the Paraguayan courts against Pena
and the police for the murder of his son. As a result, Dr. Filartiga's attorney was arrested
and brought to police headquarters where, shackled to a wall, he was threatened with death
by Pena. It was alleged that this attorney was subsequently disbarred without just cause. Id.
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Filartiga learned of his presence in the United States, and provided information enabling the Immigration and Naturalization Service to arrest
Pena. Following a hearing, Pena was ordered to be deported on April 5,
1979. At that time, he had resided in the United States for more than
nine months. Filartiga served him with a civil summons and complaint at
the Brooklyn Navy Yard, where Pena was being held pending deportation, alleging that Pena had wrongfully caused Filartiga's son's death by
torture. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages of ten
million dollars. The district court dismissed Dr. Filartiga's complaint for
want of subject matter jurisdiction, and application for further stays of
deportation were denied by a panel of the Second Circuit on May 22,
1979, and by the United States Supreme Court two days later. Shortly
thereafter, Pena returned to Paraguay.'
Despite Pena's deportation, Filartiga continued his suit for damages,
resting his principal argument in support of federal jurisdiction upon the
Alien Tort Statute. Implementing the constitutional mandate for national
control over foreign relations, the First Congress of the United States
provided that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil actions by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." (Emphasis added.) Thus, as
part of an articulated scheme of federal control over external affairs, Congress provided for federal jurisdiction over suits by aliens where principles of international law are in issue.
The constitutional basis for the Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations, which the court said had always been a part of the United States
common law. 7 The court of appeals indicated that "the history of the judiciary article gives meaning to its pithy phrases."" Still, only two cases
have ever used the Alien Tort Statute as the basis for jurisdiction during
its long history. In 1795, the statute provided an alternative basis of jurisdiction over a suit to determine title to slaves on board an enemy vessel
taken on the high seas.' In 1961, it afforded the basis for jurisdiction over
a child custody suit between aliens, with a falsified passport supplying the
requisite international law violation.10 However, the court indicated that.
"[t]he narrowing construction that the Alien Tort Statute has previously
received reflects the fact that earlier cases did not involve such well-es-

6. At this stage in the proceedings, the appellate court only decided that federal jurisdiction may properly be exercised over Pena pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute. The action
was remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 889.
7. In Jefferson's words, the very purpose of the proposed Union was "to make us one
nation as to foreign concerns, and keep us distinct in domestic ones." See Dickenson, The
Law of Nations as Part of the NationalLaw of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. Rv. 26, 36
n.28 (1952).
8. 630 F.2d at 887. "[A] review of the history surrounding the adoption of the Constitution demonstrates that [the law of nations] became a part of the common law of the United

States upon the adoption of the Constitution." Id. at 886.
9. Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607).
10. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D.Md. 1961).
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tablished, universally-recognized norms of international law that are here
at issue."'"
The court found that "a threshold question on the jurisdictional issue is whether the conduct alleged violates the law of nations." s However, it had little difficulty concluding that "[tihere are few, if any, issues
in international law today on which opinion seems to be so united as the
limitations on a state's power to torture persons held in its custody." ' In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon the traditional sources of
14
international law. Quoting a 1920 United States Supreme Court case,
the court agreed that the law of nations "may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professionally on public law; or by the
general usage and practice of nations, or by judicial decisions recognizing
and enforcing that law."' 8 The court relied upon such modern international sources as the International Court of Justice to confirm the propriety of this approach."
The court recognized that the right to be free from torture has become part of customary international law, as evidenced by the United
Nations Charter which makes it clear that in this modern age a state's
treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international concern.1 7 The
right to be free from torture is further defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," which states, in the plainest of terms: "No one
shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."1 " Particularly relevant, too, is the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture,2 0 which the court
set out in full in a footnote. This Declaration expressly prohibits any
state from permitting the "dastardly and totally inhuman act of
11. 630 F.2d at 888.
12. Id. at 880.
13. Id. at 881.
14. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153 (1920).
15. Id. at 160-61.
16. The court cited the Statute of the International Court of Justice as evidence that
the court should also apply international conventions, international custom, the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations, judicial decisions, and the teachings of publicists as a means for determination of the rules of law to apply in this case. Art. 38, the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945, entered
into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
17. Article 55 of the U.N. Charter provides:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations . . . the United
Nations shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex,
language or religion.
18. Adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
19. Id. art. 5.
20. G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975). This
Declaration, like the Declaration of Human Rights before it, was adopted without dissent by
the General Assembly. See Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and United States
Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 813, 816 n.18 (1978).
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torture.""1
The court also had little difficulty discerning that torture had been
universally denounced in the modern usage and practice of nations. The
international consensus surrounding torture has found expression in numerous international treaties and accords, including the American Convention on Human Rights, 22 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,22 and the European Convention for the Protection of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 24 Recognizing that torture is
prohibited, expressly or implicitly, by the constitutions of over fifty-five
nations,2 6 including both the United States26 and Paraguay, 27 the Filartiga court concluded that no contemporary state could assert a right to
torture its own or another nation's citizens.2 8 Finally, the court cited the
opinions of several jurists to conclude that official torture is now prohib-

ited by the law of nations.2 "The prohibition is clear and unambiguous,
and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and citizens."8
Thus, in light'of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous
international agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy by virtually all of the nations of the world, in principle if not in practice, the court found that an act of torture committed
by a state official against a person held in detention violated established
norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of

nations. The court was concerned enough to conclude: "We believe it is
sufficient here to construe the Alien Tort Statute, not as granting new

21. 630 F.2d at 883.
22. American Convention on Human Rights, done at San Jose, Nov. 22, 1969, entered
into force July 18, 1978, art. 5, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23
doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 673 (1970).
23. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 168 (1967).
24. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done
at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, art. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (1968), 213
U.N.T.S. 211.
25. 48 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr PENALE 208 (1977).
26. U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII, where "cruel and unusual punishment" is prohibited; id.
amend. XIV.
27. CONSTITUTION OF PARAGUAY, art. 45, which prohibits torture and other cruel
treatment.
28. 630 F.2d at 884.
29. Professor Richard Falk stated that "it is now beyond reasonable doubt that torture
of a person held in detention that results in severe harm or death is a violation of the law of
nations." Professor Thomas Franck offered his opinion that torture has now been rejected
by virtually all nations, although it was once commonly used to extract confessions. Professor Richard Lillich concluded that officially perpetrated torture is "a violation of international law (formerly called the law of nations)." Professor Myres McDougal stated that torture is an offense against the law of nations, and that "it has long been recognized that such
offenses vitally affect relations between states." Id. at 879 n.4. See generally GLOBAL
HUMAN RIGHTS (V. Nanda, J. Scarritt, & G. Shepherd eds. 1981).
30. 630 F.2d at 884.
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rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal courts for adjudication
of the rights already recognized by international law."8 1
The foreign relations implications of this and other issues that federal district courts will be required to adjudicate underscores the wisdom
of the First Congress of the United States in vesting jurisdiction over
such claims in the federal district courts through the Alien Tort Statute.
According to the amicus curiae memorandum of the United States Department of State which was solicited by the court of appeals, "today a
nation has an obligation under international law to respect the rights of
its citizens to be free of official torture. . . . [There is] wide recognition
that certain fundamental human rights are now guaranteed to individuals
as a matter of customary international law.' ' i Judge Jessup said that
"[t]his official position of the United States will go down in the history of
international law as an epochal event. It is the realization of the first keystone of a revised international legal order which I envisioned thirty-five
3
years ago."
The court's holding gives effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted
by the First Congress and "is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from [the] brutal violence" of
torture.34 Although the question was explicitly left open what acts, other
than torture, might furnish a basis for federal jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Statute," the Second Circuit widened the scope for federal jurisdiction over torts which occurred entirely in a foreign state. Now that one
can plausibly argue that federal courts have jurisdiction for suits against
violators of fundamental human rights, dictators can no longer rely on
safe haven within the borders of the United States. Those refugees who
were denied judicial process within their native countries can now seek
legal recourse in American courts.
John H. Works, Jr.

31. Id. at 887.
32. 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 585, 587-89 (1980).
33. Jessup, supra note 2, at 4. Judge Jessup's reference is to his A Modern Law of
Nations (1946), wherein he wrote that the first keystone of a revised international legal
order "is the point that international law, like national law, must be directly applicable to
the individual." Id. at 2.
34. 630 F.2d at 890.
35. "International law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own
governments. While the ultimate scope of those rights will be a subject for continuing refinement and elaboration, we hold that the right to be free from torture is now among
them." 630 F.2d at 885. Genocide, summary execution, and slavery may also furnish a basis
for jurisdiction. See Blum & Steinhardt, Federal JurisdictionOver InternationalHuman
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartigav. Pena-Irala,22 HARv. INT'L L.J.
53 (1981).
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Fernandez v. Wilkinson: Making the United
States Accountable Under Customary
International Law
"We speculate that this opinion has the potential to affect, in addition to the petitioner, only a small subset of aliens consisting of the other
approximately 230 Cuban nationals detained at Leavenworth as well as
the nearly 1800 Cubans held in federal prisons across the country."'
United States District Judge Richard D. Rogers humbly shouldered this
limitation on the decision in Fernandez v. Wilkinson,2 but under the
proper circumstances it may provide a basis for the application of customary international law in the United States courts to litigation in many
areas, especially human rights and habeas corpus.
Pedro Rodriguez Fernandez (Rodriguez) arrived in the United States
in early June 1980, one of approximately 130,000 Cuban refugees to land
during that year's mass immigration, seeking admission into this country.
In the course of his entry proceedings he revealed that he had had criminal convictions in Cuba,8 and that he had in fact been released to come to
the United States directly from prison. Under immigration rules, this record made him "excludable" at the border, but Cuba did not respond to
diplomatic efforts to return him. As a result, he was detained at the
United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, indefinitely to await
an apparently not forthcoming deportation. The Fernandez v. Wilkinson
decision was rendered in habeas corpus proceedings brought against the
Leavenworth Penitentiary warden.
The court was particularly impressed by the fact that Rodriguez was
detained in a more restrictive area and given fewer privileges than the
general inmate population at Leavenworth; but the element of arbitrary
detention was the factor critical to the outcome. A specific finding was
made that "extended, indefinite confinement in a federal prison [was]
deleterious to the personal integrity of petitioner and [could] only be
viewed as arbitrary detention."' The detention thus was unauthorized
by law and an abuse of the discretion of the Attorney General and his
delegates.'

1. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 800 (D. Kan. 1980), appeal docketed, No.
81-1238 (10th Cir. Feb. 27, 1981).
2. 505 F. Supp. 787.
3. The crimes were two thefts of suitcases, in 1959 and 1964, and an attempted burglary. Rodriguez had been sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment for these, plus a penalty of three years for an escape. These offenses fit into the class of crimes of "moral turpitude" rendering an alien visa applicant excludable. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(9) (1976). 505 F. Supp.
at 789. It appeared to the district court that he might already be eligible for release had he
remained in Cuba. Id. at 791-92. No charge was ever made against Rodriguez within the
United States.
4. Id. at 791.
5. Id. at 792.
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In cases where aliens are excludable at the border, the relevant applicable rules6 are similar to those used in deportation proceedings concerning persons earlier admitted into the country:7 provision is made for minimal hearings and challenge to the Attorney General on the ground of
abuse of discretion.8 It is possible under each category to parole, or "conditionally release," the alien after he is found to be deportable.9 The regular deportation proceedings contain two safeguards, absent from exclusion
proceedings, to which the Fernandez court attached great significance.
First, the regular deportation statute permits the Attorney General to
contact alternative countries if that country from which the alien arrived
in the United States refuses to take him back. The exclusion statute contains no such option, because usually an alien is screened for admissibility
before he leaves his home for the United States, with the result that
"alien convicts are normally disallowed entry to this country when they
go through pre-processing prior to departing their home land."10 Thus the
Cuban refugees' situation was "unique in United States history,"" for
they could not be returned to Cuba without
that nation's acceptance, and
12
no other recipient could be discovered.
Second, the deportation statute contains a time limit beyond which
the alien's detention is "automatically terminated."'' That limit is six
months, when the alien is to be released "if deportation has not been
practicable, advisable, or possible, or departure of the alien from the
United States under the order of deportation has not been effected,""
although such release is made subject to the supervision of the Attorney
General. The only reference made by the exclusion statute to timing is
the provision that the excludable alien's deportation be concluded "immediately.' 5 Rodriguez' imprisonment had lasted beyond six months at
the time of this decision.
The detention referred to in this discussion is only that which is "for
the sole purpose of effecting deportation."'" If deportation is not realiza-

6. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1976).
7. Id. § 1252.
8. Id. §§ 1105(a), 1226(b).
9. For deportable immigrants, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(3), (d); for excludable aliens, 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). The tragedy that could result where an alien was held indefinitely
before parole was possible is exemplified in Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
10. 505 F. Supp. at 792.
11. Testimony of Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] District Director,
George W. Geil, in hearing on another (unspecified) Cuban detainee's habeas corpus case.

Id.
12. In effect the INS was stuck with Pedro Rodriguez and the others. It was granted by
the court that the situation was likely occasioned by an innocent failure of the authorities to
adjust timely immigration procedures to meet the challenge of the mass immigration. Id. at
792, 794, 799.
13. Id. at 793. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c).
14. Id.
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
16. 505 F. Supp. at 793, citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896);

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 10:360

ble within the time limit, the "continued detention of the alien [is] without cause."" In cases where the alien is determined to be a security risk,
or when he has been charged or convicted in accordance with United
States law and procedure, it is possible that he might legally be detained
past the statutory limit. The Fernandez court declared, however, that
"indeterminate detention in a maximum security prison of excluded
aliens who have not been convicted of a crime in this country or found to
be a security risk is arbitrary and every bit as objectionable as indefinite
detention of deportable aliens."1 8
The most peculiar difference to be found between the treatment of
excluded aliens and those who have been admitted into the United
States, later to become deportable, is the "time-honored legal fiction" according to which certain excludable and excluded aliens "are not recognized under the law as having entered our borders. Consequently, these
nonentrants customarily have not enjoyed the panoply of rights guaranteed to citizens and alien entrants by our Constitution."' In the absence
of argument against this precedent in the Fernandez proceedings, the
court reaffirmed its legitimacy,20 at the same time setting the basis for an
unprecedented constitutional ruling.
On the authority of the legal fiction 'of nonentry, the court rejected
the petitioner's claim that his detention violated the Eighth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 2' It summarized these holdings and the breadth of the resulting problem in this fashion:
We have declared that indeterminate detention of petitioner in a
maximum security prison pending unforeseeable deportation constitutes arbitrary detention. Due to the unique legal status of excluded
aliens in this country, it is an evil from which our Constitution and
statutory laws afford no protection. Our domestic laws are designed to
deter private individuals from harming one another and to protect individuals from abuse by the State. But in the case of unadmitted
aliens detained on our soil, but legally deemed to be outside our borders, the machinery
of domestic law utterly fails to operate to assure
22
protection.

Unable to find relief under domestic law, the court then sought to deterKusman v. District Director of Immigration, 117 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
17. 505 F. Supp. at 793. See also Ross v. Wallis, 279 F. 401 (2d Cir. 1922); Kusman, 117
F. Supp. 541.
18. 505 F. Supp. at 794.
19. Id. at 790. As authority for the constitutionality of this denial of rights, the court
cites, inter alia, Fiallo v. Beal, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596
n.5 (1953), citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring);
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
20. 505 F. Supp. at 790.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 975.
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mine whether relief was available under international law.
An amicus curiae brief filed by Kansas Legal Services was credited
with raising the argument adopted by the court that "international law
secures to petitioner the right to be free of arbitrary detention and that
his right is being violated."' 8 The amicus brief cited two multilateral instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"4 and the American Convention on Human Rights,2 5 the latter signed by President Carter
in 1977. The court responded favorably, reciting the provisions on arbitrary detention, and brought into the discussion two more documents, the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 17 quoting from the latter at length in the text of the opinion.28

The court noted that since the United States is not a ratifying party to
the American Convention, the European Convention, or the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the present petitioner had alleged no direct
violation of a binding treaty obligation." But there remains the important effect given by internal United States law to international law, both
by constitutional mandate and by governmental policy.
Illustrating the Carter Administration's attitude toward arbitrary detention within the context of the United States' international obligations,
the court quoted Patricia M. Derian, President Carter's Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs: "Our human
rights concerns embrace those internationally recognized rights found in
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. The specific focus of
our policy is to seek greater observance by all governments of the rights
of the person including. . . freedom from arbitrary detention." 0 And for
23. Id.
24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A
(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
25. American Convention on Human Rights, done at San Jose, Nov. 22, 1969, entered
into force July 18, 1978, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. LJV/
11.23 doc. 21, rev. 6, (1979); reprinted in 9 Ir'L LEGAL MAT. 673 (1970).
26. Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at
Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, [1950] Europ. T.S. No. 5 (1968), 213
U.N.T.S. 221.
27. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 168 (1967).
28. 505 F. Supp. at 797.
29. Id. at 795. The court recognized the binding obligation of the United States under
the United Nations Charter. Id. at 796. See generally Rogoff, The InternationalLegal Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty, 32 MmINE L. REV. 263 (1980). On the changing nature of the acceptance under international law of the human rights of individuals, see
generally Ferguson, InternationalHuman Rights, 1980 L. FORUM 681 (1980); Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in International Law, 24 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 11
(1978); Nanda, From Gandhi to Gandhi-InternationalLegal Responses to the Destruction
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in India, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 19
(1976); Note, Detention Without Trial in Kenya, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 441 (1978).
30. 505 F. Supp. at 798, quoting Derian, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy-The
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expression of Congress' recognition of the same commitment, it quoted
Congressman Donald M. Frasier, former Chairman of the Subcommittee
on International Organizations and the Commission on International Relations, House of Representatives:
Generally [Congress has] said the military aid should be reduced or
terminated to a country guilty of a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. We define gross violations as those involving the integrity of the person: torture, prolonged detention without charges or trial, and other cruel and
inhuman treatment. 1
The court continued, borrowing from the recent decision in Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala,"2 two citations from which set forth the traditional interpretation of constitutional references to international law as part of the
law of the United States. The Filartigacourt cited Justice Marshall's
1815 statement that absent congressional enactment,
United States courts are 'bound by the law of nations, which is a part
of the law of the land.' These words were echoed in The Paquete Habana [1900]: '[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination.'"8
An important, insightful rule stated in Filartigaas a basis for determination of customary international law was applied without modification to bring together all of the various authorities cited by the Fernandez court:u
Principles of customary international law may be discerned from
an overview of express international conventions, the teachings of legal scholars, the general custom and practice of nations and relevant
judicial decisions. [Citation omitted.] When, from this overview a
wrong is found to be of mutual, and not merely several, concern

Executive Perspective, [1978] INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS L. & PRAc. 183. For an insightful appraisal of the United States' human rights policy under the Carter administration, see
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS 3-91 (V. Nanda, J. Scarritt, & G. Shepherd eds. 1981).
31. 505 F. Supp. at 797-98, quoting from Frasier, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy-The CongressionalPerspective, [1978] INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS L. & PRAc. 171, 178.
32. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See Development, Filartigav. Pena-Irala:Providing
Federal Jurisdictionfor Human Rights Violations through the Alien Tort Statute, 10 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 355 (1981).
33. 630 F.2d at 887. The Court relied on The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422
(1815), and The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), for these principles.
34. In addition to those mentioned supra in notes 22-25, 28-34, the court relied on:
Arbitration Matter of France ex rel Madame Julien Chevreau, M.S. Dep't of State, file no.
500, AIA11197, quoted in 1 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 440-63 (1937);
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Order of 29
January 1971, [1971] I.C.J. 12, 76 (separate opinion of Vice President Ammoun); Bilder,
The Status of InternationalHuman Rights Law: An Overview, [1978] INT'L L. & PRAc. 1, 8;
Stotzky, Book Review, 11 MIAMI J. INT'L L. 229 (1979).
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among nations, it may be termed an international law violation."
Determining that the presence of rules against arbitrary detention in the
cited international instruments indicates this mutual concern, and distilling from these and other sources a consensus of international law on arbitrary detention according to the rule in Filartiga,the court declared
that there was an international law violation in the treatment of Rodriguez. Applying this rule to the situation presented, the court concluded
that "even though the indeterminate detention of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate the United States Constitution or our statutory
laws, it is judicially [remediable] as a violation of international law. '' "
The final ruling was an order that the respondent terminate the arbitrary detention of the petitioner within ninety days, by deportation, release on parole, determination of security threat or likelihood of absconding, or transfer to a refugee camp; if termination according to one of these
or another reasonable alternative was not effected within the prescribed
time, the court would grant the writ of habeas corpus and release Rodri87
guez on parole.
The effect of Filartigav. Pena-Iralawas to grant foreign nationals a
United States forum for the vindication of violations of international law,
specifically in contravention of the law against torture." The unanswered
question is how that decision will affect violations of other, similarly wellestablished rules of international law. The decision in Fernandez v. Wilkinson has made a logical application of the rule: the United States, too,
is bound by customary international law and will be held to the accordant
standard of conduct by its own courts.
The limitation inherent in the facts of this case cannot be disregarded, for had Rodriguez been a United States resident there would
have been no question of his eligibility for habeas corpus relief under the
Constitution. By the strength of the authority and reasoning mustered by
the court in support of its conclusion, however, this decision could surpass that limitation. In essence, the court said that where there exists a
shortfall in constitutional protection to the disadvantage of any individual within United States territory, if there is adequate protection under
customary international law the court will apply the customary rule. The
question arises, then, what will be the reaction of courts if domestic
law-constitutional or general, statutory or common-is challenged as
falling short of a principle of international law. It is submitted that a
strong case may be made under Fernandez for the supremacy of customary international law.
Katharine J. Kunz

35.
36.
37.
38.

505 F. Supp. at 798, citing Filartiga,630 F.2d 876 (1980).
505 F. Supp. at 798.
Id. at 800.
Note 32 supra.
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Fedorenko v. United States: The Memories
and Emotions of World War II Endure
The United States Supreme Court recently confirmed the revocation
of a World War II refugee's naturalized citizenship,1 refusing to apply the
Chaunt v. United States2 test of materiality to a misrepresentation found
in the refugee's visa application. Significantly, the Court also held that
courts do not have broad equitable powers in a denaturalization proceeding when the naturalized citizenship was procured illegally or by willful
misrepresentation of material facts. Fedorenko v. United States deals
specifically with an accused concentration camp guard, but its ramifications are unclear for other persons who were forced to assist in the camps
and who entered this country after the war.
Feodor Fedorenko was born in the Ukraine and served in the Russian
army until 1941, when he was captured by German troops. The Germans
trained him to serve as an armed concentration camp guard and sent him
to Treblinka, a notorious extermination camp in Poland.3 In 1949, he applied for admission to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act
(DPA) of 1948," misrepresenting on his visa application his whereabouts
during the war years, and failing to note his service as a concentration
camp guard. After arriving in the United States in 1949, he led an uneventful and law-abiding life. When Fedorenko applied for naturalization
in 1969, he failed again to reveal that he had served as a guard at Treblinka. He was naturalized in 1970.
In 1977, the United States filed a denaturalization action under 8
U.S.C. section 1451(a) against Fedorenko, charging him with willful concealment of his wartime activities both in applying for a DPA visa and in
applying for citizenship. The government argued that Fedorenko had procured his naturalization illegally or by willful misrepresentation of material facts under the terms of the denaturalization statute."

1. Pedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981).
2. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
3. Treblinka was literally a death camp:
It contained only living facilities for the SS and the persons working there. The
thousands who arrived daily on the trains had no need for barracks or mess
halls: they would be dead by nightfall. It was operated with barbarous methodology-brutally efficient-and such camps surely fill one of the darkest chapters in the annals of human existence, certainly the darkest in that which we
call Western civilization ....
The death toll? One million victims, according
to one witness.
United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 901 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
4. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1952) provides:
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys . .. to institute proceedings ... for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting
a naturalized citizen to citizenship and cancelling the certificate of naturalization on the gound that such order and certificate of naturalization were ille-
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In the midst of a highly emotional trial setting,* the district court

found that Fedorenko's guard duty was not voluntary7 and that even
though he had made certain misrepresentations, the government had
failed, under the Chaunt standard, to show by "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing' evidence either (1) that facts were suppressed which, if
known, would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the
discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship."8 The court
noted the apparent ambiguity in the second of these tests,9 and interpreted it to require the government to prove that an investigation
prompted by a complete and truthful response by Fedorenko would have

revealed facts justifying denial of citizenship. 0 Since the government had
failed to meet this burden, the district court refused to strip Fedorenko of
his citizenship."

As an alternative basis for its decision, the district court held that
since a denaturalization proceeding is a suit in equity,"3 the court has
broad equitable powers to weigh "the rights of the parties in light of all

the circumstances in order to arrive at a decision which is just and fair."18
The court reasoned that since naturalization courts have considered the
equities in determining whether citizenship should be granted,' 4 similar
discretion should also be available in denaturalization proceedings. Since
Fedorenko had been a responsible citizen and resident for twenty-nine
years and since the record before the court as to his alleged concentration
camp activities was inconclusive, the court found that the equities should

be weighed in favor of Fedorenko.

5

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,1' agreeing with the gov-

gaily procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful
misrepresentation ....
6. As one example of the emotional intensity surrounding the trial, the district court
observed that the Jewish Defense League ran advertisements in newspapers offering
chartered buses from Miami Beach to Fort Lauderdale on opening day. A demonstration
outside the courtroom echoed with a chant: "Who do we want? Fedorenko. How do we want
him? Dead." 455 F. Supp. at 899. This emotional intensity also seems to have influenced the
government's presentation of their case. The government requested daily copy of the reporter's transcript and had four lawyers at its counsel table. In addition, the government
hired two Russian translators for Fedorenko's testimony. Id. at n.8. Futhermore, Attorney
General Civiletti personally argued the government's case before the Supreme Court.
7. Id. at 913.
8. 364 U.S. at 355.
9. The court of appeals and the Supreme Court also noted the ambiguity. 597 F.2d at
951; 101 S. Ct. at 759 (White, J., dissenting).
10. 455 F. Supp. at 916.
11. Id. at 921.
12. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 671 (1946).
13. 455 F. Supp. at 918.
14. In re Iwanenko's Petition, 145 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. I1. 1958); In re Baspatow, 100 F.
Supp. 44 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Petition of R., 56 F. Supp. 969 (D. Mass. 1944).
15. 455 F. Supp. at 920-21.
16. 597 F.2d at 954.
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ernment that the proper interpretation of the second Chaunt test was
that the government only had to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that disclosure of the true facts would have led the government to make
an inquiry that might have uncovered other facts warranting denial of
citizenship.' 7 In addition, the circuit court held that the lower court did
not have broad equitable powers under the denaturalization statute to
excuse a "fraudulent procurement of citizenship."" s
In affirming the revocation of Fedorenko's citizenship, the Supreme
Court agreed that the "right to acquire American citizenship is a precious
one, and that once it has been acquired, its loss can have severe and unsettling consequences. '""9 However, the Court noted an important line of
cases 20 holding that a certificate of citizenship may be cancelled unless
there has been strict compliance with the conditions imposed by Congress
prerequisite to the acquisition of citizenship: "Failure to comply with any
of these conditions renders the certificate of citizenship 'illegally procured,' and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be set aside."'"
Rather than being irreconcilable, these two lines of cases were used to
illustrate the importance to the Court of the issues at stake for both the
22
citizen and the government in a denaturalization proceeding.
In the seven-to-two Fedorenko decision written by Justice Marshall,
the Court refused to accept the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the Chaunt test
for two reasons: first, the materiality standard announced in Chaunt was
as applied to false statements in applications for citizenship rather than a
visa; second, the arrests that Chaunt failed to disclose all took place after
he entered the United States." Fedorenko, on the other hand, had made

17. Id. at 951. This is also the interpretation offered by the dissenters in Chaunt, 364
U.S. at 357 (Clark, Whittaker, Stewart, JJ., dissenting). The circuits have split on the interpretation of Chaunt. The district court's interpretation is in accord with the Third and
Ninth Circuits. United States v. Riela, 337 F.2d 986 (3rd Cir. 1964); United States v. Rossi,
299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962); La Madrid-Peraza v. I.N.S., 492 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1974). But
the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits support the Fifth Circuit's interpretation. Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1961); United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1964); Kassab v. I.N.S., 364 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1966).
18. 597 F.2d at 954.
19. 101 S.Ct. at 747. Justice Black wrote that "[n]ot only is United States citizenship a
'high privilege,' it is a priceless treasure." Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950)
(Black, J., dissenting). See also Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 269 (1961); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 675, 676 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
20. See Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17 (1928); United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319
(1917); United States v. Ginberg, 243 U.S. 472 (1917).
21. 101 S.Ct. at 747.
22. Id. at 748.
23. In Chaunt, the government sought to denaturalize the defendant because he had
procured his citizenship by concealment and misrepresentation of his arrest record. He had
stated on a form connected with his naturalization that he had never been arrested. In fact,
he had been arrested three times: once for distributing handbills in violation of an ordinance, once for making a speech in violation of park regulations, and once for general breach
of peace. All of these arrests occurred at least ten years prior to the defendant's naturaliza-
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false statements in his application for a visa, and the alleged misconduct
occurred prior to his arrival-in the United States. Announcing a new standard for materiality of false statements in visa applications, the Court
stated that "at the very least, a misrepresentation must be considered
material if disclosure of the true facts would have made the applicant
ineligible for a visa." '
The Court then turned its attention to the DPA to see if Fedorenko
had indeed been ineligible for a visa. Under the DPA, the definition of
"displaced persons" eligible for immigration into this country specifically

excluded individuals who had "assisted the enemy in persecuting
civil[ians]" or had "voluntarily assisted the forces

. . .

in their opera-

tions."2 5 Even though the district court had found that Fedorenko served
involuntarily as a guard at Treblinka,2" the Supreme Court was unable to
find any basis for an "involuntary assistance" exception in the language

of the DPA: "The plain language of the Act mandates precisely the literal
interpretation that the District Court rejected: an individual's service as a
concentration camp armed guard-whether
voluntary or involun''
tary-made him ineligible for a visa. 27
The laws under which Fedorenko was admitted to citizenship require
an applicant to have been admitted lawfully into the United States for
permanent residence.2 8 Lawful admission for permanent residence, in
turn, requires that the individual hold a valid unexpired immigrant visa.2e
Since the DPA provided that "all immigration laws.., shall be applica-

tion. Although the record in the case was not clear, it appeared that he was convicted of
only one charge, that involving the park regulation. 364 U.S. at 351, 352.
24. 101 S. Ct. at 748.
25. The Displaced Persons Act, 62 Stat. 1009, at § 2, incorporated the definition of
"refugees or displaced persons" contained in Annex I to the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization of the United Nations (IRO). The IRO Constitution, 62 Stat.
3037-55 (1946), was ratified by the United States on December 16, 1945 (T.I.A.S. No. 1846)
and became effective on August 20, 1948. 62 Stat. 3037. The IRO Constitution provided that
the following persons would not be eligible for refugee or displaced person status:
1. War criminals, quislings and traitors.
2. Any other person who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, Member of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the
second world war in their operations against the United Nations.
Annex I, Part II, 62 Stat. 3051-52.
26. 455 F. Supp. at 913.
27. 101 S. Ct. at 750.
28. Sections 316(a) and 319(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952; 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1427(a), 1429.
29. At the time of Fedorenko's initial entry into the United States, § 13(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 161 (repealed in 1952), provided
that "[no immigrant shall be admitted to the United States unless he has an unexpired
immigration visa." The courts at that time consistently held that § 13(a) required a valid
visa and that a visa obtained through a material misrepresentation was not valid. See
United States ex rel. Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1951).
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ble to. . . eligible persons who apply to be or who are admitted into the
United States pursuant to this Act,"80 Fedorenko was not admissible into
the United States under the terms of the DPA. The Court concluded that
his citizenship must be revoked.8 1
Justice Blackmun concurred with the majority's result, 8 2 noting their
reluctance to adopt the Chaunt test and expressing his own preference
for doing so. Justice White, on the other hand, dissented 31 on the narrow
ground that while the court of appeals had correctly interpreted Chaunt,
it had incorrectly focused its attention solely on whether Fedorenko had
willfully concealed material facts when he applied for a visa. Since the
Fifth Circuit had failed to review the district court's application of
Chaunt to Fedorenko's concealment of material facts at the time he applied for citizenship, Justice White would have remanded the case for the
court of appeals to make this review. Finally, Justice Stevens, in an emotional dissent," pointed out numerous problems with the case which the
majority, in his opinion, had failed to resolve. He seemed even more
troubled, however, with the underlying premise of the majority that
Fedorenko's or any citizen's involuntary conduct could provide the basis
for stripping him of his United States citizenship.
Several aspects of Fedorenko v. United States deserve note. First,
the Fedorenko majority was overly concerned with avoiding the Chaunt
test of materiality. Admittedly, Chaunt is factually distinguishable since
it involved a citizenship application which contained false statements
concerning events which had occurred after Chaunt's arrival in the
United States. 3 5 Yet even these differences fail to explain the Court's reluctance to apply Chaunt, given the similarities and close relationship between a visa and citizenship.3" While differences do exist between the
two, the differences do not seem so great as to warrant application of one
test of materiality to misstatements in citizenship applications and another to those in visa applications.
As another basis for its refusal to apply Chaunt, the Court distinguished Fedorenko's alleged misconduct itself as having occurred prior to
his arrival.8 7 Again the difference does not support two separate tests. A
person with a history of misconduct prior to his arrival would appear just
as unacceptable for United States residency or citizenship as a person
whose arrival preceded his misconduct. The use of two different tests

30. Displaced Persons Act, § 10.
31. 101 S. Ct. at 753.
32. Id. at 753-58 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
33. Id., at 758-59 (White, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 759-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. 364 U.S. at 351, 352.
36. A visa is an initial step in the process which eventually may lead to citizenship.
Also, a visa may be just as difficult to obtain as citizenship in light of the numerical limits
imposed on total lawful admittances. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1952). Furthermore, a visa, like citizenship, can be revoked. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i) (1952).
37. 364 U.S. at 351, 352.
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based on the date of a visa or citizenship applicant's misconduct, without
elaboration, is not the ideal way for the Court to draw its analysis. 8
Another interesting aspect of the Court's decision was its refusal to
accept the circuit court's interpretation of the second part of the Chaunt
test-"that the Government need only prove that disclosure of the true
facts might have led to other facts which would have warranted denial of
citizenship."'s3 Yet although the Court refused to accept this interpretation, it declined expressly to reject the Fifth Circuit's interpretation in
favor of the district court's, that the Government must prove that a
truthful response by Fedorenko would have led to other facts which
0
would have justified denial of citizenship.'
Under the district court's interpretation of Chaunt, the Government
would bear a heavy burden (often impossible, according to Justice
White"1 ) .of proving facts that existed many years before the person applied for citizenship or visa. However Justice White's conclusion that the
district court's definition of materiality would greatly improve the odds of
successful concealment and encourage applicants to withhold information
is one-sided. 4' As a practical matter, the chances for abuse would be just
as great under the court of appeals' interpretation, since its application
suggests that a deliberately made false answer to any question the government might ask in a visa or citizenship application may be material.
Conceivably, a person's naturalization could be revoked years after it is
conferred, on the mere suspicion that certain undisclosed facts might
have warranted exclusion from the country. It should be noted, however,
that "by concluding that the government has demonstrated the actual existence of disqualifying facts-facts that themselves would have warranted denial of [Fedorenko's] citizenship-the Court adheres to a more
rigorous standard of proof.' 3 This standard of proof is closer in line with
the district court's interpretation than with the court of appeals' and suggests that, although Fedorenko lost his citizenship, future cases where the
Court chooses to apply Chaunt may be resolved under the higher standard of proof espoused by the district court.
The Court's rejection of the "involuntary assistance" exception in the
language of the DPA" is another interesting aspect of this case. The difficulty with this position and the Court's literal construction of the Act is
that such an interpretation might bar many Jewish prisoners who sur38. The difficulty encountered by the Court in trying to avoid the Chaunt test is apparent in the similarity between itsnew definition of materiality for the visa application-"if
the disclosure of the true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a visa," 101 S.
Ct. at 748-and the first part of the Chaunt test, which deems material those facts "which,
if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship." See text accompanying note 8 supra.
39. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
40. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
41. 101 S. Ct. at 759 (White, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 756 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
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vived the concentration camps from asserting that they had lawfully entered this country after the war. For example, working prisoners who led
arriving prisoners to the gas chambers to be executed or wore armbands
as part of the ruse at the gas chambers or cut the hair of the females to
be executed would have technically assisted the enemy, albeit involuntarily and under the utmost duress, and would not have been eligible for
entry into the United States under the DPA. It is absurd to call their
conduct "assistance" inasmuch as it was involuntary, even though the
word "voluntarily" was omitted from the definition of an eligible person
in the DPA. "5
The Court handled this dilemma in a footnote 46 by concluding that
prisoners who did no more than lead new arrivals to the gas chambers or
cut the hair of women prisoners could not be considered to be assisting
the enemy in persecuting civilians. However, as Justice Stevens argued,
"the Court would give the word 'persecution' some not yet defined specially limited reading. In my opinion, the term 'persecution' clearly applies to such conduct; indeed, it probably encompasses almost every aspect of life or death in a concentration camp.' 47 The Supreme Court also
attempted to distinguish the Jewish workers and the Ukrainian guards on
such factors as the issuance of uniforms and weapons, the receipt of a
stipend, and the privilege of being allowed to leave the camp and visit the
nearby town.'8 These distinguishing factors, though, seem to bear no relation to the persecution of the Jews in the concentration camps.
The last noteworthy aspect of this case is the Court's facile approval
of the court of appeals' holding that district courts lack equitable discretion to enter or refrain from entering a judgment of denaturalization
against a naturalized citizen whose citizenship was procured illegally or
by willful misrepresentation of material facts. The Court, in effect, refused to look beyond the fact that Fedorenko made misstatements on his
visa and citizenship applications. That Fedorenko may have feared for his
life while he served at Treblinka or thought that repatriation to the Soviet Union would follow if he told the truth on his DPA application are
possibilities" the Court chose to ignore. This rigid stance is disturbing
because if United States citizenship is a "priceless treasure,"' 1 then great
care should be exercised when it is granted or revoked. The Court's un-

45. The word "assistance" connotes voluntary assistance: "The act or action of assisting; aid, help. . . ." WEBSTER'S THiRtD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 67 (1971).
46. 101 S. Ct. at 750 n.34.
47. Id. at 762 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 750 n.34.
49. Id. at 752-53.
50. The district court accepted Fedorenko's testimony that although Russian guards
did enjoy some privileges such as being able to walk down the road outside the camp, if a
guard did not return, he would be captured and executed. 455 F. Supp. at 901. The district
court also accepted one witness' testimony that thousands committed suicide rather than be
repatriated to the Soviet Union. Id. at 911.
51. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 791.

1981

DEVELOPMENTS

willingness to take even a brief look at the reasons behind Fedorenko's
misstatements seems unjustified.
Perhaps at the bottom of the Court's difficulties with this case were
the emotions and memories that remain of World War II concentration
camps. In his dissent, Justice Stevens recognized this force-"a sort of
'hydraulic pressure' that tends to distort our judgment."'
He concluded:
Perhaps my refusal to acquiesce in the conclusion reached by my
highly respected colleagues is attributable in part to an overreaction
to that pressure. Even after recognizing and discounting that factor,
however, I remain firmly convinced that the Court has committed the
profoundest sort of error by venturing into the unknown to find a basis for affirming the judgment of the court of appeals. That human
suffering will be a consequence of today's venture is certainly predictable; that any suffering will be allayed or avoided is at best doubtful. 6
Bernie M. Tuggle

The Impact of Title VII Protection on FCN
Treaties: Conflict and Interpretation
Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.,1 a recent Second Circuit
case, brings into focus a direct conflict between United States domestic
law and the provisions of a 1953 commercial treaty between the United
States and Japan.' A group of female secretarial employees of Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc. (Sumitomo), a New York-incorporated, wholly-owned
subsidiary of a Japanese commercial firm, brought a class action alleging
that the corporation's practice of hiring only male Japanese nationals for
management-level positions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,3 section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,' and the Thirteenth
Amendment. 5
Sumitomo sought dismissal on the ground that the Japanese Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) exempted Japanese
trading companies and their wholly owned subsidiaries in the United
52. 101 S. Ct. at 763 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

53. Id.
1. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981).
2. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as Japanese Treaty or Treaty].
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1976).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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States from the Application of Title VII. The district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' section 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment claims, but denied
the motion with respect to the Title VII claim.' Although the court of
appeals affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion, it did so on
grounds other than that relied on by the district court. On appeal, the
Treaty was found not to exempt Japanese companies operating in the
United States, whether or not they were incorporated in the United
States, from United States laws prohibiting discrimination in employment. The action was remanded to the district court for a determination
of the Title VII claim.
The significance of the appellate decision is twofold. First, the Treaty
has been construed to clarify the issue of whether a wholly owned locally
incorporated subsidiary has standing to invoke a Treaty provision to protect foreign investments in a discriminatory employment action. Second,
the right of Japanese firms operating in the United States under the
Treaty to hire executives "of their choice'" has been limited by the standards prescribed by United States laws prohibiting discrimination in employment. The denial of the defendant's defense will have ramifications
beyond the Japanese Treaty because the United States presently is party
to some two dozen treaties containing substantially similar provisions.,
Another factor is accelerating foreign investment in the United States,9
creating more managerial positions to be staffed by foreign personnel. 10
Although the practical effect of the Sumitomo decision has yet to be fully
realized, the Second Circuit has struck the initial balance between the
needs of foreign employers and the value of fair employment practices in

6. 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The district court denied the defendant's motion
on the ground that the Treaty was not meant to protect the employment practices of Japanese subsidiaries incorporated in the United States. Sumitomo sought reconsideration of the
refusal to dismiss, and upon reconsideration the motion was again denied, this time on the
ground that, while Japanese subsidiaries incorporated in the United States are given some
rights by the Treaty, the specific provision of the Treaty on which Sumitomo was relying
was not intended to apply to subsidiaries. No. 77-5641 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1979).
7. Japanese Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII, para. 1.

8. For a partial list, see 1

INT'L LEGAL MAT.

92 (1962).

9. See Japan Steps Up its "Invasion" of U.S., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 11,
1978, at 57.
10. Two visa categories, "treaty traders" and "treaty investors," permit foreign citizens
to enter the United States and serve as managerial employees for foreign employers. A
"treaty trader" is an alien who enters the United States to serve in a supervisory capacity,
pursuant to a commercial treaty, "to carry on substantial trade, principally between the
United States and the foreign state of which he is a national." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(i)
(1976). A "treaty investor" is an alien who enters the United States to serve in a "responsible capacity" pursuant to a commercial treaty "to develop and direct the operations of an
enterprise in which he has invested." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(ii) (1976). From 1966 to
1975 the total number of treaty-trader and treaty-investor visas issued by the United States
grew from 4,521 to 13,548, with Japanese employees accounting for more than half of the
increase. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF SECURITY AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE VISA OFFICE 66 (1975); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF SECURITY AND CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 68 (1966).
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the United States in favor of a commitment to anti-discrimination
principles. 1
The 1953 Japanese Treaty is a commercial agreement designed to
create a legal environment that encourages mutually beneficial trade and
investment between the United States and Japan. The general aim of the
Treaty, as in most FCN agreements, is to
establish or confirm in the potential host country a governmental policy of equity and hospitality to the foreign investor. This means,
above all, assurance that the enterprise and property of the alien will
be respected and that he will be accorded equal protection of the laws
alike with citizens of the country."8
FCN treaties have contained so-called "establishment provisions"
dealing with the right of citizens of each country to establish and carry on
business activities within the other and to receive due protection there for
themselves and their property. The basic rule to govern the conduct of
such activities has long been settled in United States treaty practice: "national treatment," or equality of treatment, is accorded the alien. It is
also customary that the alien and property will receive "a certain minimum degree of protection, as under international law, regardless of a
Government's possible lapses with respect to its own citizens." Is
Article VII of the Japanese Treaty is the "basic establishment provision" I ' and embodies the juridical basis of economic intercourse and level
of treatment to be accorded Sumitomo. Article VII provides in relevant
part that
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national
treatment. . . whether directly or by agent or through the medium of
any form of lawful juridical entity. Accordingly, such nationals and
companies shall be permitted within such territories . . . to organize
companies under the general company laws of such other Party....
Moreover, enterprises which they control, whether in the form of individual proprietorships, companies or otherwise, shall. . . be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded like enterprises controlled by nationals and companies of such other Party."
As stated above, the district court's denial of Sumitomo's motion was
affirmed on appeal, but on different grounds. Unlike the lower court, the
court of appeals construed Articles I, VIII and XXII of the Treaty in such
a way as to reach the determination that a wholly owned locally incorporated subsidiary is entitled to the protection of the Treaty. Article I pro-

11. For an analysis of American anti-discrimination principles, see Developments in
the Law § 1981, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rav. 29 (1980).
12. Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment:
Present United States Practice, 5 Am. J. CoMP. L. 229, 230 (1956).
13. Id. at 232.
14. The State Department has referred to Article VII as such in its Outgoing Airgram

No. A-453, U.S. Department of State to USPOLAD, Tokyo, Jan. 7, 1952.
15. Japanese Treaty, supra note 2, 4 U.S.T. 2069.
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vides that "nationals of either Party shall be permitted to enter the territories of the other Party and to remain therein . . . for the purpose of
carrying on trade . . . and engaging in related commercial activities
..
16 Article XXII(3) provides that "companies constituted under the

applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either Party shall
be deemed companies thereof. ' 17 Article VIII provides that "nationals
and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the
territories of the other Party .

.

. executive personnel .

.

. of their

choice." 18
The district court determined that since the definition, derived from
the relevant articles, did not include subsidiaries, Sumitomo was a United
States company. Therefore, it was ineligible to invoke the freedom of
choice protection of Article VIII of the Treaty. The court of appeals, however, took the position that "such a reading would overlook the purpose
of the Treaty, which was not to protect foreign investments made through
branches, but rather to protect foreign investments
generally" 1 without
20
employed.
vehicle
corporate
specific
the
regard to
The remaining issue that could affect the standing of a subsidiary is
whether the subsidiary incorporated in the United States is sufficiently a
national of a state party to invoke the Treaty's provisions. This determination turns on whether the standards set forth in State Department regulations of "treaty traders" and "treaty investors" have been met."1 Apparently, this issue was resolved in Sumitomo's favor.
A caveat with respect to the Second Circuit's interpretation is in order. Future determinations of a subsidiary's standing to invoke the substantive provisions of an FCN treaty may depend on a particular court's
analysis of the September 11, 1979 communication from the State Department to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission," indicating that locally incorporated subsidiaries were not intended to come
under the protection of the Treaty. Until more courts face the issue, however, the Second Circuit's position is clear, and will be the standard by

16. Id. at 2066.
17. Id. at 2080.
18. Id. at 2070.
19. 638 F.2d at 556.
20. This interpretation finds support in the negotiations that preceded ratification of
the FCN treaty between the United States and the Netherlands. The Dutch negotiators
finally concluded, however, there was no need to include in the treaty a provision explicitly
granting parent-company rights to subsidiaries. See Official-Informal Letter from Counselor
of Embassy for Economic Affairs, Trade Agreements and Treaty Division, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Counselor for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, The Hague, Netherlands, Oct.
28, 1955.
21. See note 10 supra.
22. See Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 74 Am. J. INT'L L. 181 (1980). But see Letter of Lee R. Marks, Deputy Legal Adviser,
U.S. Department of State, to Abner W. Sibal, General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Oct. 17, 1978), reprinted in 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 284 (1979).
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which the parties can govern their choice of foreign investment vehicle.
Although the district court did not reach the issue of the degree of
protection that Article VIII might provide from charges of discrimination
under Title VII, the court of appeals, not limiting its decision to the
standing issue, resolved that the Treaty did not exempt Sumitomo from
Title VII with respect to executive personnel. In formulating a narrow
interpretation of the phrase "[executives] of their choice," the court relied heavily on the general purpose of FCN treaties to establish competitive equality between domestic and foreign businesses, not to provide special privileges to foreign businesses., s Supportive of this interpretation
are other United States commercial treaties of the same period which incorporate the phrase "regardless of nationality" into the employer's
choice provision2 4 to guarantee that companies operating abroad would be
exempt from local legislation restricting employment of non-citizens.
There is evidence that the United States included employer's choice provisions largely to protect United States firms abroad from being forced to
hire locally when American employees might be considered better
qualified.
The Supreme Court recognized in Reid v. Covert"' that the treaty
power is subject to constitutional limits on government action. The present holding in Sumitomo should not be viewed as an entirely new position, given the Bolling v. Sharp2 indication that reading any of the treaties to exempt foreign employers from anti-discrimination laws might
offend the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
However, despite the court's refusal to accept Sumitomo's broad interpretation of the "of their choice" clause, the decision explicitly leaves
the Japanese company with the option of going forward with evidence to
support a "bona fide occupational qualification" ("bfoq"). The closing
comments of the Sumitomo decision are of interest when one contem27
plates the eventual impact of the holding in light of "bfoq" precedent:
Although the 'bona fide occupational qualification' exception of Title
VII is to be construed narrowly in the normal context ... we believe
as applied to a Japanese company enjoying rights under Article VIII
of the Treaty it must be construed in a manner that will give due
weight to the Treaty rights and unique requirements of a Japanese

23. See Note, Commercial Treaties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of
Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L. REv. 947, 951 n.21 (1979).
24. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1951, United
States-Denmark, art. VII, para. 4, 12 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797.
25. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
26. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
27. From the time of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme
Court has interpreted Title VII to prohibit not only the intentional use of the proscribed
categories, but also neutral employment practices which result in discriminatory effects on
any of the categories when an employer cannot show a "business necessity" for its practices.
Id. at 429-33. Accord Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
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company doing business in the United States ...."
The courts have devised several tests to implement the "bfoq" provision of Title VII. Upon remand, the district court will probably rely on
one of the following tests to decide the validity of Sumitomo's "bfoq"
claim. Most frequently used is the "all or substantially all" test announced in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.2 9 The
test as originally devised addressed sex discrimination, but it can readily
be applied to nationality discrimination as well. To rely on the "bfoq"
exception, Sumitomo would have the burden of proving that it had reasonable cause to believe, or had a factual basis for believing, that all or
substantially all non-Japanese nationals would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the jobs involved. A major weakness of
this test is that the generality of the phrase "all or substantially all" permits the employer to avoid an individual applicant's qualification. As a
result, courts have expanded the test to require an employer to justify
discrimination by demonstrating the impracticality of individualized
testing.8"
The "essence test" announced in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.31 focuses on the word "necessary" in the language of the
"bfoq" provision. Courts distinguish business necessity from business
convenience and will uphold discrimination only when the essence of the
business operation would be undermined by a prohibition against hiring
members of one class exclusively. This is a narrow test requiring a determination of what constitutes the essence of a total business operation, not
merely the essence of the employment position in question. However,
subsequent cases have interpreted the Diaz test to apply also to the essence of the employment position in question. Under this interpretation
of Diaz, an employer must demonstrate that applicants of one class are
unable to perform the required duties of the employment position.
The third major test developed is one of "economic feasibility" as set
forth in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.8 2 A determination is made "whether
there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose significantly compelling to override the significant impact on one class" and whether there
is available "no acceptable alternative policy or practice which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish the business
purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential
'3 3
impact.
It would appear that despite the Second Circuit's narrow interpretation of the "of their choice" clause, and regardless of which test the dis-

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

638 F.2d at 559.
408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
E.E.O.C. DECISION No. 72-2179 (1976).
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trict court uses on remand to decide the validity of the claimed "bfoq"
exception, Sumitomo will have the advantage of the uniqueness of its
treaty rights and its requirements as a Japanese company to bolster its
argument for an exception to Title VII standards, at least for some of the
executive positions in question. This conclusion is premised on the factors
cited in the appellate opinion as worthy of consideration: linguistic and
cultural skills; knowledge of Japanese products, markets, customs, and
business practices; familiarity with the parent enterprise in Japan; and
acceptability to those persons with whom the company or branch does
3 4
business.
To predict the outcome on remand would be mere speculation, but in
light of precedent and the uniqueness of its treaty reights, Sumitomo will
have a good argument for the validity of the "bfoq" exception even
though the court has spoken out in favor of a strong commitment to antidiscrimination principles.
Christine J. Jobin

Forum Non Conveniens: Limiting Access to
Federal Courts for Transnational Disputes
United States citizens conducting business abroad should be aware of
recent court decisions restricting access to United States courts for redress of grievances against foreign nationals." The federal appeals courts
in these cases have allowed the trial courts broad discretionary power to
dismiss transnational suits based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The courts' application of the doctrine effectively remits a
United States citizen's claim to a foreign country's jurisdiction: the
ramifications of this ouster are serious for U.S. litigants. The decisions
represent a shift from the traditional preference for upholding the plaintiff's choice of forum toward allowing the court to dismiss an action based
upon judicial efficiency and convenience. The courts in Pain v. United
Technologies Corp.' and Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent s adopted a new basis for dismissal of actions brought in United
States courts which is ideologically inconsistent with the concept of the
4
right of access to United States courts.

34. 638 F.2d at 559.

1. Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc.
v. M/V Nordic Regent, 636 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1980).
2. 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
3. 636 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1980).
4. See Comment, Forum Non Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in Federal Courts,
47 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (1980) (discussing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821)).
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A. Recent Interpretationsof the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
1. Pain v. United Technologies Corp.
The district court in Pain v. United Technologies Corp.5 simplified
the standards to be applied by the trial court when dismissing an action
based upon forum non conveniens, requiring that 1) the action be an "imposition upon [the court's] jurisdiction" and 2) an "alternative forum" be
available. Within these parameters the court must weigh the "relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial," a function which lies within the
sound discretion of the court and is not readily accessible to attack. Acceptance of a standard allowing the dismissal of an action based upon
inconvenience to the court is a clear departure from the traditional application of doctrine of forum non conveniens, the purpose of which was7
previously to prevent hardship to the litigants rather than to the court.
The action in Pain arose from a helicopter crash in the North Sea
which killed passengers of different nationalities, including an American
citizen. The defendant in the action, United Technologies Corp. (U.T.C.)
was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut. A subsidiary of U.T.C. which designed and manufactured the
helicopter involved in the crash was owned and operated by a Norwegian
corporation. The trial court dismissed the action based upon stipulations
that U.T.C. consent to: "personal jurisdiction in the foreign court where
plaintiffs might subsequently bring suit;" and that U.T.C. agree "to waive
any defense of statute of limitation were such a suit to be brought within
one year of the date of dismissal," and agree to "proceed directly to trial
only on the issues of damages without contesting liability in any suit filed
by plaintiffs outside the United States." Not only was an alternative foreign forum available to the plaintiff, but the court also ensured the cooperation of the defendant in an action to be brought outside the United
States.9
In Pain, dismissal of the action was justified, in light of the fact that
the United States court was without personal jurisdiction over the Norwegian corporation and would therefore have had to proceed solely
against the American defendant. However, the doctrine of forum non conveniens could have been applied consistent with traditional standards of
At common law, U.S. courts subscribed to the general rule that if a court was of competent

jurisdiction it was required to hear a case brought before it. The doctrine of forum non
conveniens was initially adopted by the courts to avoid unnecessary involvement in the internal affairs of a corporation foreign to that jurisdiction where the domicile of the corporation would be the more appropriate forum. See Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123,
130-31 (1933); Williams v. Green Bay & W.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549 (1946).
5. 637 F.2d at 775.
6. 637 F.2d at 779, quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
7. For the historical development of forum non conveniens and its application in American courts, see Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. REv. 908, 912
(1947).
8. 637 F.2d at 780.
9. Id.
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convenience of litigation. Instead, the court reconciled apparent inconsistencies in prior cases-Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert0 and Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co."-and applied the rule of Alcoa
2
Steamship Co., Inc. v. M/M Nordic Regent"
that the domestic standards
of forum non conveniens are to be applied to transnational disputes in
such a way as to establish a liberal precedent allowing the trial court
broad power to dismiss a case brought in its court by an American
plaintiff.
2. The Standards: Gulf Oil v. Gilbert and Koster v. (American)
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert is recognized as having established guidelines for a trial court to consider in a motion to dismiss on the ground of
forum non conveniens. 8 With any application of the doctrine goes the
presumption that "at least two forums are available in which the defendant is amenable to process." Beyond this fundamental requirement, the
use of the doctrine rests primarily within the discretion of the court.14
Factors for the court to consider include: the private interests of litigants;
access to evidence; availability of witnesses; expense of litigation; advantages and obstacles to a fair trial; and public policy, including recognition
of the problem of excess litigation in congested centers rather than in the
origins of the cause of action. These discretionary considerations are to be
balanced against the rule that the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely
be disturbed. 15 The priority of the plaintiff's choice of forum has been
lost in recent decisions along with other factors which the courts, before
Alcoa and Pain, had established as controlling dismissal of an action to
another jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court emphasized different criteria to be considered
when depriving a plaintiff of his choice of forum in Koster v. (American)
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.' s Koster adhered to the balancing of
interests set forth in Gilbert but implied an additional requirement that
the defendant show harassment before the plaintiff's choice of forum is
disturbed. Regarding the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens the Court stated the general rule:
Where there are only two parties to a dispute, there is good reason
why it should be tried in the plaintiff's home forum if that has been
his choice. He should not be deprived of the presumed advantages of
his home jurisdiction except upon a clear showing of the facts which
either (1) establish such oppressiveness and vexation as to defendant

10. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
11. 330 U.S. 518 (1947).

12. 637 F.2d at 775.
13. 636 F.2d at 863.
14. 330 U.S. at 507.
15. Id. at 508. See generally Recent Decisions, Civil Practice-ForumNon Conveniens,
39 BRooKLYN L. Rzv. 218 (1972).

16. 330 U.S. at 518.
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as to be out of all proportion to the plaintiff's convenience, which may
be shown to be silent or non-existent, or (2) make trial in the chosen
forum inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's
own administrative and legal problems.17
The concern in Koster was whether the court had the power to disturb
the plaintiff's choice of forum. Pain approaches the problem of forum non
conveniens from a different perspective and considers the more objective
question of where the action should be brought, independent of the plaintiff's choice of forum.
3.

Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent

Pain was based primarily upon Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc. v. M/V
Nordic Regent.18 Alcoa was an admiralty action brought in New York by
a New York corporation against a Liberian shipping corporation for damages sustained by the New York corporation in a collision in Trinidad,
West Indies. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of
forum non conveniens. On appeal, the Second Circuit discussed the
proper standard to determine a motion to dismiss an admiralty action
brought by a United States resident and held that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in dismissing the case but had properly considered
the Gilbert standard."9
The Alcoa court addressed the potential conflict in application of the
Gilbert standard without specific adherence to the Koster decision. It
suggested that Koster did not create a new standard, but rather a pragmatic application of Gilbert in derivative actions.20 The court's reasoning
is not compelling; however, the basis for its approach may be revealed in
a footnote which notes the impracticality of applying the Koster requirement that the defendant be harassed in the chosen forum before a change
of venue may be granted. There the decision cites the various treaties
between the United States and foreign countries which provide "for access to each country's courts on a 'national treatment' basis."" Therefore,
if a court is to provide for special treatment of a resident's claim it is
equally obliged to afford the same treatment to a foreign claim brought in
United States courts.
Consistent with this reasoning the court discussed the relevance of
the U.S. citizenship of the plaintiff." In essence the court concluded that

17. Id. at 524.
.18. 636 F.2d at 860.
19. Id. at 861. The court noted that the principles of Gilbert had recently been applied
in Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978). Farmanfarmaian involved
an action brought by an Iranian national in New York District Court against a U.S. corporation for breach of contract. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
action based upon the availability of an alternative forum and the trial court's wide discretion in the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
20. 636 F.2d at 865.
21. Id. at 865 n.6.
22. Id. at 867.
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citizenship is not a relevant factor (nor could it be, in light of the court's
deference to treaties promising equal access to the courts). The court recognized a preference for liberal application of the doctrine as evidenced
by state court decisions.28 Silver v. Great American Insurance Co.u is
cited as authority for a more liberal application of forum non conveniens:
it represents a pronounced departure from the general rule of upholding
plaintiff's choice of forum and allows the court to disregard the residence
of the plaintiff if the litigation is clearly in an inconvenient forum."
The court cites numerous cases supporting its willingness to refer
U.S. citizens to foreign jurisdictions.2 " Likewise, the court deemphasizes
plaintiff's choice in deference to the convenience of the court. Thus the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, at one time referring to the convenience of the litigants, is evolving into a doctrine of convenience to the
court. The minimum requirement at the inception of the doctrine-that
an alternative forum be available-may, based upon the wide discretion
of the court and its liberal construction, be the sole determinant of relegability of an action to a foreign jurisdiction.
B.

Right of Access to United States Courts

An American citizen does not have an absolute right of access to
United States courts. Courts have, however, been reluctant to send Americans into foreign courts.2 7 Despite the recent trend to lessen the significance of the claim brought by an American plaintiff there is considerable
authority to the contrary. To a certain extent the argument may be raised
that the right of access to the courts is protected by the Constitution."
The difficulty in applying this argument to the U.S. citizen's right to
bring an action against a foreign party in U.S. courts is that the Constitution's reference to jurisdiction between state and federal courts "cannot

23. Id. at 868.
24. 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972).
25. 636 F.2d at 867. See Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1163 (2d Cir. 1978),
which asks "should defendant and the court be burdened with [the case's] continuing there,
if an alternative forum now exists so that plaintiff will not be without a remedy?"
26. 636 F.2d at 869, citing, e.g., Mizokami Bros. of Arizona, Inc. v. Baychem Corp., 556
F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Mohr v. Allen, 407
F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
27. Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (1956). The status of a suit between
two non-residents is discussed in Barratt, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL.
L. REv. 380 (1941), in a domestic context, i.e., where both parties are residents of different
states rather than foreign countries. The general rule provides that, where a more appropriate forum is available, the court may dismiss the action. Some states compel the court to
accept jurisdiction where either party is a resident of the state and a dismissal for forum
non conveniens is not allowed. Id. at 410-13. See generally Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CoRNELL
L.Q. 12 (1949). See also note 4 supra.
28. See The Epson, 227 F. 158 (W.D. Wash. 1915); Note, Forum Non Conveniens: Two
Views on the Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Alcoa S.S. Co.,
Inc. v.M/V Nordic Regent, 12 J. MARrmIm L. 123 (1980).
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be construed to interfere with the treaty-making power of the Executive
and the Senate."' " In addition, the argument has been raised that the
U.S. citizen has a right of access to the courts because of his taxpayer
status.3 0 However, in the interest of the integrity of the court there can be
no necessary connection betwien paying taxes and using the courts.
Moreover, the payment of taxes as a basis for access to the courts would
be inequitable, for a "resident alien may pay considerable American
taxes, while a company incorporated in the United States but conducting
all of its business elsewhere may pay little or none."31
Taken to the extreme, it has been suggested that the doctrine of forum non conveniens may be applied without any consideration of the citizenship of the parties. 82 This argument assumes that any presumption
against the adequacy of a foreign court is unjustified, or that, if the forum
court is inadequate, it is inadequate regardless of whom (alien or citizen)
the court may relegate to that jurisdiction. That is, if a forum is unfair
when ousted from U.S.
and aliens have to redress their grievances there
38
courts, the same should be applied to citizens.
Convenience and court efficiency are not controlling values inherent
in the historical development of the judicial system in the United States.
The complexities of international issues and the popular preference for a
fair resolution to conflicts which can be found in U.S. courts should not
provide a basis for the court to dismiss a case. Beyond the constitutional
and taxation arguments, the U.S. citizen has a right of access to the
courts based upon his right to choose his forum to litigate his grievance.
The right, though limited, is consistent with the notion of freedom and
justice for United States citizens. The rule which more closely expresses
traditional American values is found in The Saudades:3
[A]n American court may not refuse to try a case brought by an
American citizen, unless it feels that injustice would be done by allowing him to proceed in his own court. The result of such a rule is
that the discretion of the court, so far as it has any existence, is limited, and that mere inconvenience to the respondent, or to both parties, will not be considered a ground for exercising it to refuse
jurisdiction.
C.

Conclusion
The present trend is moving away from the plaintiff's choice to de-

29. Bickel, supra note 27, at 43 n.129. For a discussion of the constitutional ramifications of using forum non conveniens, see Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in
Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM L. REv. 1, 3-19 (1929).
30. 636 F.2d at 977 (Oakes, J., dissenting); 12 J. MARITIME L. 123 (1980), note 28 supra.
31. Comment, Forum Non Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts,
47 U. CHi. L. RE V. 373 (1980).
32. Id. at 393.
33. Id. at 379.
34. 67 F. Supp. 820, 821 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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mands of public policy in determining forum non conveniens. 36 The plaintiff's access to the U.S. courts is necessarily limited. Likewise, predictable
limitations on the discretion of the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff's
claim are necessary. As the law presently stands, the trial court has broad
discretion to determine the viability of a U.S.-foreign action. The general
standards, albeit ambiguous, require a showing of "inconvenience" and
"public interest" to deprive an American plaintiff of an American forum.36 In balancing the standards, weight is to be accorded plaintiff's citizenship and residency in favor of continuance in the forum wherein the
plaintiff initiated the action. 7
The fundamental principles underlying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens have not been abolished. But the businessperson should be
aware of Pain and Alcoa which grant the trial court broad discretion to
dismiss a case based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The
discrepancy between the purported standards and their application alert
the prudent businessperson to a need for contractual safeguards regarding choice of forum and arbitration provisions in transnational agreements lest he find himself on an unexpected "vacation" abroad for
litigation.
Christina Neslund

35. 637 F.2d at 784.
36. Note 31 supra, at 379.
37. 637 F.2d at 795.
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An International Criminal Court
Reviewed by William M. Beaney
An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward World Peace-A
Documentary History and Analysis, by Benjamin B. Ferencz (two
volumes 1980). Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York
10522. ISBN 0 379 20389 8. Volume I, Half a Century of Hope: pages
xx, 538; $37.50. Volume II, The Beginning of Wisdom: pages x, 674;
$37.50.
Those skeptical about the reality of international law, and the American legal profession includes an abundance of such people, will- scoff at
the idea of an international criminal court ever coming into existence.
They insist that until there is an effective world government, capable of
enforcing an accepted body of international norms, it is futile to talk of
international crimes and international courts. They would add that the
prospects of a world government, even for limited purposes, are more remote today than they were at the end of World War II.
The optimists, who are found in substantial numbers in the academic
world, reject such a negative view. They stress the advances made under
the auspices of the United Nations in declaring that human rights deserve protection. They point to the many governmental actions adversely
affecting human rights which now are proscribed through the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and numerous conventions drawn up in the recent past. It is a fact, they assert, that many
nations, unfortunately not always the most powerful, are showing a
greater willingness to accept supra-national norms in an effort to create
and maintain a more peaceful world. The European region in particular,
excluding the Soviet Union, has taken significant steps in the adoption of
supra-national norms.
This two volume work by Benjamin B. Ferencz, one-time Chief Prosecutor for the United States in the cases against the German extermination squads at the Nuremberg trials, provides data of comfort to both the
skeptics and the optimists. In tracing the fitful progress of the idea of an
international criminal court over the past century, le tends to treat all

William M. Beaney is a Professor of Law at the University of Denver College of Law.
A.B., 1940, Harvard University; LL.B., 1947, Ph.D., 1951, University of Michigan.
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positive proposals enthusiastically and to accept with sadness the many
disappointments and failures. He is consistently an optimist because, in
his judgment, there is growing world-wide recognition of the pressing
need for such an institution as an essential means for removing many of
the sources of tension and conflict between nations.
The justification for establishing an international criminal court was
stated succintly by a committee at the 1926 conference of the International Law Association:
[Tihe trial of the nationals of one State by the Courts of another,
however fair and impartial in fact it may be, is invariably regarded
with suspicion. Further, experience has shown that the trial of war
crimes by National Courts, whether of the victor or vanquished, has
almost invariably proved unsatisfactory.'
Over a half-century later, these observations are still valid, and the course
of events has increased the urgency that solutions be found. The growing
use of terrorism to advance political objectives, the taking of innocent
hostages for either political or personal reasons, and the growth, however
grudgingly, in the acceptance of supra-national norms for the protection
of human rights, increasingly demonstrate the inadequacy of purely national law in dealing with certain types of individual and group behavior.
Surprisingly, in spite of the substantial bulk of these two volumes, it
is not easy for the reader to grasp the variety of factors which have
doomed efforts to establish an international court with a specific body of
law to apply. In part this is the result of Mr. Ferencz's keying a rather
lean text (190 pages) with forty-five largely unedited documents of varying length. As a result the reader has little background as he reads the
various proposals advanced from time to time by scholars and committees, but the defects of these proposals are usually disposed of by Mr.
Ferencz in extremely terse fashion. Perhaps his ambitions were too limited insofar as he seems content to describe in chronological order various
conferences, starting with the Hague Conference of 1899, and various reports issued under auspices of the League of Nations, and the successor
United Nations, up to 1980. Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect the author
to apply an elaborate analytical scheme to what undoubtedly have been
rather complex diplomatic relationships, but the reader has a right to expect some enlightenment as to why the efforts of so many people of good
will have come to naught.
It is also inadequate to paint the antagonists in simple black and
white terms, with the noble idealists always frustrated by the wretched
realists. Many people who believe in the need for positive steps toward a
more peaceful world find it difficult to support the idea of an international criminal court unless and until there is a high degree of consensus
as to the appropriate criminal law norms. No nation state will accept the

1. 1 B. FRRNCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STp TOWARD WORLD
PEAcE-A DocuMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYsIs 255 (2 vols. 1980).

1981

BOOK REVIEw

concept of an international criminal court unless it is given important
jurisdictional tasks not effectively handled by domestic criminal courts. It
is also true that in addition to difficulties in formulating norms appropriate to the acts and behavior to be dealt with, there are serious philosophical and realistic concerns with the way the norms may be applied by an
international tribunal, for the nations of the world are far from united on
jurisprudential values. This can be seen with respect to three of the substantive areas which have been the subject of frequent discussions and
proposals: laws against terrorist acts, laws prohibiting the taking of hostages, and legal norms outlawing the planning and waging of aggressive
war. Even brief discussion reveals sharply divergent approaches by nations to each of these normative areas, arising from their position vis-avis other national power centers and their views concerning the legitimacy
of the current international order.
Given past patterns of colonial relationships, a Third World Nation
may well feel that its present world position reflects past injustices and
deprivations produced by one or more of the major powers, or that the
current policies of other nations are grossly unfair. Terrorist acts against
a nation perceived as having an evil past or current policy thus appear to
the terrorists as responsive to principles of justice. Groups seeking a separate national identity similarly regard the end as justifying violent means,
as with the PLO or the IRA. Thus the various explanations and rationalizations of terrorism suggest the difficulty of reaching an international
consensus on suitable norms, and explain the failure to reach agreement
on one or more conventions dealing with terrorism.
In contrast is the International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December
1979.' By recognizing a right of asylum and the exemption of political
offenses from the coverage of a statute, the potential impact of the convention is greatly weakened; yet, it is likely as a result of the convention
that there will be more situations in the future when nations will be willing to extradite hostage-takers. And, it is probably true that if an international court came into being, many nations which normally would be unwilling to extradite might yield a prisoner to international prosecution
and trial.
Where a government is the offender, as in the case of South Africa
under the 1973 apartheid convention, 3 or in the case of the German government after Hitler's rise to power, a wholly different set of difficulties

2. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted Dec. 17, 1979,
G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted
in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1457 (1979). See also Rosenstock, InternationalConvention Against
the Taking of Hostages: Another International Community Step Against Terrorism, 9
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 169 (1980).
3. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, G.A. Res 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doc. A/
9030 (1974), entered into force July 18, 1976, reprinted in 13 INTL LEGAL MAT. 50 (1974).
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arises only a few of which can be mentioned here. An obvious and frustrating impediment where states or their leaders are the offenders is the
inevitable refusal of the accused parties to subject themselves voluntarily
to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court. In the absence of
coercive measures imposed by the other states party to the basic agreement or covenant, is there any value in creating norms applicable to
states, such as the proscription of apartheid or of aggressive acts of a warlike nature?
While Austinian sanctions may not be available as in the case of domestic criminal law, trade and other economic sanctions can be imposed
on the errant state. Limits on the travel of its officials and citizens are
possible. Penalties on multinational corporations that do business with
the violator is another route. Deprivation of the violator's privileges in
the United Nations is another sanction. Finally, the issuance by an international tribunal of findings, even in a case where the violator chooses not
to appear, may at least have a moral effect on the international community. While the likelihood of the great powers submitting, or being asked
to submit, to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal may seem chimerical, it is possible that even the great powers would welcome the availability of such a court in certain instances, such as the Iraq-Iran war, the
Lebanon crisis, or where a ruler runs amok, as in Uganda under Amin.
But, if one examines the uses of military force by the super-powers, 4 it
becomes depressingly clear that nations can defend even the most dramatic forms of aggressive action in the name of self-defense, and that to
the victor of the next war there will be ample evidence available to justify
the conviction of the loser's leadership.
By focusing on an international court, with all its connotations, Mr.
Ferencz, it is submitted, is misplacing his emphasis. The need for the present is the definition of norms that will meet with wide agreement. The
model is the world's experience with piracy and other offenses on the high
seas which have become embodied in international norms that are systematically and sympathetically enforced. Similarly, by emphasizing the
centrality of human rights through the Convention on Apartheid and
other existing human rights instruments, and posing wherever possible
the rights of individuals against the power of each and every government,
it will be possible gradually to weaken the tendency of nations to interpose their national interest as a rationale for failing to take appropriate
action. The fate of the International Court of Justice should remind us of
the prematurity of setting up an institution to deal with political actions
and behavior before there has been effective international agreement on
norms.

4. For the experiences of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, see B.
BLECHMEN & S. KAPLAN, FORCE WITHOUT WAR (1978), and S. KAPLAN, DIPLOMACY OF POWER
(1981).

Soviet Law After Stalin
Reviewed by Eugene D. Fryer
Soviet Law After Stalin, parts I-III. Part I, The Citizen and the
State in Contemporary Soviet Law, edited by Donald D. Barry,
George Ginsburgs, and Peter B. Maggs (1977). Part II, Social Engineering Through Law, edited by Barry, Ginsburgs, and Maggs (1978).
Part III, Soviet Institutions and the Administration of Law, edited
by Barry, Ginsburgs, Maggs, and F.J.M. Feldbrugge (1979). No. 20 in
the series Law in Eastern Europe (F.J.M. Feldbrugge, general editor).
Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn,
The Netherlands; available in the U.S. from Sijthoff & Noordhoff,
20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, Maryland 20767. Part I: ISBN 90
286 0567 3; pages xv, 303; $43.00 (cloth). Part II: ISBN 90 286 0318 2;
pages xiv, 335; $48.00 (cloth). Part III: ISBN 90 286 0679 3; pages xiv,
414; $57.50 (cloth).
PART I
This collection of ten scholarly articles surveys major areas of Soviet
civil and criminal law against one agreed common index. Each author attempts to determine for his area of research how much of the law is normative and how much is prerogative. For this purpose, the notion of law
encompasses more than the writ, more than statutory and constitutional
enactments. Law more nearly refers to the law process: law articulation or
rule making, law or rule interpretation, and law or rule enforcement. This
flexible focus upon rule as well as law permits treatment of administrative
law where appropriate as the normative parity of statutory or constitutional law. This latter analytical facility is understandable and profitable
in its application to the Soviet legal system, where official discretion
makes formal western distinctions between administrative rules, on the
one hand, and statutory and constitutional law, on the other, less than
descriptive.
The contents of Part I are: Soviet Housing Law: The Norms and
their Application, by Donald Barry; Soviet Corrective Labor Law, by
F.J.M. Feldbrugge; A Propos the Application of Corrective Labor Law in
the USSR, by Valery Chalidze; Soviet Court Reform: 1956-1958, by
George Ginsburgs; The Right to Counsel in Ordinary Criminal Cases in
the USSR, by Yurii Luryi; Whom the State has Joined: Conjugal Ties in
Soviet Law, by Peter Juviler; The Legal Status of Collective Farm Mem-

Major Eugene D. Fryer is a member of the Florida Bar and until recently was an adjunct professor of Soviet law at the University of Virginia and chairman of the international
law division at the Judge Advocate General's School. J.D., 1970, University of Georgia;
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bers, by Peter Maggs; Due Process of Law and Civil Rights Cases in the
Soviet Union, by Christopher Osakwe; Criminal Law Protection of Socialist Property in the USSR, by Stanislaw Pomorski; and Soviet Law of
Job Security Since Stalin: Controllingthe Individual Employee's Choice
in A Non-Market Economy, by Zigurds Zile.
Except for Chalidze and Luryi, both recent Soviet emigrants, all contributors are Western European or American. Luryi, an experienced former trial lawyer, avoids the value based condemnations characteristic to
Chalidze (see the latter's several recent lay polemics on the Soviet legal
system). This in no way detracts from the real contribution made to this
volume by Chalidze, whose article clearly is offered for its anecdotal insights. Chalidze's authority flows from his former status as one of the
front-standing dissidents, or "constitutionalists" who sought during the
1960's and 70's to bind Soviet authority to the supposed equitable spirit
of Soviet law. A bias of more obscure origin is apparent in Juviler's lament over Soviet non-delivery of equal rights to women. His superbly annotated paper critiques as victimization the non-availability under Soviet
law of non-consensual paternity adjudication and support in favor of
mothers out of wedlock. Juviler falls into the snare of mirror imaging,
however, when his critique turns to equal rights pique. Maggs, Osakwe
and Pomorski best deliver on the job of divining the normative and the
prerogative with dispassion, a notable achievement since the latter two
authors deal most directly with the draconian sanctions which underpin
party control. These two aptly state the conclusion shared by the other
contributors that in matters mundane both Soviet law and the legal process operate with fair predictability and near normativeness. As party interests are impinged upon, however, even at the local level, the writ of law
bends to party prerogative and legal lacunae are plugged by self-serving
discretionary party definition.
PART II

In Part II, the analysts shift their focus from the relation between
the citizen and the state, examined in Part I, to the state instigated social
process by which Soviet authority seeks to achieve certain programmatic
results.
The contents of this survey are: A Constitution for "Developed Socialism," by John Hazard; The New Constitution of the USSR From
Draft to Law: An Analysis of the Changes Adopted, by Luryi; Human
Rights in the New Soviet Constitution, by Chalidze; The Soviet Union,
"Jus Commercii," and International Law: The Case of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, by Ginsburgs; Improving the Legal Mechanisms
for Economic Change, by Maggs; Automobilization and Soviet Law: Reflections on Certain Aspects of Soviet Automobile Law, by Osakwe; Consumer Product Quality in Soviet Law: The Tried and the Changing,by
Zile; Law and the Delinquent Family: Reproduction and Upbringing,by
Juviler; Administrative Justice and Judicial Review in Soviet Administrative Law, by Barry; ProcuratorialSupervision of Economic Violations
in the USSR, by Gordon Smith; Crimes Against the Central Planner:
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"Ochkovtiratel'stvo",by Pomorski; and Legal Policy Under Khrushchev
and Brezhnev: Continuity and Change, by Robert Sharlet.
In their effort objectively to deal in tangibles and to serve empirical
scholarship, the contributors, save Hazard and Pomorski, fail to treat adequately the role of self-serving Party ideology in Soviet-style social engineering. The general tendency in this volume is to describe the current
unsatisfactory state of affairs within respective special areas of examination, to make a case for the indispensability of rationalization in a complexifying social system, and then to urge (for whose ears?) pursuit of the
social engineering necessary for the realization of these rational goals.
Hazard and Pomorski add the reasonable and unavoidable perspective of social engineering as a tool for preserving the status quo to the
party's benefit. They account for the irrationalities in the Soviet social
and legal systems, recognize the merit and sustainability of the tried and
reasonably proven Soviet muddle-through approach to system maintenance, and attempt not to prescribe brave new courses for Soviet social
engineering through law. Instead, they weigh the risk-benefit calculus inherent in continued status quo maintenance. Hazard, for example, explains the "need" for a "new" constitution in terms of symbolism. The
1977 Brezhnev Constitution is assessed in view of the systemic desirability of a definite formal signal that the Stalin period has ended. Law of a
constitutional magnitude, where toothless as here, provides a low risk
signal of this sort, not to mention a physical object subject to veneration-all this without the potential risks inherent in the volatile sort of
social signals given at the de-Stalinizing Twentieth Party Congress.
Pomorski's view, cynical but founded, is that individual legal anomie is so
significant in the Soviet Union that neither symbolic engineering nor affirmative bureaucratic measures to cause real change will have much actual impact. Therefore, he reasons, as might Hazard: cannot social engineering through law serve merely to keep the social genie in the jug?
I am inclined in reviewing this volume to recognize a measure of
merit in the rationalist approach. As a concession to Marxist-Leninist
base-superstructure teachings, it is not unreasonable, and Soviet theorists
admit as much, that the legal superstructure and the social base can have
a push-pull relationship. Whether the push-pull is characterized by thrust
or by stasis, the executive direction of the phenomenon is engineering indeed. To recognize, for example, that the physically uncontrovertable
phenomena of automobilization and of juvenile delinquency require executive attention, as do Osakwe and Juviler respectively, is to identify a
target demanding the attention of executives, be they either dynamic or
static.
PART III

This final volume of the three part series examines the institutional
framework within which Soviet law is administered. As did Parts I and II,
this volume views law in the broadest sense to include administrative regulation and administration of popular, or peoples' law, although this lat-
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ter area is inadequately treated. Further, law is taken to mean the process
as well as the substance of social regulation, this process being viewed in
both its formal sense, as when the formal legal structure and its official
actors are examined, and its informal or sub judice aspect, as in the case
of party influence.
The contents of this volume are exhaustive of the formal and informal Soviet legal establishment and its actors, except for the omission of
separate treatment of, for example, the Comrades' Courts and Peoples'
Patrols. The scope of Part III includes The Development of Soviet Administrative Procedure,by Barry; The Individual in Soviet Administrative Procedure, by Henn-JUri Uibopuu; The Reform of Soviet Military
Justice: 1953-1958, by Ginsburgs; Are Military Couts Necessary?, by
Ren6 Beermann; Some Trends in Soviet Criminal Justice, by Juviler;
Further Trends in Soviet Criminal Justice, by Friedrich-Christian
Schroeder; Characteristicsof Soviet Tax and Budgetary Law, by Maggs;
On the Status of the CPSU and Higher State Agencies in Soviet Financial Law, by Dietrich Loeber; Administration of Socialist Property in the
USSR: New Trends and Institutions, by Pomorski; Comments on the
Administration of Socialist Property in the USSR, by Leonid Polsky;
ProcuratorialCampaigns Against Crime, by Smith; Jurisconsults in the
Soviet Economy, by Luryi; Soviet Advokatura Twenty-five Years after
Stalin, by Zile; Some Reflections on the Soviet Advokatura: Its Situation
and Prospects,by William Butler; Humble Guardiansof Routines (Notaries and ZAGS), by Hazard; Soviet Trade Union Organizations in Legal
and HistoricalPerspectives, by Osakwe; The Communist Party and the
Administration of Justice in the USSR, by Sharlet; The Relationship of
the CPSU to the Ministry of Justice, by Boris Meissner; and "Does Soviet Law Make Sense?" Rationality and Functionalityin Soviet Law: An
Epilogue, by Feldbrugge.
The "Administered Society" paradigm springs to mind upon a reading of these analyses. Centrally prescribed and unchangable structures
administer a similarly derived substantive law according to a similarly established process. The actors in this process, both institutional and individual, perform in conformity with definite job descriptions as well as
with less tangible but just as fully understandable "rules of the game."
This is the reason for the undertreatment in this volume of the various popular forms of Soviet law such as Comrades' Courts, Peoples' Patrols, local inspection commissions, juvenile commissions, and popular
forms which are integrated into the formal system, such as lay assessors
and social organization representatives in Peoples' Courts. The tacit basis
for their exclusion perhaps is their relative functional inefficacy, their
doctrinal mootness. The scholars represented in this volume unfortunately fail to bring into print this obviously felt need. These popular
forms were touted by Soviet authority as recently as the 1977 public discussion of the draft constitution, as evidence of the progressive withering
of state and law in accordance with the projections of scientific MarxismLeninism. In reality they operate under a short, tight leash, closely super-
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vised by the formal institutionalized legal system, which in turn is under
close scrutiny and control by the party.
As Sharlet points out, and here we feel the warming verity of the
social sciences amid the legal congeries, the party state exists to serve and
perpetrate party rule and party privilege. Antithetical to this are popular
forms of law which rise above ritual. Also antithetical to party interests is
the organization of lawyers into an independent, nationwide bar, a coalescence which has not been permitted under Soviet rule. Others, namely
Barry and Gorgone, elsewhere have attempted to make the case for the
existence of a sub rosa national bar. But Lurji, with actual experience in
the perils of lawyering beyond the party threshold, maintains that interest group solidarty among Soviet lawyers is pure illusion. Similarly, to
find within the formal legal structure any effective form of equitably inclined concert to mitigate party monopoly is folly. Hazard points out that
so long as the Soviet legal system lurches along without the benefit of
independent judicial review, the party must remain supreme.

BOOK NOTES
ABRAHAMSSON, B.J., INTERNATIONAL OCEAN SHIPPING: CURRENT CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES; Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder,

Colorado, 80301 (1980); $27.50 (cloth); ISBN 0-89158-875-2, LC 79-26674;
xv, 232 p.; footnotes, bibliography, appendices, tables, index.
This book is a basic text in international ocean shipping, concerning
how the industry functions and the special problems and issues that arise
because of its international character. The author makes no attempt to
pass judgment on the various developments and positions within the international shipping industry. The book seeks to clarify underlying concepts and principles and to explain how the various aspects of ocean shipping are interrelated.
The first four chapters deal with basic concepts and principles applicable to all modes of shipping. The concepts developed in these chapters
are: merchant shipping in transition, focusing on dry cargo shipping and
liquid cargo shipping; transportation economics; demand influences; the
importance of transportation costs and factors in rate determination; and
freight rates and tariffs. The main thrust of the author's attempt is to
present basic concepts and principles which in themselves have no foreseeable time limit. Statistical tables are included in the appendix to substantiate and to illustrate these concepts.
The remaining seven chapters of the book apply the concepts previously developed to the specific mode of international shipping. The topics addressed and analyzed include the elements of ocean shipping, the
functional types of ships, technological changes, types of transport contracts, marine insurance, rate determination in the tramp and linear
markets, flags of registry, and international organizations.
The appendices consist of statistical tables, the major international
conventions on bills of lading, and the international conventions on
marine pollution controls.
Bernhard J. Abrahamsson is a master mariner, and is Acting Dean
and Associate Professor of International Economics at the Graduate
School of International Studies, University of Denver.

ALEXANDER, Y., CARLTON, D., WILKINSON, P. (editors), TERowsM:
THEORY AND PRACTICE; Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder,

Colo. 80301 (1979); $20.00 (cloth); ISBN 0-89185-089-1, LC 78-14491; xiii,
280 p.; footnotes, bibliography, index.
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This collection of articles offers a long-term appraisal of terrorist
phenomena. The editors have attempted to relate the theory and practice
of terrorism both to wider changes in social behavior, attitudes, and conditions and to advances in scientific knowledge and technology. The implications of modern terrorism are assessed within the context of international relations and conflict.
The book is divided into five parts. The first three parts of the book
examine the various theories of terrorist motivations, focusing on the
causes of terrorism, social-scientific theories of violence, the effects of
transnational information flows on terrorism, and the main characteristics
of terrorist movements and their modus operandi. Part four deals with
specific current issues such as Northern Ireland, hostage negotiations, the
media and terrorism, and the legislation of terrorism. The final section of
the book contains two articles offering objective discussions of possible
future trends in terrorism and the implications for policymakers that flow
from this assessment.
Among the contributing authors are Charles Russell, Leon Banker,
Bowman Miller, Paul Wilkinson, Amy Sands Redlick, Alan, O'Day, Abraham Miller, Yonah Alexander, L.C. Green, David Carlton, Robert
Friedlander.
Yonah Alexander is Professor of International Studies and Director
of the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism at the State University of New York at Oneonta. He is co-editor of InternationalTerrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives, and is Editor-in-Chief
of Terrorism: An International Journal. David Carlton, senior lecturer
in diplomatic history at the Polytechnic of North London, is the author
of MACDONALD VERSUS HENDERSON, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SECOND
LABOUR GOVERNMENT.

Paul Wilkinson is a senior lecturer in politics at

University College, Cardiff. He is the author of Political Terrorism and
Terrorism and the Liberal State.

t
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE

80's; ABA Press

(1980); ISBN 0-89707-018-6, LC 80-67958; xviii, 254 p.
Enterprise Law of the 80's is a collection of papers and speeches delivered to the transatlantic Symposium on Enterprise Law of the 80's
held in Luxembourg, Brussels, and London in September 1979. The Symposium was jointly sponsored by the ABA Sections for Antitrust and International Law, the United Kingdom Association for European Law, and
the Belgian Association for European Law.
The overall theme of the Symposium was European and United
States perspectives on business competition and organization, with an eye
towards European assimilation of American antitrust practices. The topics presented in the book include the role of the European Court of Jus-
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tice in enforcing European competition laws, the European Community's
competition policies and laws, the United States' competition policies and
laws, European trends in corporate goverance, and British competition
policies.
The European Community's initial steps towards assimilating the
United States' competition policies occured in the early 1960's, when the
European business environment was still strongly grounded in statism
and cartelization. By the time of the 1979 Symposium, the European
Community was well on the road to a new spirit of business competition.
The purpose of the Symposium was to provide an intellectual forum
for a profressional exchange of information in order to perfect United
States and European concepts, policies, and institutions in the field of
enterprise organization and antitrust law. The Symposium allowed European jurists to learn more about U.S. business competition law, and
jurists from the United States to gain from the European Community's
experience in governing mega-enterprises.

BFixs, L.R., TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SEcuRry: THE NucLEAR
Westview Press, Inc., 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado
80301 (1979); $18.50 (cloth); ISBN 0-89158-557-5; LC 79-16291; xii, 161 p;
footnotes, tables, index.
This book is divided into two parts. Part I is a description of the
problems of nuclear terrorism; part H discusses strategies for its
prevention.
Part I begins with a general overview of the varied and sometimes
contradictory psychological and philosophical motivations of the terrorist,
and a brief history of terrorism. Terrorist access to nuclear weapons is
discussed in two contexts, theft of complete weapons from existing stockpiles, and pilferage of materials from which nuclear weapons could be
constructed. Additional factors of cooperation among terrorist groups at
the international level, and tolerance and support of terrorism by certain
governments, illustrate the technological and logistical feasibility of terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons. The ineffectiveness of orthodox
means of deterrence in both political and psychological contexts is convincingly demonstrated.
Having established in the mind of the reader that the unthinkable
indeed can happen, the forms and effects of nuclear terrorism are identified and discussed. Forms of nuclear terrorism include the use of nuclear
explosives, radiological weapons, and nuclear reactor sabotage. The effects of an act of nuclear terrorism are considered both in environmental
and political terms, and include scenarios ranging from limited retaliation
to an all out nuclear exchange between the superpowers.
Part II suggests methods of analysis and potential solutions to the
THREAT;
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specter of nuclear terrorism. Two basic approaches are taken. The first of
these involves the denial of access to nuclear weapons or weapons-grade
material through increased physical security and nonproliferation. Increased security and nonproliferation, however, are shown to be ineffective when practiced only on a unilateral basis.
The second approach taken involves action directed against the terrorists themselves. Here a behavioralist paradigm which defines six principal types of terrorist groups is presented. Suggestions are then made as
to how a given terrorist group may be most effectively dealt with depending upon its behavioral classification. This discussion is expanded to include effectiveness of behavioral measures at the international level, and
the problem of extradition from countries that refuse to prosecute
terrorists.
The book ends with a call for increased international unity and cooperation, suggesting a design for an improved world order as the only effective means of gaining freedom from the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Mr. Beres, an associate profesor of political science at Purdue University, has lectured and published extensively on the subject of nuclear
terrorism.

BREWSTER, K. & ATWOOD, J., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD: Shepards/McGraw-Hill, P.O. Box 1235, Colorado Springs, Colorado 80901 (1981); $120.00 (cloth); ISBN 0-07-002435-9, LC 81-1504; 2
vols., xxxix, 884 p.; footnotes; International Practice Series.
This two volume set is a revised edition of Kingman Brewster's Antitrust and American Business Abroad, first published in 1958. It is intended to be a reference guide for practitioners of international commercial law.
The volumes are divided into five parts. Part one examines the scope
of the problem and the basic domestic and foreign policy issues involved.
Part two examines the basic jurisdictional and substantive concepts involved in the application of antitrust laws, including jurisdiction over foreign persons, legislative jurisdiction over foreign acts, antitrust concepts
applicable to foreign commerce, and the relevance of foreign government
involvement. Part three analyzes the impact of the law on specific arrangements such as exports, imports, licenses, ownership of foreign enterprises, and the impact of international and foreign antitrust law. Part
four looks at the process of administration of the law including allocation
of enforcement responsibility, investigations and discovery, and sanctions
and remedies. The final section considers possible adjustments to the antitrust law for American business.
The book is intended to guide attorneys through foreign litigation
and includes suggested legal arguments and approaches to problems. In-
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formation is provided as well on how to anticipate government and court
reaction to proposed business transactions.
James R. Atwood is currently a partner in the law firm of Covington
and Burling, Washington, DC. He recently served as acting professor at
Stanford University and as Deputy Assistant Secretary and Deputy Legal
Advisor for the United States Department of State.
Kingman Brewster is a former United States Ambassador to the
United Kingdom and has served as professor at Harvard Law School and
as President of Yale University. He is a member of numerous national
boards and commissions, and is counsel in the firm of Winthrop, Stimson,
Putnam, and Roberts, New York.

BUTLER, W.E. (editor), INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE; Sijthoff and Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands

(1980); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff and Noordhoff, Germantown,
Maryland; $50.00 (cloth); ISBN 90-286-0089-2, LC 79-90515; vii; 315 p.,
footnotes, selective bibliography, index.
This book is an attempt to apply the comparative method to more
fully understand the international legal order and its relationship to other
legal systems or families of legal systems by enlarging the area of common
principles and practices and by devising bases for adjustment, harmonization, standardization, and cooperation. It is a collection of essays, all of
which date from within the last forty years.
The collection begins with material by the late Professor H.C. Gutteridge who held the Chair of Comparative Law at Cambridge University.
Professor Gutterridge was very skeptical of the use of comparative law in
the international arena. The essays which follow discuss, inter alia, the
contribution of comperative law, the theory and practice of private international law, and the comparative approach to the history of international law. Essays by such reknowned international scholars as Myres
S. McDougal, Georg Schwarzenberger and A.M. Connelly are included,
along with those of the editor. The concern of all the essays with the
exception of the one by Professor Gutteridge is not whether to use comparative law but how, when, and where to use it.
The essays presented in this volume collectively suggest that despite
one's understanding of the nature of the international system, comparison
is essential to illuminate essential aspects of its structure and operation
and its relationship to other legal orders, either existing or theoretical,
past or present. It is an attempt to illustrate that comparative legal
study is essential for an adequate training an international law.
The editor, William E. Butler, has shown great interest in the area of
comparative law as it relates to international legal studies. In 1968-1970
he collaborated with Professors R.R. Baxter, H.J. Berman, J.A. Cohen,
and H. Chin at Harvard Law School, where he offered a course on

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 10:397

"Soviet, Chinese, and Western Approaches to International Law." He was
also a Scholar in Residence at the Villa Serbelloni in 1977. Many of his
essays appear in this volume.

CROSSWELL, C.M., LEGAL AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL

BusiNEss; Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York (1980);
ISBN 0-379-20683-6 LC80-14900; ix, 350 p.
This book outlines a suggested procedure for the prospective investor
in international business transactions to maximize potential profits and
avoid latent and apparent disadvantages. Discussion centers on the best
available corporate structures, financial aids, and restrictions placed on
foreign businesses entering foreign fields. The illusory nature of incentive
programs is examined. Common market anti-trust laws and the extraterritorial effect of U.S. antitrust doctrine are evaluated with respect to impact on developing subsidiaries abroad.
General guidelines are suggested to evaluate the above factors with
respect to the experience of ventures already established. In order to ascertain the time value of operating an enterprise under the laws of foreign
states, the author asserts that attention must be focuses on these
specifics:
(1) Incentives in the form of foreign tax deferral or profits. The net
effect of any incentive provision should be carefully examined. For example, depreciation rates lose their advantage when given at the same time a
tax holiday is given, if they cannot be carried forward. An excess profits
tax may be imposed after tax deferral on ordinary income, thereby defeating the original tax concession. In addition to examining tax incentives in their composite form and for factual impact, tax imposition structures should be understood. Negotiation with government authorities may
be a possibility to control taxation levels imposed on a new foreign
corporation.
(2) Interaction of the foreign taxation structure with the U.S. tax system. The author offers an analysis of the main principles to be followed
when setting up a foreign corporation so that problems do not arise when
complying with the Revenues Codes of 1962 and 1976. Discussion focuses
on sections 269, 367, and 1491, and the imposition of excise taxes and
taxation of appreciation of assets.
(3) Exchange rate systems and restrictions on repatriation of original
investment profits. The effect of multiple currency systems on the problem of exchange restrictions is examined in light of foreign guarantees of
currency convertibility. The value of U.S. (OPIC) guarantees as a back-up
to local foreign guarantees is emphasized.
In addition to analysing the above factors, the discussion turns to the
businessperson's treaty position, the patent and trade secret position, and
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the status of a stockholder in a foreign corporation operating under foreign law. Identifying and assessing the substantial and varying consequences arising from the choice of a corporate vehicle are the main thrust
of the book.
Professor Carol Crosswell teaches international business law at the
Nova University Law Center.

FINER, S.E. (editor), FIvE CONSTITUTIONS; The Harvester Press Limited, 16 Ship Street, Brighton, Sussex, England (1979); distributed in the
U.S. by Humanities Press, Inc., Atlantic Highlands, NJ 07716; (1979);
$30.00 (cloth); ISBN 0-391-00967-2; 349 P.; analytical and alphabetical
indices.
This volume was conceived and is designed to serve as a handbook
for all those involved in the study of modern government. Its core consists of the full texts of the constitutions of the United States, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the Fifth French Republic, and the 1936 and
1977 constitutions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The editor introduces the book with comments on the study of comparative constitutional law. Specifically, the topics examined are: "On the
Comparative Study of Constitutions"; "On whether Constitutions Matter"; "On the Variety Among Constitutions"; and "On the Constitution of
Britain."
Two indices follow the text. The first is analytical; the components of
government are broken down into the major categories commonly used by
political scientists, and the contents of the five constitutions are crossindexed accordingly. The second index is traditional: topics are listed in
alphabetical order, but in such a way that cross comparison between the
constitutional provisions of the four countries is possible.
Another feature of the book is that it provides easy access to the
principles of the unwritten British Constitution. A pr6cis of the main features is incorporated in the introduction. In the main text, laymen's language and wording borrowed from other written constitutions is used.
In the case of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, the official translations of the constitutions are used. The editor
presents his own translation of the Fifth French Republic Constitution,
arguing that the semi-official English language version is unsatisfactory.
S.E. Finer is a professor at All Souls College, Oxford.

GEE, S., TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES;
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands (1979);
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$35.00, ISBN 90-286-0038-8; xiii, 450 p.; appendix, list of participants.
Published proceedings of an international conference on technology
transfer in industrialized countries, Estoril, Portugal, Nov. 7-11, 1977,
sponsored by NATO and the U.S. Departments of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force.
This volume presents the official record of an international conference on technology transfer in industrialized countries. The conference
was attended by 128 participants from eighteen countries, including representatives from national and international defense establishments, civilian institutions, and industrial organizations. The primary purpose of the
conference was to exchange and develop ideas and techniques regarding
technology transfer within the Western industrialized world.
The recorded presentations and discussions reflect a wide range of
topics, including politicals, economic, legal social and human behavioral
as well as military considerations as part of the overall subject of technology transfer. The common theme of all these interests is the need to increase the sharing of technology for socioeconomic progress and common
defense needs. Despite the apparent diversity of subject matter, there is
a significant degree of interdependence among the various perspectives.
For example, policy incentives for industrial innovation affect national
capacities for research and development which in turn affect cooperative
development and coproduction issues.
Part I of the book contains the transcripts of the conference discussions and prepared presentations. Part H contains the record of the panel
discussions. A Chairmen's Panel, consisting of the session chairmen serving as panelists to review and summarize their sessions and to present
their own views. Included in the Chairmen's Panel section is the summary
report of the Conference Rapporteur, Dr. B.J.A. Bard. In addition, the
results of a questionnaire distributed to all participants are reproduced
and discussed in the appendix.
Dr. Sherman Gee is an official at the Naval Surface Weapons Center
in Silver Spring, Maryland.

HAWK, B.E., UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRusT: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE; Law and Business, Inc./Harcourt

Brace Jovanovich, 757 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10017 (1979);
$75.00 (cloth); ISBN 0-15003-973-5, LC 79-14899; xv, 946 p.; footnotes;
appendices, table of foreign and United States cases, general index.
This book, the outgrowth of a set of materials used in seminars, emphasizes source materials of primary importance for an understanding of
the issues involved in international antitrust. Among the source materials
cited are foreign and United States statutes, regulations and excerpts
from decisions, and official pronouncements such as the Justice Depart-
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ment's Antitrust Guide for International Operations. The materials are
important to underscore the proliferation of trade laws and enforcement
agencies operating in the international trade area. This proliferation
ranges from the application of traditional antitrust laws such as the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts, to arrangements occurring largely outside the United States and involving foreign parties.
Foreign competition legislation and enforcement has grown significantly
in the last two decades, with the European Communities, West Germany,
and the United Kingdom developing a substantial body of statutory, judicial, and administrative rules. Developing countries outside Western Europe and some socialist-bloc countries have also developed varying types
of competition rules.
The book is not intended to provide an overall intellectual framework for the study of competition principles in the operation of international trade. Rather, it focuses on a narrower examination of existing and
proposed legal rules. The author's goal is to provide an analysis of primary and secondary materials in order to provide the reader with a working familitarity with the relevant issues.
The volume is organized in three parts. Part 1 discusses the application of United States antitrust and related trade laws with respect to the
formulation and execution of a general foreign economic policy. Consideration is given to a background of differing and sometimes conflicting national policies and interests.
Part 2 examines the highly developed foreign system of competition
rules and enforcement of the EEC. This part contains comparative materials to illuminate differences and similarities between the antitrust regimes of the United States and the EEC.
Part 3, which deals with both restrictive business practices and the
regulation of technology transfers, is intended to be introductory. This
part addresses international codes and guidelines, developing country legislation and enforcement, international cooperation, and mechanisms for
conflict resolution in antitrust.
Professor Hawk teaches international transactions at Fordham University School of Law.

t
Kuusi, J., THE HOST STATE AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION;
Saxon House, Teakfield Limited, Westmead, Farnborough, Hampshire,
England (1979); ISBN 0-566-00249-3; xvi, 177 P.; footnotes, select bibliography, index of cases, index. Introduction by Gabriel M. Wilner.
The contractual relationship between the host state and the transnational corporation serves as the central theme of this book's inquiry and
analysis. Specifically, the author examines contracts between developing
countries and transnational corporations in basic sectors, such as the ex-
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ploitation of natural resources. These contractual arrangements have
often been perceived as guarantees or standards of protection for the economic interests of the foreign transnational enterprise different and often
greater than those provided under the domestic law of the host state. In
the area of economic relations, international law has emphasized the responsibility of the host state to protect the property of foreign enterprises. Theories following this approach present reasons why contracts
between host states and transnational corporations ought to be "internationalized" or "denationalized," and therefore ought not be governed by
the national law of the host state. On the other hand, developing countries have responded to this approach by applying the law of the state
party to the contract, in an attempt to protect their own vital national
interests.
The author offers a discussion of several different approaches to the
problem of determining the applicable law for contracts between states
and foreign enterprises. Under "the comparative approach," various national legal systems are examined and a composite of these legal systems
or one system other than that of the state party to the contract is applied.
Another technique involves the insertion of choice of law provisions into
multilaterally accepted uniform rules on arbitration. A further approach
is the development of specific international standards through multilateral treaties, which states parties to particular treaties agree to enact into
national law. This last approach has been followed in the drafting of
Codes of Conduct for transnational corporations in United Nations bodies
and in organizations such as OECD.
Juha Kuusi, an official of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
has participated in a number of intergovernmental negotiations on transnational corporations.

NANYENYA-TAKIRAMBUDDE,

P.,

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INTERNA-

Praeger Publishers, CBS Educational and Professional Publishing, 521 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10017 (1980); $18.95 (cloth);
ISBN 0-03-047531-7; LC 79-23571; x, 177 p., end notes. Written under
the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.
TIONAL LAW;

This book offers an analysis of the legal aspects of technology transfer. It begins with an overview of the fundamental legal issues, and then
introduces the process of technology production by noting that the process primarily involves an interaction between multinational corporations
and nation states. The author asserts that technology production and
transfer is carried out within a particular administrative, political, and
legal framework; this framework governs and regulates information resources. He portrays the international legal process as a dynamic and
malleable entity by focusing on its structure and the process itself, rather
than formal rules of law. He also presents the counterclaims offered by
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those seeking to change present institutions and international regimes in
this area. In this regard he identifies the claimants and describes what
specifically they seek to change.
In a review of the evolution of international and national regimes relating to the production, promotion, and distribution of information, the
Paris Convention is discussed at length. The author then examines the
Third World's response to the existing regimes for protection of industrial and intellectual property, as well as the conditions in these regimes
and processes that give rise to increased group and national control over
information resources. He examines the traditional justifications for the
existing regimes, and appraises the trends in the decisionmaking process
in this area, emphasizing Third World control in response to the preferential criteria for decisionmaking. Finally, he attempts to project the future course of the legal process and the factors that will have to be
considered.
The author, a former Jones Warburg Fellow at Yale and Compton
Research Fellow at Princeton, is currently a lecturer at the University of
Botswana and Swaziland.
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H.D., INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT LIABILrTY: A STUDY OF COMINTERNATIONAL

LEGAL ASPECTS

OF PRODUCT

LIABILITY;

Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The
Netherlands (1979); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Germantown, MD; $42.50 (cloth); ISBN 90-286-0469-3, LC 79-64913; English
edition; xx, 433 p.; footnotes, bibliography, summary, table of cases, index
of terms.
This book addresses the problem of product liability in international
law, utilizing a comparative approach to survey the laws of six major industrialized nations-the United States, Canada, Great Britain, West
Germany, France, and the Netherlands-which support vast consumer
markets.
The expansion of products liability primarily in the industrialized
nations has been connected with the availability of liability insurance.
Historically, the United States was considered to be the birthplace of the
concept because of its mass production lines which were able to distribute
large quantities of goods to consumers for the first time. It was not until
after the Second World War that the concepts developed in U.S. law had
a significant influence on Western Europe. These countries have approached the problem using the categories of production flaws, design defects, and inadequate user information as guidance in developing their
own specific categorizations. The laws of all six nations provide remedies
to victims of defective products either solely in contract, solely in tort, or
some other variation.
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The book also examines the problem of liability insurance, especially
the territorial aspects of insurance coverage, in order to determine
whether these aspects might affect choice of law. As a final point, products liability as a legal problem is part of a larger problem of productrelated accidents in general. The issue of how to prevent accidents in the
first place has many more aspects-politico-legal, social, economic-than
the one issue of civil liability.
H.D. Tebbens is Head of the Department for Private International
Law and Commercial Arbitration, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague,
and is also a practitioner in Rotterdam.

WESTLING, A.H., WARFARE IN A FRAGILE WORLD; published by Taylor
& Francis Ltd., 10-14 Macklin Street, London WC2B 5NF (1980); distributed in the U.S. by Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 3 East 44th St., New
York 10017; ISBN 0-848-1344-3; LC 79-20421; xiv, 249 p., (bibliography),
tables, appendices. Third in a series of SIPRI (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute) studies relating to the impact of warfare on the
environment.
This book examines the extent to which warfare and other military
activities contribute to the degradation of the world environment. It examines each of the world's environmental regions in terms of their human
occupancy and utilization in order to illustrate their vulnerability to military disruption. The book begins by discussing man's use and abuse of
the earth. This overview is preceded by a brief summary of modern warfare and weaponry. The author then focuses on the effect of military activities on the temperate regions of the world, noting that this habitat has
been substantially modified by these activities. The effect on the tropical
areas of the world is examined, as well as the impact on the desert regions. Desert areas, the author notes, are extremely vulnerable, as warfare
exacerbates the process of desertification. This is contrasted with the impact of military activities in the arctic regions which have a high ecological fragility. The oceanic islands are examined, especially their importance for economic and strategic purposes. The author points out that a
number of environmentally disruptive wars have already been fought in
these areas in this century. Finally, the book focuses on the impact of
military activities on the global environment as a whole, concluding that
man must take steps to desist from these destructive activities in order to
preserve the world environment.
Dr. Arthur H. Westing wrote this work while he was a senior research
fellow at SIPRI. He is currently Professor of Ecology and Dean of the
School of Natural Science Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts.

